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Most academics agree that search and seizure jurisprudence is a
“mess.” Professor Luna proposes a new approach to the Fourth
Amendment founded on a sovereignty-based theory of the Constitu-
tion. Under this individual rights model, a government search or sei-
zure of an individual’s home or body receives the strongest presump-
tion of invalidity. This presumption, he argues, could only be rebutted
in three discrete circumstances: (1) consent by the individual to search
his home or body; (2) individualized suspicion of wrongdoing; or (3)
real, direct, and substantial threats to the sovereignty of other persons.
Apart from these exceptions, governmental intrusions into the body
and home are beyond the boundaries of official authority. Professor
Luna contrasts the individual rights model with what he calls an anti-
discrimination approach to the Fourth Amendment, which focuses on
group participation in the political process rather than coercive effects
on the individual. He identifies an important flaw in the antidiscrimi-
nation model: the lack of a constitutional floor protecting individuals
and constraining government. Professor Luna’s individual rights
model provides content to that constitutional floor—tangible zones of
individual sovereignty.
INTRODUCTION
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence needs to be overhauled. A
mere tune-up will not do. Vacillating interpretations have left scraps
of search and seizure law randomly strewn across the legal landscape.
The Supreme Court has valiantly attempted to keep the machinery
up and running, tinkering with new approaches and bending the
rules. But each doctrine is more duct tape on the Amendment’s
† Fellow and Lecturer-in-Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful for the
comments of Albert Alschuler, Markus Dubber, and Stephen Schulhofer, and for the discus-
sions I have had with Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares.
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frame and a step closer to the junkyard. Sometimes the most difficult
thing for the mechanic to do is concede that repair is not possible and
begin the reconstruction process.
Academics of all stripes agree that search and seizure law is a
“mess”1 and have offered their own fix-it guides for the Fourth
Amendment. Peering over the Justices’ shoulders, some scholars
point to various parts of the law that should be tightened up or re-
placed. Others argue that the Court just needs to change its perspec-
tive to spot the structural cracks and the jurisprudential leaks. This
scholarship fills countless articles, books, and treatises, providing
blueprints for impassioned debate in legal circles.2 But these works
fail to realize that the Fourth Amendment is not a self-contained unit
but part of a much larger machine—the Constitution. Few critics
have attempted to link search and seizure law with modern constitu-
tional theory;3 most present schemes that are descriptive of the
Court’s jurisprudence or prescriptive within a doctrinal niche known
as criminal procedure. They fail to unite Fourth Amendment law
with any larger theoretical justification.
What is needed is a new jurisprudential engine connected to con-
temporary constitutional thought. But rather than monolithic for-
malisms, potential theories should be viewed as distinct interpretive
frameworks founded on unified principles. In other words, scholar-
ship should focus on constructing theoretical “models” of the Fourth
Amendment. One possible model is grounded in a political process
1. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
759 (1994); Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits
of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 334 (1973) (describing search and seizure law as so uncertain
and incomprehensible “that it deprives any sanction of a meaningful chance to control con-
duct”); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitu-
tional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 20 (1988) (noting “virtual unanimity” among observers that the
Court has bungled search and seizure law).
2. Seminal works on the Fourth Amendment include WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (3d ed. 1996); JACOB W. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL IN-
TERPRETATION (1966); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937); TELFORD TAYLOR,
TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Per-
spectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974).
3. See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L.
REV. 747, 763 (1991) (“Anyone pondering the constitutional justification for the modern crimi-
nal procedure revolution cannot help but be struck by the utter poverty of the scholarly litera-
ture.”); Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 1, at 21 (“[V]irtually no work has been done on
the implications that modern constitutional theory holds for fourth amendment questions.”).
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theory of the Constitution.4 This interpretation holds that the consti-
tutional framework in general and criminal procedure guarantees in
particular are concerned with fair process rather than individual sub-
stantive rights. Majority rule is the fundamental feature of American
democracy and should be deferred to unless equal representation is
denied or law enforcement costs are concentrated on a discrete mi-
nority. This approach generates what I call an antidiscrimination
model of the Fourth Amendment, focusing on group participation in
the political process. A citizen cannot complain if his voice can be
heard and the relevant community internalizes the costs of a search
and seizure policy.
The primary vice of the antidiscrimination model is its failure to
provide a constitutional floor protecting individuals and constraining
government. If the political majority wants to reside in a police state
marked by absolute power to search and seize, the model poses no
barrier so long as the burden is shared by the entire community. A
surveillance society seems unthinkable to most at this particular mo-
ment in history, but bad government is not built in a day. It comes
through slight shifts in power and gentle encroachments on individual
rights—a form of creeping oppression that would go unnoticed and
unstopped by the antidiscrimination model.
A second model of the Fourth Amendment can be constructed
from a theory of individual sovereignty, protecting personal zones of
autonomy that may not be invaded by government. The sovereign in-
dividual is an independent moral agent, unaccountable to political
majorities. He is the ultimate and final source of authority within his
domain, making choices and enacting personal policies at will. The
citizen is subject to the laws of society outside his boundaries, but
within the borders of personal sovereignty the state must accede. This
individual rights model fits the constitutional text, context, and
precedents while providing a theoretical justification that unifies
post-Enlightenment philosophy and American constitutionalism.
And unlike the political process approach, the individual rights
model sustains a constitutional baseline of rights that are beyond the
reach of government.
The question of which model is more consistent with the Consti-
tution and the philosophical underpinnings of our nation echoes the
perennial debate between individual liberty and societal order: Does
society need to be protected from the selfish citizen? Or does the in-
4. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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dividual need a safe harbor from the tyranny of the majority? The
abstract answer involves a little bit of both. But if history is any indi-
cator, society in fact possesses more than adequate means to ensure
the public good. It is the individual, unique in style and substance,
who must be secure from forced conformity. Although the antidis-
crimination model generally serves both the singular citizen and col-
lective society, there are times when the political process functions
“properly” but driven by sheer emotion rather than calm delibera-
tion. Only an individual rights model of the Fourth Amendment pro-
vides inviolable protection against intemperate decisionmaking.
Open discussion and compromise leading to an ultimate vote
are, of course, the hallmarks of a prosperous society. And in most
situations, the political majority can be expected to do the right thing.
But the Constitution was not designed for times when the general
public can be trusted. A written charter in such circumstances is
largely superfluous; express and implicit majoritarian devices are of-
ten equally successful at smoking out the best resolution. The true
mettle of government is tested when the exigencies of the day raise
public passions to a boil and individual rights seem too expensive to
retain.
The purpose of this Article is to develop these two competing
models from the ground up and then take them out for a constitu-
tional test drive. In Part I, I describe the theoretical battle over the
Fourth Amendment and the resulting chaos in search and seizure ju-
risprudence. Part II provides a brief overview of constitutional theory
and considers the promise of modeling. Part III derives an antidis-
crimination model of the Fourth Amendment from political process
scholarship. In Part IV, I construct an individual rights model of the
Fourth Amendment based on a sovereignty theory of the Constitu-
tion. And in Part V, I run the models through the gauntlet of suspi-
cionless searches and seizures to confirm their relative merits and
limitations.
I. A TALE OF TWO CLAUSES
The current state of search and seizure law reflects an ongoing
war of linguistic interpretation. The first clause of the Fourth
Amendment (the Reasonableness Clause) generally prohibits
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“unreasonable searches and seizures.”5 The second clause (the War-
rant Clause) outlines the requirements for a valid warrant, expressly
noting the necessary level of suspicion and the specific information
that must be provided. The comma between the two Clauses, how-
ever, has become a virtual Mason-Dixon line. How the Clauses are to
interact, if at all, is the central question that divides judges and schol-
ars.6
The “conjunctive” interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
holds that the two Clauses should be read together, shedding light on
one another.7 Searches and seizures, according to this view, are pre-
sumptively unreasonable without a warrant based on probable cause.8
Except for a few “jealously and carefully drawn” exceptions,9 war-
rantless searches and seizures violate the Fourth Amendment, and
their fruits must be suppressed in subsequent court proceedings. Ju-
dicial analysis under this interpretation is relatively straightforward:
courts should look only at whether the search was conducted pursu-
ant to a warrant based on probable cause or a recognized exception
to the warrant requirement.10
5. The full text states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
6. See generally Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment’s Two Clauses, 26 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1389-90 (1989) (discussing literal and historical approaches to the rela-
tionship between the Clauses).
7. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (“[I]t is by now axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of ‘unreasonable
searches and seizures’ is to be read in conjunction with its command that ‘no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause.’”); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315
(1972) (holding that the definition of “reasonableness” turns in part on the specific commands
of the Warrant Clause); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately
Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173,
1178-79 (1988) (noting that the conjunctive interpretation has been the conventional view
among scholars and judges); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing
the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 417-18 (1988) [hereinafter Sundby, A
Return to Fourth Amendment Basics] (proposing a “composite model” under which the two
Clauses work in tandem to achieve the Fourth Amendment’s broader purposes).
8. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted out-
side the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.”).
9. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
10. Exceptions to the warrant requirement include, inter alia, searches incident to valid
arrests, see, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 220-22 (1973) (upholding pat-down
search of defendant arrested for driving after revocation of permit); searches and seizures of
items in plain view, see, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 472 (1971) (outlining
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In contrast, the “disjunctive” interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment maintains that the two Clauses are distinct.11 Under this
view, the specific requirements of the Warrant Clause—in particular,
the prerequisite of probable cause—apply only to warrant-based ac-
tivity.12 Warrantless searches and seizures are not necessarily invalid
but need only be reasonable.13 Pursuant to the disjunctive interpreta-
tion, courts must conduct a context-sensitive inquiry into “the total
atmosphere” of a particular case.14 This analysis requires judicial bal-
ancing of the individual’s interest in constitutional protection against
the government’s interest in conducting the search.15
Currently, neither interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is
the clear jurisprudential victor.16 One might argue that the conjunc-
tive view remains the law of the land, pointing to the unequivocal
                                                                                                                                     
the plain view exception but refusing to apply it in the case of a car outside defendant’s house,
since police had ample opportunity to obtain a warrant); searches and seizures in exigent cir-
cumstances, see, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (approving of seizure of finger-
nail samples without a warrant, given the destructibility of the evidence); and searches based
on voluntary consent, see, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (affirming
conviction where the state demonstrated that defendant voluntarily consented to search of car).
See generally California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (listing
exceptions to the warrant requirement).
11. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
FIRST PRINCIPLES 3-20 (1997); TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 43 (arguing that the Framers did not
intend “reasonableness” to include the requirements of the Warrant Clause in all cases).
12. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (“[A] warrant is not
required to establish the reasonableness of all government searches; and when a warrant is not
required (and the Warrant Clause therefore not applicable), probable cause is not invariably
required either.”).
13. See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 581 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment “merely prohibits searches and seizures that are ‘unreasonable’”). Chief Justice
Rehnquist has been a primary champion of the disjunctive interpretation. See Robbins v. Cali-
fornia, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The terms of the Amendment
simply mandate that the people be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, and that
any warrants which may issue shall only issue upon probable cause.”); Steagald v. United
States, 451 U.S. 204, 224 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that reasonableness, not
the existence of a warrant, is the ultimate standard).
14. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
15. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53 (“[W]hether a particular search meets the reason-
ableness standard ‘is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989))).
16. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring) (contending that the Court has
“lurched back and forth” between the two interpretations); James J. Tomkovicz, California v.
Acevedo: The Walls Close in on the Warrant Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1104
(1992) (arguing that the Court seems unable to decide whether the warrant requirement “is or
is not a constitutional command”).
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language of recent search and seizure decisions.17 But on close exami-
nation, it becomes obvious that the Court’s allegiance is more lip
service than reality.18 The disjunctive theory has made substantial in-
roads into search and seizure law, creating the aforementioned doc-
trinal mess. In particular, two systemic changes have enshrined
“reasonableness” as the defining attribute of a vast body of Fourth
Amendment law.
A. Katz and “Reasonable Expectations of Privacy”
Beginning with the 1967 decision in Katz v. United States,19 the
Supreme Court moved from a property-based conception20 of the
Fourth Amendment to a privacy-based interpretation, holding that
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”21 The new
17. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (“Time and again, this Court has
observed that ‘searches . . . conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting
Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984) (per curiam))).
18. See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468,
1475 (1985) (“By its continued adherence to the warrant requirement in theory, though not in
fact, the Court has sown massive confusion among the police and lower courts.”); William J.
Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 882 (1991) (observing
that the Court “regularly narrows the range of cases to which the warrant requirement applies,
so that in practice warrants are the exception rather than the rule”).
19. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz had been convicted of gambling charges based on his phone
call from a public telephone booth. Federal agents had recorded the conversation by attaching
a listening device to the outside of the booth. See id. at 348.
20. Until the late 1960s, search and seizure analysis focused solely on concepts of property.
A physical intrusion into a “constitutionally protected area” was required before government
activity would be deemed a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961). This so-called “trespass doctrine” was more than adequate to
protect individuals in a pre-technological agrarian society; searches prior to the turn of the cen-
tury uniformly required some form of physical intrusion. See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a
Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 557 (1990). But the advent of
electronic surveillance demonstrated the limitations of a Fourth Amendment strictly grounded
in the law of property. Wiretapping phone lines, for example, was constitutional because no
physical intrusion was made into a protected area. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
465 (1928). But inserting a microphone into a wall was considered a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment because of the physical trespass into the structure. See Silverman,
365 U.S. at 512. A constitutional right that turned on antiquated notions of property was highly
manipulable and could provide sporadic protection at best.
21. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. Professor Albert Alschuler has made a powerful argument that
Katz added privacy as a measure of constitutionality without displacing the prevailing prop-
erty-based conception: “Much of the trepidation that scholars have voiced concerning Katz
may stem from a failure to recognize that Katz supplemented earlier visions of fourth amend-
ment protections but did not supplant them.” Albert W. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and
the Fourth Amendment, 1983 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 7 n.12.
Luna to Printer.doc                   04/29/99 4:49 PM
794 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [48:787
touchstone of search and seizure analysis safeguards conversations
whispered in the public cafe but not words screamed out the bed-
room window.22 In particular, the Fourth Amendment protects “an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reason-
able.”23 According to this interpretation, like the disjunctive interpre-
tation, warrantless surveillance should be judged under the mantra of
reasonableness.
The Katz formula was clearly intended to provide individuals
with a high level of protection against governmental surveillance.24
But in an ironic twist, Katz has been used to constrict Fourth
Amendment rights rather than expand them. “Reasonableness”
might be the law’s greatest waffle word, allowing courts to hedge
their bets or duck principled analysis. In the criminal procedure con-
text, a reasonableness standard is flexible and simple, but also ma-
nipulable, terribly ambiguous, and subject to inconsistency.25 The
Fourth Amendment reasonableness test contains the vice of degen-
erative self-definition, with each unimpeded intrusion providing a
new baseline against which all subsequent modes of government sur-
22. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected.”) (citations omitted).
23. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). This is actually the second part of
the two-prong test originally articulated by Justice Harlan in his Katz concurrence. Individuals
are afforded constitutional protection when: (1) they demonstrate a subjective expectation of
privacy, and (2) society recognizes that expectation as reasonable. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring). Although scholars have demonstrated that the first prong is legal non-
sense, see Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 384 (noting that adherence to the first prong would al-
low the government to “diminish each person’s subjective expectation of privacy merely by an-
nouncing half-hourly on television that . . . we were all forthwith being placed under electronic
surveillance”); Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment: “Second to None in the Bill of
Rights,” 75 ILL. B.J. 424, 427 (1987) (“The first of these two requirements certainly deserves no
place in a theory of what the Fourth Amendment protects.”), the second prong has flourished
as the threshold test of Fourth Amendment coverage.
24. See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 385 (“Katz is important for its rejection of several
limitations upon the operation of the amendment.”); Lewis R. Katz, supra note 20, at 560-63
(1990) (observing that Katz “provided a framework for ensuring freedom by protecting per-
sonal security”); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
Between Government and Citizens?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1756 (1994) [hereinafter Sundby,
“Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment] (arguing that Katz extends the Fourth Amendment’s scope
to protect against an array of intrusions that would not fall within its literal meaning).
25. See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 414-15 (arguing that “unreasonableness . . . is obvi-
ously much too amorphous either to guide or to regulate the police”).
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veillance will be measured. As a test, it provides a near-perfect boot-
strap for incrementally more intrusive police actions.26
B. Administrative Searches, Brief Detentions, and Special Needs
A second systemic change in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
began within a year of the Katz decision. The Supreme Court crafted
two doctrines that rejected a strict conjunctive reading of the Fourth
Amendment and set the stage for a partial adoption of the disjunctive
interpretation.27 Both attempted to toe the line of past precedents,
but their adherence to the dictates of the Warrant Clause was largely
superficial, and their progeny demonstrated that initial allusions to
the conjunctive interpretation of the Fourth Amendment were win-
dow dressing. In the end, a new hybrid doctrine unequivocally re-
jected the conjunctive interpretation.
1. Administrative Searches. Beginning with Camara v. Superior
Court,28 the Supreme Court constructed a special doctrine for
“administrative searches.”29 Although the Camara Court clung to the
warrant requirement, it expressly rejected the need for any predicate
of individualized suspicion in administrative searches based on a
litany of factors.30 Administrative inspection schemes were judged
under a reasonableness test, balancing the individual’s privacy
interests against the government’s interests in conducting the
search.31 Five years later, the Court completely dispensed with the
warrant requirement in the administrative search context, confirming
26. See infra notes 190-219 and accompanying text.
27. See Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (articulating the “brief detention” doc-
trine); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967) (articulating the “administrative
search” doctrine).
28. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
29. Id. at 534. In Camara, the Court examined routine, areawide building inspections by
city health and safety officials. The defendant’s conviction for refusing to allow the inspection
was overturned because the officials had failed to seek a warrant after consent was withheld.
See id. at 534. Nonetheless, Camara overruled Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which
had held that Fourth Amendment interests were not implicated by administrative inspections.
See Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 (overruling Frank).
30. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 538. The factors were: the presence of a neutral administrative
scheme; the long history of judicial and public acceptance of such schemes; the compelling in-
terest in preventing urban catastrophes; the absence of less-restrictive alternatives; the non-
personal, non-criminal nature of the inspection; and the limited invasion of individual privacy.
See id. at 535-37.
31. See id. (“[T]here can be no ready test for reasonableness other than by balancing the
need to search again the invasion which the search entails.”).
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its retreat from the conjunctive reading of the Fourth Amendment.32
Subsequent cases disregarded each of the elements found to be
essential to the Camara decision.33 By invoking an arguably
administrative or regulatory purpose, the government can now avoid
warrant and probable cause requirements even when the search
results in a criminal prosecution.34 The label placed on the search,
therefore, will often determine whether the conjunctive or disjunctive
interpretation controls the case.35
2. Brief Detentions. One year after Camara, the Court con-
fronted the issue of warrantless investigatory detentions in Terry v.
Ohio.36 In upholding the police technique commonly known as a
“stop and frisk,” the Terry Court refused to apply the strictures of the
Warrant Clause and instead adopted the reasonableness balancing
test as the appropriate mode of inquiry.37 Because the governmental
interests in safety and crime prevention outweighed the individual’s
privacy interests,38 the scale tipped against the warrant and probable
cause requirements. Government officials could conduct warrantless
investigative detentions based on a “reasonable suspicion” of wrong-
doing, a less demanding standard than probable cause.39
32. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972).
33. This has not gone unremarked. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment
Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 93-107 (1989) (detailing the case-by-
case dilution of Camara). The Court has approved warrantless search schemes in a variety of
regulated businesses. See Biswell, 406 U.S. at 317 (licensed firearms); Donovan v. Dewey, 452
U.S. 594 (1981) (underground and surface mines); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 708
(1987) (automobile junkyards).
34. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 725 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state had used
an administrative scheme as a pretext to search a junkyard for evidence of criminal violations
without probable cause).
35. Cf. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics, supra note 7, at 408 (arguing that
“the government retains inordinate power to dictate which fourth amendment standard ap-
plies”).
36. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The facts in Terry were as follows: after a police officer noticed that
three men appeared to be “casing” a store for a robbery, he approached the individuals, asked
for their identification, and patted them down. See id. at 6-7.
37. Id. at 20-21 (“[W]e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct . . . which histori-
cally has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subject to the warrant procedure.”).
38. See id. at 22-26. According to the Court, an investigative detention “constitutes a brief,
though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person.” Id. at 26.
39. See id. at 27 (concluding that police authority to search for weapons can be based on a
reasonable belief that felonious conduct is afoot, not whether probable cause exists to arrest
the individual for a crime).
LUNA TO PRINTER.DOC 04/29/99 4:49 PM
1999] SOVEREIGNTY AND SUSPICION 797
Terry maintained at least a minimal connection to the conjunc-
tive interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Although the reason-
able suspicion standard departs from the literal requirements of the
Warrant Clause and demands a lesser quantum of evidence than
probable cause, it nonetheless demands some form of individualized
suspicion. But a subsequent line of “minor seizures”40 cases rejected
even this tangential association with the conjunctive reading.41 In ap-
plying the reasonableness balancing test, the Court has generally
found weighty government interests served by brief detentions.42 The
intrusion on the countervailing privacy interests is often deemed rela-
tively minimal,43 allowing minor seizures to pass constitutional muster
without warrants or probable cause.
3. Special Needs. Camara and Terry represented initial breaks
from the conjunctive interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Their
direct and indirect progeny dismissed the prevailing view that
searches and seizures could only be conducted pursuant to a warrant
based on probable cause. Instead, the dictates of the Warrant Clause
presented but one option open to the government. In a variety of
contexts, officials could turn to the Reasonableness Clause to justify
their actions.
A new line of cases—collectively establishing the so-called spe-
cial needs doctrine—has been built on the foundation laid by Camara
and Terry.44 This doctrine shares with its predecessors a distaste for
40. Wayne R. LaFave, Computers, Urinals, and the Fourth Amendment: Confessions of a
Patron Saint, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2553, 2576 (1996).
41. For example, law enforcement may conduct warrantless, suspicionless checkpoint
stops of all vehicular traffic to check for illegal aliens. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 561-67 (1976) (illegal aliens); cf. Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,
455 (1990) (drunk drivers); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (explaining that road-
block stops would be permissible alternatives to random checks for documentation, which the
Court deemed unreasonable).
42. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 (noting the magnitude of the nation’s drunk driving problem);
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-57 (reasoning that highway checkpoints are the most effective
means of apprehending illegal aliens).
43. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-53 (reasoning that checkpoints generate less fear and surprise
than random stops); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557-60 (noting that random stops only involve
answering a few questions and possibly producing documentation).
44. The initial articulation of the special needs doctrine can be traced back to 1985. In
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), Justice Blackmun stated that “special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, [can] make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable.” Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The most remarkable aspect of the
T.L.O. decision, however, was not Blackmun’s legal rubric but the majority’s point of depar-
ture for its Fourth Amendment inquiry. The then-prevailing legal norm was to offer at least a
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the warrant and probable cause requirements of the conjunctive in-
terpretation. Yet unlike its precursors, the special needs doctrine
shares few of the bells and whistles that provide ostensible limita-
tions. An administrative or regulatory purpose is not the sine qua non
of constitutionality. The searches and seizures are often personal.
And the intrusions need not be brief. But the special needs cases
have adopted one defining characteristic of previous doctrines—the
reasonableness balancing test.
Special needs cases are defined by a few general characteristics.
As the title suggests, government must articulate a special need for
the search that goes beyond, and is arguably greater than, law en-
forcement prerogatives.45 Second, the warrant requirement must pro-
vide little constitutional protection and be excessively burdensome
and impractical in the context of the search.46 And finally, the officials
conducting the search must be unable to articulate probable cause or
comprehend the legal standard, or the probable cause requirement
must defeat the underlying purpose of the search itself.47 When the
                                                                                                                                     
passing reference to the conjunctive interpretation before moving on to a reasonableness bal-
ancing test. But the T.L.O. Court began its analysis with a disjunctive reading of the Fourth
Amendment, arguing that reasonableness was the primary issue rather than an alternate read-
ing of second choice. See id. at 337 (“[T]he underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is
always that searches and seizures be reasonable . . . [which] requires ‘balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails.’” (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967))). Ironically, the oft-quoted language in Justice Blackmun’s concur-
rence was intended to admonish the Court for “omit[ting] a crucial step,” that is, consideration
of the warrant and probable cause requirements. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring).
45. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (finding a special need in
protecting students and deterring drug use); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 666-67 (1989) (same as to preventing drug users from becoming customs agents);
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1989) (same as to prevent-
ing railroad accidents); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 (1987) (same as to rehabilitating
probationers); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (same as to ensuring supervision,
control, and efficient operation of the workplace); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (same as to main-
taining school discipline and security). Ensuring safety in the railroad industry, for example,
satisfies this criterion, even thought the government is trying to prevent locomotive catastro-
phes, not crime. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
46. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666-67 (reasoning that requiring a warrant for drug tests of
customs service employees would do little to protect privacy and would divert valuable agency
resources); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622 (reasoning that requiring a warrant before drug testing of
railroad employees would provide little additional protection); O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 722
(reasoning that requiring an employer to obtain a warrant before searching an employee’s of-
fice “would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business”); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340
(reasoning that requiring teachers to obtain warrants before searches “would unduly interfere
with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in schools”).
47. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668 (stating that the probable cause standard is unhelpful in
analyzing activities that seek to prevent hazardous conditions, since these “rarely generate ar-
LUNA TO PRINTER.DOC 04/29/99 4:49 PM
1999] SOVEREIGNTY AND SUSPICION 799
Court finds some semblance of these factors, it then moves on to the
reasonableness balancing test.48 But this final step is largely a formal-
ity; once a special need is found, the government almost always pre-
vails.49
II. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The preceding was but a brief overview of the unwieldy, confus-
ing, and uncouth state of search and seizure doctrine. Trying to un-
cover the rhyme or reason of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
seems fanciful to many. “Warrants are not required—unless they
are,” Professor Akhil Amar quips.50 “All searches and seizures must
be grounded in probable cause—but not on Tuesdays.”51 Sometimes
the disjunctive approach holds sway, other times the conjunctive in-
                                                                                                                                     
ticulable grounds for searching any particular place or person”); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628
(stressing that the railroad employees subject to testing could cause great human loss before
showing the signs of impairment necessary to give rise to probable cause); O’Connor, 480 U.S.
at 724-25 (“It is simply unrealistic to expect supervisors in most government agencies to learn
the subtleties of the probable cause standard.”).
48. The Court has suggested that the non-prosecutorial nature of a search may play a part
in the existence of special needs. See, e.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666. But this factor has been
ignored or flatly contradicted in other cases. See, e.g., Griffin, 483 U.S. at 868 (allowing a search
where the evidence was used to convict a probationer for possession of a firearm); T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 347-48 (upholding a search at school where the evidence was used for a delinquency
proceeding against a juvenile).
49. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Tellingly, each time the Court
has found that ‘special needs’ counseled ignoring the literal requirements of the Fourth
Amendment for such full-scale searches in favor of a formless and unguided ‘reasonableness’
balancing inquiry, it has concluded that the search in question satisfies that test.”). But see
Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1303-05 (1997) (finding a special need but striking down a
law that required candidates to pass a drug test to qualify for state office). The special needs
doctrine has been soundly criticized. Justice Brennan described it as “Rohrschach-like,” por-
tending “a dangerous weakening of the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to protect the pri-
vacy and security of our citizens.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The doc-
trine, argued Justice Marshall, turns search and seizure law into a “patchwork quilt.” Skinner,
489 U.S. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Even Justice Scalia, a noted advocate of law-and-
order policies, described a particular special needs case as “destructive of privacy and offensive
to personal dignity.” Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The harshest criticism,
as one might suspect, has come from legal commentators. See, e.g., Gerald S. Reamey, When
“Special Needs” Meet Probable Cause: Denying the Devil Benefit of the Law, 19 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 295, 299-300 (1992) (arguing that the “special needs” doctrine is flawed because it
requires the Court to interpret the Fourth Amendment in an ad hoc and unprincipled manner).
Each step of the doctrine—identification of a special need, determination of the interests in-
volved, application of the reasonableness balancing test—has been dissected and condemned.
Few seem to like the doctrine, other than some of those who occupy the highest court in the
land.
50. AMAR, supra note 11, at 1.
51. Id.
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terpretation reigns. But any regression analysis of Fourth Amend-
ment decisions is likely to uncover what criminal procedure scholars
have known for some time: the choice between the two interpreta-
tions will be founded on five votes rather than on principle.
The Court sometimes plays a game of semantics with the two
Clauses of the Fourth Amendment as though there were some deep
meaning yet to be discovered. In reality, the battle between the con-
junctive and the disjunctive interpretations is a red herring. The text
of the Constitution, of course, should be the origin for any interpreta-
tion. But that’s all it is—a starting point. Many constitutional provi-
sions, including the Fourth Amendment, are vaguely phrased and re-
quire content from some external source. The Constitution is clearly
concerned with official searches and seizures in particular and abu-
sive government conduct in general. But the text is light on the spe-
cifics. History often provides little help, with documentary evidence
being too fragmented or corrupted to provide insight into the original
meaning.52 And even if the Framers’ intent could be unearthed, the
question remains whether we should be guided by the dead hands of
men who lived in a universe vastly different from our own. This is a
particularly dubious proposition for the Fourth Amendment. “It is
bizarre,” Professors Silas Wasserstrom and L. Michael Seidman ar-
gue, “to focus on the precise language of the amendment in light of
the fact that the Framers themselves did not focus on it.”53 The pre-
cise wording and construction of the two Clauses were not purposeful
but seem to have resulted from an unnoticed drafting error by the
Framers.54
52. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documen-
tary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1986) (“To recover original intent from these records may
be an impossible hermeneutic assignment.”).
53. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 1, at 79.
54. Professors Wasserstrom and Seidman explain:
Congressman Benson, the chairman of the committee that arranged the amend-
ments, thought the amendment was too limited, and proposed that the phrase “by
warrants issued” be altered to read “and no warrant shall issue.” This proposal was
quickly voted down by the House of Representatives, but the persistent Benson ap-
parently smuggled his version back into the draft of the Bill of Rights that was sent to
the Senate, which accepted his language without any discussion or debate. And while
the state legislatures ratified the fourth amendment as currently written, it is doubtful
that many of those who voted paid close attention to the precise wording of the
fourth amendment, for it was, of course, ratified as part of a package consisting of the
first ten amendments. Thus, the language of the fourth amendment as we know it,
with its two clauses and the enduring uncertainty about the relationship between
them, did not receive from the Congress that proposed it anything like the attention
that has been lavished on it since. That language, it seems, is not a reliable guide to
the original intentions of the framers.
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The text and context of the Fourth Amendment cannot resolve
the dispute between conjunctive and disjunctive interpretations,55 and
the Supreme Court’s vacillation between the two views only confirms
the futility of such efforts. Yet that critical observation only begs the
question of what is to be done with the Fourth Amendment mess.
Once the doctrines are knocked down, something must be erected in
their place.
Legal scholars have submitted a variety of proposals to fill the
potential void.56 Many present simple yet powerful rubrics that could
be adopted without constitutional revolution.57 Some scholars ad-
vance elegant search and seizure theories grounded in legal philoso-
phy.58 Still others have offered fresh visions of the Fourth Amend-
ment by shifting the prevailing paradigm.59 All of these works
                                                                                                                                     
Id. at 80 (footnotes omitted); see also LANDYNSKI, supra note 2, at 41-42; LASSON, supra note
2, at 101-03.
55. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 1, at 80-81 (concluding that the history of the
Amendment leaves the dispute between the conjunctive and disjunctive interpretations unre-
solved).
56. See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment The-
ory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 203 (1993) (advocating a rule-based interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment as a replacement for the “malleable standard of reasonableness”); Katz, supra
note 20, at 555 (arguing for recognition of a new class of intrusions against which there would
be some constitutional protection); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for
Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (1983) (arguing that the Court’s Fourth
Amendment focus should be on the effect of its pronouncements on the innocent, not on the
guilty); Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 89 (proposing a revamping of the Court’s administrative
search doctrine); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 3 (1991) (setting aside the Fourth Amendment and constructing an approach to search
and seizure regulation from a blank slate); Strossen, supra note 7, at 1177 (arguing for reforms
of the Court’s Fourth Amendment balancing test); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Gov-
ernment Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 555 (1992) (advocating a
Fourth Amendment model based on contract principles); Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth
Amendment, supra note 24, at 1754-55 (arguing that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should
seek to foster reciprocal trust between the government and its citizens); Sundby, A Return to
Fourth Amendment Basics, supra note 7, at 385-86 (proposing a reinterpretation of the roles of
the two clauses and replacement of the reasonableness balancing test with a standard more pro-
tective of privacy).
57. Nadine Strossen, president of the ACLU, for example, has argued for the inclusion of
a “least intrusive alternative” component to Fourth Amendment analysis, a component which
is both consistent with other areas of constitutional law and suited for the judicial craft. See
Strossen, supra note 7, at 1208-09; see also Holly, supra note 56, at 540 (advocating the adop-
tion of a strict scrutiny standard in warrantless searches, including the imposition of a “least
intrusive alternative” requirement).
58. See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 56, at 203 (presenting a Fourth Amendment theory based
on “principled positivism”).
59. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 56 (envisioning an approach to search and seizure law in
the absence of the Fourth Amendment); Stuntz, supra note 56 (shifting the Fourth Amendment
model from tort law to contract law).
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undertake a clean-up job of massive proportions. But this genre of
legal scholarship has one fault—its isolation from contemporary con-
stitutional theory. Few authors have attempted to connect Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence with overarching theoretical justifica-
tions.60 Instead, search and seizure scholarship has, by and large, ei-
ther described the Court’s precedents or prescribed change within the
narrow confines of criminal procedure law.61 What is needed is a
framework that unites the Fourth Amendment with constitutional
substance and structure. In other words, a theory must delineate the
primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment within the Constitution
and a concomitant method of enforcement.
The use of constitutional theory is not without its perils. In past
decades, scholars have constructed “grand theories” or “formalisms”
that advocate a single overarching vision of the Constitution based on
an external standard of political morality. These metatheories at-
tempted to connect constitutional doctrine, modern philosophy, and
political theory while satisfying the inherent desire to find a common
thread running through the Constitution.62 But critics correctly noted
that there was no a priori rationale for selecting one grand theory
over another, and the unavoidable subjectivity was corroborated by
the fact that no theory achieved widespread support among legal
scholars.63 Moreover, the grand theorists themselves engaged in a
process of mutually assured annihilation, launching the academic
equivalent of neutron bombs at each other’s proposals.64 Although
scholarly criticism is a mandatory element of legal discourse, the un-
derlying premise of the debate was mutual exclusivity: grand theories
cannot peacefully coexist in the competitive world of constitutional
interpretation.
60. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. The works of Professor Akhil Amar are an
exception. See generally AMAR, supra note 11.
61. See Amar, supra note 1, at 759 (“Fourth Amendment case law is a sinking ocean
liner—rudderless and badly off course—yet most scholarship contents itself with rearranging
the deck chairs.”).
62. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 358-60
(1981) (enumerating several such theories).
63. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1331, 1376-77 (1988) (“[M]any extremely able people have attempted to discover the true
foundation of constitutional law, and none has succeeded.”).
64. As Professor Tushnet has observed: “A student of grand theory notices rather quickly
that the presentations have a common structure. In ‘Part I’ the theorist offers a critique of all
other grand theories, and in ‘Part II’ he presents an assertedly defensible and therefore differ-
ent grand theory.” MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (1984).
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This academic skirmish is both unwarranted and counterproduc-
tive. Instead, constitutional theories should be used as unique inter-
pretive frameworks built upon first principles; they serve as “models”
of interpretation for constitutional disputes. Modeling encourages
debate on constitutional aspirations and notions of fundamental law,
while channeling an otherwise unwieldy discussion into a contrastive
approach. Real-world controversies can be reviewed under each
theoretical model, and the potential outcomes can then be mapped
for comparative analysis. And while grand theories must be perfect
by definition, models need not be. Under a modeling approach, the
issue is not whether a particular theory has defects. Instead, one
should examine the size and number of flaws both in concrete dis-
putes and over the entire body of constitutional questions. The goal is
not to find the perfect or perpetual model, but rather the “best”
model for the here and now.65 It is a model that fulfills the aspirations
for contemporary society, respects the American tradition without
repeating the mistakes of the past, and makes the Constitution the
very best it can be.
The following sections detail two search and seizure models that
bridge the gap between the Fourth Amendment and constitutional
theory. The antidiscrimination model takes a “participational orien-
tation”66 to search and seizure law. This political process theory fo-
cuses on the internal workings of government, that is, how the deci-
sionmaking machinery selects policies and distributes goods to its
citizenry.67 The precise political ends are much less important than
the means to these ends. Fair and just procedure is the linchpin;
equality in representation is the goal. The Fourth Amendment serves
as an antidiscrimination device within this model, a criminal proce-
65. If one accepts the postmodern critique of modernism and the inherent challenge of
individual perspective, as I do, the idea of an objectively and eternally perfect Constitution be-
comes quixotic. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 62, at 360 (arguing that the text of the Constitution
does not lend itself to the perfection some commentators try to achieve by marrying the docu-
ment with external concepts of political morality). But human fallibility and the impossibility of
personal omnipotence should not foreclose a search for the best constitutional interpretation
for “ourselves and our Posterity.” U.S. CONST. preamble. A post-postmodern solution only re-
quires that any theory be acutely self-conscious and open to change (or even repudiation)
through meritorious critiques or superior argumentation. For a discussion of the postmodern
critique, see infra Part IV.C.
66. ELY, supra note 4, at 75 n.*.
67. See id. (“[A] participational orientation denotes a form of review that concerns itself
with how decisions effecting value choices and distributing the resultant costs and benefits are
made.”).
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dure analog to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The second model, in contrast, is drawn from a moral theory of
the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment secures individual liberties
that can be claimed in spite of fair procedures and adequate repre-
sentation in government decisionmaking. Each moral agent is guar-
anteed a baseline of constitutional protection even if a heterogeneous
super-majority would agree to relinquish its rights in whole or in part.
A well-oiled political system is not enough. Substance rather than
procedure, this model argues, is the lodestar of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
The two models do share some common ground. Both agree that
government must afford “equal concern and respect” for each of its
citizens.68 The models also reach the same conclusions in a variety of
scenarios. One can protect substantive liberties “fairly well” by en-
suring procedural equality. Likewise, one can guarantee procedural
rights “fairly well” by embracing substantive values.69 But the range
of overlapping results is not the proving ground of these models.
Where they diverge is the true test of their utility and fidelity to the
Constitution.
III. THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION MODEL
Although its title is of recent vintage, a rudimentary form of po-
litical process theory can be traced back to seminal cases of the Mar-
shall Court.70 In more recent times, a federalism version of the theory
has occasionally found its way into Commerce Clause jurisprudence71
68. Id. at 82 (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977)).
69. Professor John Hart Ely explains:
One can guarantee substantive rights directly (by pointing to them) or, fairly well, by
an equality provision commanding that everyone generally get what the best-off are
getting. Similarly, one can guarantee equality either by thus commanding it, or, fairly
well, by pointing to things one considers important and saying everyone is to get
them.
ELY, supra note 4, at 24.
70. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824) (concluding that states’ rights concerns
are sufficiently protected by the political process); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 435-36
(1819) (holding that a state may not tax an arm of the federal government because the national
citizenry is not politically represented in the state legislature).
71. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985) (“It is no
novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part
to protect the States from overreaching by Congress.”); South Carolina State Highway Dep’t v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938) (noting that state regulations affecting interstate
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and legal scholarship.72 Nonetheless, most scholars point to a cele-
brated annotation in the 1938 case United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts73 as the origin of modern political process theory. In the fourth
footnote of that decision, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone delineated situa-
tions when the usual judicial presumption of constitutionality might
be inappropriate, including: (1) “legislation which restricts those po-
litical processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about re-
peal of undesirable legislation”;74 and (2) laws involving “prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities . . . which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be re-
lied upon to protect minorities.”75
Decades later, John Hart Ely would draw upon this footnote as
the basis for a “representation reinforcing” version of political proc-
ess theory.76 Professor Ely’s 1980 book, Democracy and Distrust, is
arguably “the most important contribution to constitutional theory of
the past generation.”77 In the nearly two decades since its publication,
Ely’s theory of judicial review has provided both a framework for fur-
ther scholarship and a foil for competing theories.
A. Ely and Representation-Reinforcement Theory
According to Ely, the Constitution indicates fundamental princi-
ples that must be interpreted and applied in a contemporary con-
                                                                                                                                     
commerce are unconstitutional if their purpose is “to gain for those within the state an advan-
tage at the expense of those without”).
72. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
170-259 (1980) (arguing that the Court should not decide questions about the power of the fed-
eral government vis-à-vis the states, since states are well-represented in the national political
process); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559 (1954)
(observing that Congress’s interpretations of the Constitution with respect to issues of federal-
ism carry great weight, since it is the states’ representatives who control the political process).
73. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
74. Id. at 152-53 n.4.
75. Id. In the first paragraph of the footnote, Stone argued that the presumption of consti-
tutionality might also be improper “when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution.” Id.
76. ELY, supra note 4, at 77 (arguing that the fourth footnote of Carolene Products sug-
gests a focus on constriction of opportunities to participate in the political process rather than
on the importance of substantive values).
77. Klarman, supra note 3, at 747; see also Mark V. Tushnet, Foreword, 77 VA. L. REV.
631, 631 (1991) (noting that Ely’s representation-reinforcement theory played a key role in
shaping constitutional discourse in the 1980s).
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text.78 The hard question—and, in fact, the ultimate downfall of mod-
ern constitutional theory—is determining which principles are so
fundamental that they must be rigidly enforced against government.79
Some provisions seem fairly straightforward and require little in the
way of interpretation. The President, for example, must be at least
thirty-five years old.80 Other provisions are “open-ended,” providing
little textual guidance as to their meaning. The Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments,” for instance,
fails to delimit what types of penalties should be deemed “cruel and
unusual.”81 Open-ended provisions require comprehensive interpreta-
tion by some individual or body in order to have any effect.
Since the time of John Marshall, this duty to interpret the Con-
stitution has been vested in the judiciary.82 The Court’s definitive
authority to construe ambiguous language, however, creates the no-
torious “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”83 The American system of
government is premised on majoritarianism: popular will, as ex-
pressed through democratically elected representatives, must gener-
ally prevail. But the Constitution is not a document solely concerned
with majority rule. Various provisions, particularly those found in the
Bill of Rights, were intended to thwart the desires of political majori-
ties. Yet when a judge invokes the Constitution to protect the rights
of a minority, that action exemplifies the twin evils of the counter-
majoritarian difficulty. First, a majority of the citizenry is prevented
from getting its way. And second, the judges themselves are neither
elected nor subject to political restraints.84
The difficult task, then, is to construct a method of judicial re-
view which protects minorities without undermining a government
based on majority rule.85 Ely overcomes the countermajoritarian di-
lemma by rejecting substantive principles as the core of the Constitu-
tion. Although such principles may look value neutral on their face,
78. See ELY, supra note 4, at 1 (arguing that “the Constitution proceeds by briefly indi-
cating certain fundamental principles whose specific implications for each age must be deter-
mined in contemporary context”).
79. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 55 (1962), quoted in
ELY, supra note 4, at 43.
80. See ELY, supra note 4, at 13 (discussing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5).
81. Id. at 13-14 (discussing U.S. CONST. amend. VIII).
82. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
83. BICKEL, supra note 79, at 16.
84. See ELY, supra note 4, at 4-8.
85. See id. at 7-8 (contending that the consent of the majority is the core of American gov-
ernment but “cannot be the whole story”).
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they inevitably incorporate the subjective opinions of an insulated
cadre of judges.86 By protecting procedure rather than substance,
judges can avoid imposing value-laden judgments on society.
Ely finds support for this hypothesis in the constitutional text
and context, as well as in the Supreme Court’s contemporary juris-
prudence. The Constitution itself is largely concerned with proce-
dural fairness and popular participation in government,87 with various
provisions demonstrating an orientation towards process over re-
sults.88 According to Ely, the Constitution was almost exclusively
concerned with the structure of government rather than selecting and
preserving particular substantive rights.89 The Framers understood
that perpetual justice and equality could not be guaranteed by en-
shrining static substantive principles, but rather by constructing a
governmental framework that assured fair procedures and full par-
ticipation.90
The procedure-over-substance thesis is also justified by the
workings of the Warren Court. Ely, a former clerk for Chief Justice
Earl Warren, argues that the Court’s jurisprudence of the 1950s and
1960s was inspired by procedure writ large—the lawmaking process.
Many of its decisions were driven by the desire to ensure that all
voices would be heard and respected when policy decisions were
made.91 Likewise, the Court demanded that all citizens—particularly
the downtrodden and despised members of society—be treated
equally in the distribution of rights, goods, and services. If a legisla-
ture bestowed something of value upon a particular group, it would
have to provide that largesse to all similarly situated individuals.92
86. See id. at 44 (discussing how judges inject their own values into issues of constitutional
interpretation).
87. See id. at 87 (observing that the Constitution leaves the accommodation of substantive
values “almost entirely to the political process”).
88. See id. at 90-92 (discussing the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, Privileges and Immu-
nities, and Contract Clauses).
89. See id. at 92.
90. See id. at 89 (discussing the American colonists’ discontent with the political process
under British rule).
91. See id. at 74:
[Decisions were] fueled not by a desire on the part of the Court to vindicate particu-
lar substantive values it had determined were important or fundamental, but rather
by a desire to ensure that the political process—which is where such values are prop-
erly identified, weighed, and accommodated—was open to those of all viewpoints on
something approaching an equal basis.
92. See id.
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Drawing upon the language of footnote four in Carolene Prod-
ucts, Ely’s theory of judicial review implies that the Court should only
intervene when the political process has malfunctioned. This occurs
in two situations. First, the “channels of political change” may be ob-
structed by the politically powerful.93 This primarily results from limi-
tations on speech, association, and voting.94 In other words, some
group is denied formal participation in the political system or access
to the instruments that can change government policy.95 Laws that
systematically disadvantage “discrete and insular minorities” repre-
sent the second form of malfunction.96 Although the minority group
may have the formal right to participate in the political process, its
interests are disregarded or diminished as a result of prejudice.97 Un-
der Ely’s “representation-reinforcement” theory, legislation that im-
plicates either form of malfunction should be subjected to strict scru-
tiny.98 Laws that do not involve a defect in the political process—even
those restricting constitutional rights—should be subject to almost
complete judicial deference.99 In such circumstances, the Court must
heed majority rule.100
The power of the political process theory can be demonstrated in
a number of ways. On a superficial level, Supreme Court Justices
have cited Ely’s work more than a dozen times since its publication.101
93. Id. at 103.
94. See id. at 105-34 (discussing enforcement of rights that are critical to an effective
democratic process).
95. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (raising the
possibility that such activity may be subject to “more searching judicial inquiry”).
96. Id.; see also ELY, supra note 4, at 103.
97. See ELY, supra note 4, at 103.
98. See id. at 105, 135-36.
99. See id. at 181.
100. See id.
101. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2278 n.6 (1997) (Souter, J., concur-
ring); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 168 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); Weiss v.
United States, 510 U.S. 163, 189 n.5 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989)
(O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); McMillan v. Pennsyvania, 477 U.S. 79, 102 n.5 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 796 n.5 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 317 n.10 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 442 n.10 (1985); United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208, 231 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 n.16
(1983); Industrial Union Dep’t v. American Petroleum Inst. 448 U.S. 607, 687 n.6 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980)
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More importantly, representation-reinforcement theory provides an
explanation for decisions in a variety of contexts. Cases striking down
limitations on free speech and impediments to voting rights clearly fit
within Ely’s theory.102 But the Court has interpreted other constitu-
tional provisions under the semblance of a political process theory.103
For example, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from
policing religiously motivated conduct that burdens specific religious
sects but not the general public.104 But when the government imposes
a burden on the entire citizenry through neutral and generally appli-
cable legislation, any resulting limitations on religious practice are of
no constitutional import.105 Such laws do not represent a breakdown
in the political process, but instead a properly functioning democratic
system: a political majority spreading costs and benefits across the
entire population.
B. The Neo-Political Process Theory of Criminal Procedure
Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares have utilized Ely’s
constitutional framework to construct a new political process theory
of criminal procedure.106 The constitutional limitations on the crimi-
                                                                                                                                     
(Brennan, J., concurring); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 31 n.2 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing).
102. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (prohibiting states from outlawing the
public display of expletives); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam)
(invalidating a statute that prohibited “mere advocacy not distinguished from incitement to
imminent lawless action”); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)
(striking down a Virginia poll tax as inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause); Reynolds
v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964) (affirming the district court’s order that Alabama legisla-
tive districts be reapportioned consistent with a “one person, one vote” standard); see also ELY,
supra note 4, at 105-34 (discussing such cases).
103. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (outlawing, as inconsistent with the
Equal Protection Clause, states’ denial of welfare benefits to residents of less than one year);
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942) (invalidating a statute that
provided for the sterilization of some but not all similarly situated recidivists as a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause); South Carolina State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S.
177, 196 (1938) (affirming a state regulation of trucks traveling on state highways as imposing
the same burdens on both instate and out-of-state citizens and therefore consistent with the
dormant Commerce Clause).
104. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 545 (1993).
105. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
106. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86
GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis]. Kahan and Meares
have employed this theory to argue for the constitutionality of community policing programs,
particularly a Chicago gang-loitering ordinance. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago
Neighborhood Orgs. in Support of Petitioner, City of Chicago v. Morales, No. 97-1121 (cert.
granted Apr. 20, 1998), available in 1998 WL 328366 (U.S. June 19, 1998) [hereinafter Brief
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nal justice system, they argue, are intended to prevent oppression of
disempowered groups. As such, the judiciary must be particularly
wary of police practices that focus on a despised caste.107
A breakdown in the political process should be presumed when
the costs of a particular criminal law or practice are borne by a dis-
crete and insular minority. In such circumstances, elected officials are
unlikely to give adequate consideration to the burden placed upon
the powerless minority and may overestimate the benefits to society
in general.108 But when the whole community pays the price by inter-
nalizing the burden of a particular policy, Kahan and Meares argue
that there is little concern that the machinery of democratic govern-
ment has malfunctioned.109 One can assume that a political majority
prepared to accept a law’s coercive elements has adequately consid-
ered the advantages and disadvantages of the law enforcement policy
in question.110
Kahan and Meares claim that modern criminal procedure doc-
trine arose in the context of organized racism. Law enforcement in
the Jim Crow era utilized police power to suppress African-
Americans and exclude them from political participation.111 Confes-
sions were beaten out of black defendants. Minorities were system-
atically excluded from jury service. Police used dragnet-type round-
ups based solely on skin color, and law enforcement exercised
virtually unfettered discretion to arrest civil rights advocates. These
and other racially motivated practices were vilified by the Court, Ka-
han and Meares argue, and serve as the backbone of modern criminal
                                                                                                                                     
Amicus Curiae]; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural
Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197; Tracey L. Meares &
Dan M. Kahan, Black, White and Gray: A Reply to Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 245 [hereinafter Meares & Kahan, Black, White and Gray].
107. See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 106, at 1173.
108. Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 106, at *6 (“Where the coercive incidence of a par-
ticular policy is being visited on a powerless minority, popularly elected representatives lack
adequate incentives to determine whether the . . . benefits of the law for the community at large
truly outweigh the liberty costs to the few.”).
109. See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 106, at 1172-73 (“[I]nsofar as . . .
policies do burden average members of the community, there is much less reason for courts to
doubt the determination . . . that these policies strike a fair balance between liberty and or-
der.”).
110. See id.
111. See id at 1153; see also Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236 (1940) (observing that
oppressive governments often use “dictatorial criminal procedure . . . to make scapegoats of . . .
helpless political, religious, or racial minorities”).
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procedure jurisprudence.112 Political process theory is wholly consis-
tent with these opinions: racial minorities were prevented from par-
ticipating in government while suffering the entire burden of unjust
police practices.
But their theory has implications beyond the context of race.
Heightened scrutiny will be appropriate whenever the median voter,
who does not bear the law enforcement burden, harbors ill will to-
ward those who are subject to the policy’s provisions.113 Courts should
not defer to laws, for instance, that require convicted sex offenders to
register with government officials. The median voter is not a sex of-
fender, will not be subject to the law’s strictures, and would generally
prefer that such criminals never see the light of day.114 Likewise, in-
vestigative detentions115 and custodial interrogations116 require sub-
stantial judicial oversight—the voting public is unlikely to come into
contact with government agents in an adverse inquisitorial setting.117
Kahan and Meares’s neo-political process theory of criminal
procedure also prompts the courts to reduce the standard of review in
some circumstances. “New community policing” strategies are the ar-
chetypes of when judicial deference is appropriate.118 In the crime-
and drug-ridden inner cities, community members are banding to-
gether to find novel solutions to urban blight. Many communities
have enacted antiloitering laws, strict curfews, and other discretion-
ary policing techniques to attack criminal behavior that continues
112. See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 106, at 1153 (“Modern criminal
procedure reflects the Supreme Court’s admirable contribution to eradicating this incidence of
American apartheid.”); see also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969) (overturning rape
conviction of African-American youth who was jailed and fingerprinted without a warrant or
probable cause for arrest); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965) (voiding statute that gave
police broad discretion to arrest civil rights demonstrators for breach of peace); Brown v. Mis-
sissippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (overturning murder convictions of two African-American
men where police obtained confessions by torture); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 599
(1935) (finding rape defendant was not afforded equal protection of the laws where African-
Americans were systematically excluded from jury service).
113. See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 106, at 1173 (discussing sex-
offender registration laws).
114. See id.
115. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10, 27 (1968) (upholding “stop and frisk” police
searches).
116. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966) (requiring that a suspect be ad-
vised of his right to remain silent and right to counsel prior to custodial interrogation).
117. See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 106, at 1175 (“[T]here’s no guar-
antee that the average citizen will be affected in a way that gives her sufficient incentive to po-
lice the police for abuse.”).
118. See id. at 1160-61 (describing “the new community policing”).
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unabated under current penal regimes.119 Although antiloitering stat-
utes were once a tool of political majorities to suppress discrete and
insular minorities,120 such laws are now being used by minority com-
munities to protect and better themselves. Judges should reduce the
level of scrutiny when the relevant community can be seen as inter-
nalizing the costs of a policing policy, forcing all members to share
the burden on freedom and autonomy.121 If an individual has been af-
forded an opportunity to be heard, his interests are actually or virtu-
ally122 represented by government decisionmakers, and the entire
community bears the law enforcement costs. In such cases, commu-
nity policing strategies should be presumed valid even in the face of
reduced constitutional rights for all members of the particular com-
munity.123
C. Scholarly Criticism
As with any constitutional proposal, the political process theory
in general and the criminal procedure version in particular are sub-
ject to a variety of attacks.124 As argued before,125 Ely is simply wrong
119. See id. at 1175-76 (contending that public housing searches, curfews, and gang-loitering
provisions all pass the political process test).
120. See id. at 1156-57; William O. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE
L.J. 1 (1960) (noting oppressive use of vagrancy statutes); Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law
and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956) (reporting on the lack of due process
afforded “vagrants” in the Magistrates’ courts of Philadelphia).
121. See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 106, at 1173 (arguing that new
community policing strategies are now being chosen by inner-city African-American communi-
ties, rather than being imposed upon them as tools of oppression).
122. Juveniles, for example, are “virtually” represented by government officials. Although
they may not vote, their parents may. The political process theory of criminal procedure as-
sumes that parents and other concerned citizens, therefore, will act as surrogates for the com-
munity’s children in the lawmaking process. See id.
123. See id.
124. For criticism of Ely’s representation-reinforcement theory, see ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 194-99 (1990); DAVID
A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 14-19 (1986); TUSHNET, supra note 64,
at 70-107; CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW 343-52 (1994);
Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA.
L. REV. 721 passim (1991); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669 passim (1991); Richard A. Posner, Democracy
and Distrust Revisited, 77 VA. L. REV. 641 passim (1991); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 passim (1980); Mark
Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional
Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 passim (1980); Tushnet, supra note 77, passim; Symposium, Judicial
Review Versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981). For criticism of the political process the-
ory of criminal procedure, see Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Pro-
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when he claims that the Constitution is “overwhelmingly”126 con-
cerned with process rather than substance. Textual guarantees like
religious freedom and implicit rights such as reproductive autonomy
are wholly concerned with substance. Even clearly procedural rights
have substantive foundations; the right to vote, for example, carries a
substantive determination of who deserves the electoral franchise
and how much each vote will count. And the selection of a proce-
dural rather than substantive theory, or the choice between various
procedural theories, must be based on some underlying substantive
value. Moreover, courts will have to determine the appropriate proc-
ess and set procedural limitations under Ely’s approach. The judge’s
personal value system, therefore, will inevitably sneak into the politi-
cal process theory and pose the same danger of judicial activism con-
demned in value-laden interpretations.127
Representation-reinforcement theory can also be attacked on
practical grounds. Deciding which groups will be deemed “discrete
and insular minorities” is not as easy as it sounds. Racial minorities
appear to be obvious candidates. But race-based categories ignore
the various communities of interest that transcend skin color, such as
gender, age, and socioeconomic status. And what about homosexuals,
the physically disabled, Muslims, or the illiterate—are any of these
groups sufficiently discrete and insular to merit heightened protec-
tion? Representation-reinforcement theory offers no answer, nor
does it provide a natural limit to the potential categories. Ely’s theory
                                                                                                                                     
cedures or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 215, 240-43 (arguing that the political process theory fails to account for dissenters within the
group, and that the theory is incapable of accurately depicting the preferences of all relevant
groups within the community).
125. See Erik G. Luna, The Models of Criminal Procedure, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 45, on file with author) (“The Constitution is not exclusively
or even primarily concerned with process.”).
126. See ELY, supra note 4, at 87 (“[T]he selection and accommodation of substantive val-
ues is left almost entirely to the political process and instead the [Constitution] is overwhelm-
ingly concerned . . . with procedural fairness in the resolution of individual disputes . . . [and]
with ensuring broad participation in the processes and distributions of government.”).
127. Scholars also reject the countermajoritarian difficulty which drives Ely’s theory. See,
e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 15-17 (1996) (arguing that the “defining aim” of democracy is not that the ma-
jority rules, but that decisions are made by institutions that treat all individuals equally). But
see Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to
Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 339 (1998) (describing the countermajoritarian
difficulty as a “dominant paradigm” and stating that “[t]he need to reconcile judicial review
with democracy framed almost all constitutional scholarship about the role of the Supreme
Court in the 1970s and 1980s”).
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also fails to define the level of generality for the relevant community.
African-Americans, for example, may constitute a discrete and insu-
lar minority at the national level but a powerful majority in a given
county or city. And even if it were possible to ascertain the pertinent
minority group and community, the theory offers little guidance on
how to determine whether the political process has malfunctioned.
Minority groups may lose on the merits rather than as a result of
prejudice.128
Similar criticisms can be lodged against the political process the-
ory of criminal procedure. Constitutional rights were not designed to
end institutionalized racism but rather to prevent governmental tyr-
anny.129 Moreover, the idea that a political majority can define the
fundamental rights of the citizen is inimical to the Framers’ design.
Constitutional guarantees were intended precisely to thwart the will
of the majority and its political representatives, and to reserve an in-
delible compass of freedom for the individual.130 The fact that a com-
128. Political process theory also ignores the phenomenon of interest-group politics and the
various sources of political power. See Posner, supra note 124, at 646-48.
129. See Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 124, at 244 & n.138 (“The reason for the
Framers’ endorsement of an old conception of rights was not their fear of institutionalized ra-
cism. (Many of them in fact were slaveowners.) It was their dread of tyranny.”) (footnote text
added in parenthetical). Pragmatically, the inevitable points of discretion in the criminal justice
system make it unlikely that constitutional guarantees could prevent some forms of racial dis-
crimination. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.7, 294, 313 (1987) (accepting the re-
sults of the Baldus study—that persons convicted of killing white victims were more than four
times as likely to be sentenced to death in Georgia than persons convicted of killing black vic-
tims—but holding it insufficient to prove racial discrimination in individual trial and sentencing
decisions); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Crimi-
nal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1997):
[T]he criminal justice system is characterized by extraordinary discretion—over the
definition of crimes (legislatures can criminalize as much as they wish), over en-
forcement (police and prosecutors can arrest and charge whom they wish), and over
funding (legislatures can allocate resources as they wish). In a system so dominated
by discretionary decisions, discrimination is easy, and constitutional law has surpris-
ingly little to say about it.
And even if criminal procedure rights were aimed specifically at organized racism, scholars re-
ject the idea that the constitutional guard may now be let down. “Despite increases in black
voter registration in the South and despite dramatic increases in the number of black elected
officials,” Professors Albert Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer respond, “there is no basis for
assuming that the days of institutional racism are behind us.” Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra
note 124, at 222.
130. In the venerated words of Justice Robert Jackson:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissi-
tudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and offi-
cials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right
to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and as-
sembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on
the outcome of no elections.
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munity stands ready to share the burden on liberty does not change
the inviolate nature of these rights.131 The Constitution also rejects ra-
cially calibrated or geographic approaches to fundamental rights;
constitutional guarantees do not depend on your skin color or the
neighborhood you call home.132
Many of these criticisms can be rebutted by affirmative evidence
or by pointing to the flaws in alternate theories.133 But one deficiency
cannot be so easily dismissed. Political process theory provides no
baseline of rights, no constitutional floor below which government is
not allowed to operate. In particular, it would not prevent gradually
increasing intrusions into private lives. If a political majority wanted
to reside in a totalitarian state where government officials had abso-
lute power to search and seize, the antidiscrimination model would
have no objection so long as the entire community shared the bur-
den.134 Ely, Kahan and Meares would argue, I presume, that the pos-
sibility of an Orwellian surveillance society is minute; a properly
functioning majoritarian process can be trusted to protect the sub-
stantive interests of the citizenry.135 But safeguards subject to political
vicissitudes provide only theoretical protection. And as will be ar-
gued later, the slide down the slippery slope may have already begun.
                                                                                                                                     
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
131. See Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 124, at 240 (contending that even when a
group’s majority stands ready to forego certain liberties, not all members of the group are nec-
essarily ready to do so).
132. The political process theory of criminal procedure would also countenance a danger-
ous level of police discretion as a quick-fix solution to urban blight. See Luna, supra note 125
(manuscript at 52-53). Moreover, Professors Alschuler and Schulhofer take the Kahan/Meares
approach to task for its specific application to Chicago’s gang-loitering ordinance. “On virtually
every essential point, the picture [Kahan and Meares] paint is incorrect or seriously mislead-
ing.” Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 124, at 216. But see generally Meares & Kahan, Black,
White and Gray, supra note 106 (responding to such criticism).
133. See Klarman, supra note 3, at 772-88 (criticizing those who contend that Ely’s model
mischaracterizes the nature of democracy and the proper conception of judicial review, but
conceding that substantive value judgments are inherent in the model).
134. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 1, at 94 (“Unlike various normative theories
of the fourth amendment, [Ely’s] theory does not rest on any assertion about the ultimate worth
of privacy. [With the exception of first amendment values], the majority would be free to
choose whatever level of privacy it wished.”).
135. In his concluding chapter, Professor Ely considers Harry Wellington’s example of “a
statute making it a crime for any person to remove another person’s gall bladder, except to
save that person’s life.” ELY, supra note 4, at 182. After an interesting internal dialogue, Ely
concludes that “[i]t is an entirely legitimate response to the gall bladder law to note that it
couldn’t pass and refuse to play any further.” Id. at 183.
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D. A Model of the Fourth Amendment
As noted earlier scholarly criticism does not prevent a constitu-
tional theory from serving as an interpretive model. A flawed ap-
proach may nonetheless offer the “best” possible model for modern
constitutional interpretation. And although its critique is severe, po-
litical process theory is not so inherently defective as to prevent its
use in a model of the Fourth Amendment.
In Democracy and Distrust, Ely briefly argued that the Fourth
Amendment could be viewed as both a procedural and substantive
guarantee.136 In fact, Ely suggested, it could be considered a forerun-
ner of the Equal Protection Clause and the limitations on disparate
government treatment.137 By injecting a neutral and detached magis-
trate into the picture, requiring the contemporaneous documentation
of the facts, and specifying a minimum quantum of evidence for a
warrant to issue, the Fourth Amendment provides indirect protection
against invidious discrimination.138
This antidiscrimination model of the Fourth Amendment is also
explored by Kahan and Meares within their discussion of criminal
procedure doctrine. The Court has frequently held that constitutional
rights in the criminal justice system require a reasonable balance be-
tween liberty and order.139 In the search and seizure context, the lib-
erty interest is an individual’s right to privacy—or, in the words of
Justice Brandeis, “the right to be let alone.”140 When a search is pur-
suant to a warrant based on probable cause, the procedural mandates
of the Fourth Amendment have been met and we can presume that
the relevant interests have been appropriately considered. But when
law enforcement conducts a warrantless, suspicionless search, the
modern Court has often struck the balance in an ad hoc manner, us-
ing the reasonableness balancing test.
An antidiscrimination model of the Fourth Amendment hopes
to avoid many of the value judgments required from an ad hoc bal-
ancing test in the suspicionless search context. As with the political
process theory in general, the ultimate question is whether the rele-
136. See id. at 96-97, 172-73.
137. See id. at 97.
138. See id. at 172-73.
139. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (noting “the careful balance that
the Constitution strikes between liberty and order”); Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, su-
pra note 106, at 1172-73).
140. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
LUNA TO PRINTER.DOC 04/29/99 4:49 PM
1999] SOVEREIGNTY AND SUSPICION 817
vant community could be seen as internalizing the costs of a police
practice. If a particular individual or disempowered minority is sub-
jected to suspicionless searches and seizures while the political ma-
jority is free from such action, government officials are likely to un-
dervalue the privacy interests at stake while overestimating the law
enforcement gains. Judicial intervention and a presumption of uncon-
stitutionality are appropriate in such circumstances: the individual or
minority group has not been provided the constitutionally mandated
procedure, yet is required to bear the entire burden of the police
practice.141
In contrast, a suspicionless search regime which spreads the law
enforcement costs across the entire community will likely pass muster
under the antidiscrimination model. Government officials are less
likely to ignore the tolls on privacy that accrue to both political ma-
jorities and minorities. If all members of a community had an oppor-
tunity to air their views and their interests were factored into the de-
cisionmaking process, a diffusely felt suspicionless search practice
would be presumed constitutional.142 Obligatory searches of every
person entering government buildings do not violate the Fourth
Amendment,143 because discrete groups or individuals are not singled
out for disparate treatment. Rather, society as a whole suffers the in-
trusions as an incident of modern life. If such searches were truly un-
reasonable, political process theory would expect the equally afflicted
political majority to vindicate the interests of the entire citizenry.
An antidiscrimination model of the Fourth Amendment is con-
sistent with much of the Supreme Court’s suspicionless search juris-
prudence.144 It explains, for instance, why police can conduct suspi-
cionless stops of all cars on a given road as part of a regulatory
scheme,145 but not individual vehicles at the officer’s own discretion.146
The model also provides a prescriptive tool for analyzing new search
141. See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 106, at 1173 (presenting sex of-
fender registration statutes as an example).
142. See id. at 1174 (listing searches of regulated commercial enterprises and random drug
testing of student-athletes, who are virtually represented by their parents, as examples).
143. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989)
(dictum) (discussing, with approval: United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974)
(upholding generalized searches before boarding commercial airplanes); United States v. Skip-
with, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1973) (same); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908-10
(9th Cir. 1973) (same)).
144. See infra Part V.
145. See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
146. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1978).
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and seizure issues. In Chicago, an inner-city housing authority en-
acted a policy allowing suspicionless searches of government-
subsidized apartments following random gunfire in the buildings.
Under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, such searches are un-
constitutional without a warrant based on probable cause.147 But Ka-
han and Meares argue that political process theory would justify a
different conclusion: all members of the housing projects are subject
to the same search procedure, ensuring that the coercive burden is
spread across the entire population. Each individual had an opportu-
nity to express his opinion in an open forum and the voices were
heard by political representatives accountable only to the community
and not to unaffected parties.148 In such circumstances, Kahan and
Meares believe that judicial deference to the political branches is ap-
propriate. Even if the search fails to give sufficient weight to the pri-
vacy interests at stake, a majority-driven legislature can be expected
to correct any imbalance in due course.149
IV. THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS MODEL
In contrast to political process approaches, moral theories are
primarily concerned with substance and the content of fundamental
law. They attempt to identify a universal good and universal moral
rights, and are generally founded on a common first principle—the
rationality of all human beings. Virtually all moral theories share an
affinity with liberalism or individualism, a belief that each person
possesses a set of inviolate rights, rights that preexist any government
and provide normative standards for society. The individual, there-
fore, is the ultimate concern and must be protected from oppression
by the state. It is up to each person to decide for herself what the
“good life” entails, consistent with the existence of that same right in
all individuals. Although moral theory descends from natural law
philosophy, moral rights are not divinely conferred but are a conse-
quence of fundamental human dignity.
Many of the leading contemporary moral theorists have been
philosophers rather than legal scholars, including Isaiah Berlin, John
147. See Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 794-95 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
148. See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 106, at 1175 (arguing that there
“is every reason to believe that the majority . . . gave due weight to the dissenters’ interests”).
149. See Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000aa (1994)) (effectively overturning the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment de-
cision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978)).
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Rawls, and Robert Nozick.150 Nonetheless, moral theory has found its
way into the legal academy. And quite possibly the greatest (and
surely the most criticized) moral theorist of modern times happens to
be a law professor—Ronald Dworkin.151
A. Dworkin and the Moral Reading
Over the course of more than two decades, Professor Dworkin
has attempted to construct a moral interpretation of the law. He has
consistently argued that it is the duty of the courts to make the law
“the best it can be,” looking to the past for guidance while aspiring to
a just and principled future.152 Judges are required to make moral
judgments about the propriety of various legal interpretations given
the historical record, the facts of the case before them, and the juris-
prudential path that lies ahead. A moral interpretation or, in
Dworkin’s words, a “moral reading”153 of the Constitution is but a
natural extension of this theory. He is not calling for a legal revolu-
tion but a popular realization that lawyers and judges undertake a
150. See ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
151. Professor Dworkin has authored an impressive body of provocative work challenging
the distinction between moral and legal philosophy. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW:
THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW] (advancing the “moral reading” of the Constitution, in which “we all—
judges, lawyers, citizens—interpret and apply these abstract [constitutional] clauses on the un-
derstanding that they invoke moral principles about political decency and justice”). See gener-
ally RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHA-
NASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION];
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
(1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). He has been heralded as a
leading public philosopher and a respected contributor to the science of law whose scholarship
has frequently reshaped the legal playing field and influenced the direction of the day’s juris-
prudential issues. See Edward J. McCaffery, Ronald Dworkin, Inside-Out, 85 CAL. L. REV.
1043, 1043 (1997) (reviewing DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra); T.M. Scanlon, Partisan for
Life, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, July 15, 1993, at 45 (reviewing DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION, su-
pra); Mortimer Sellers, Forming a More Perfect Union, WASH. POST, May 12, 1996, at X5
(reviewing DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra). His works have provided academic fodder of
the highest caliber, resulting in harsh, sometimes personal criticism. See, e.g., Allan C. Hutchin-
son, Indiana Dworkin and Law’s Empire, 96 YALE L.J. 637, 639 (1987) (reviewing DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE, supra, and, while sarcastically comparing Dworkin to the adventure hero Indi-
ana Jones, stating: “[Dworkin] bids us to lift our heads from the trough of mundane legal prac-
tice and to gaze upon a juristic splendor that, with will and nerve, could be ours to share”); see
also infra Part IV.C (discussing additional criticism of Dworkin’s theories). Nonetheless,
Dworkin is to many “the preeminent Anglo-American legal philosopher of our time and, quite
possibly, of any time.” McCaffery, supra, at 1043.
152. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 151, at 411.
153. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 151, at 2.
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moral reading of constitutional provisions on a daily basis. As a mat-
ter of instinct and necessity, legal actors derive moral principles from
the Constitution and apply them to real-world cases based on moral
conclusions.154 Any coherent constitutional theory utilizes a moral
reading—it is impossible for it not to.155 Although Dworkin contends
that the merger of constitutional law and moral theory is inevitable,
an explicit connection has yet to be fully recognized.156
In his 1996 book, Freedom’s Law, Dworkin undertakes precisely
this project. Like Ely, he notes that the Constitution contains a mix of
abstract and concrete provisions.157 Some terms require little in the
way of interpretation.158 Other provisions are ambiguous on their face
and require theoretical input.159 Under the moral reading, it is the
duty of the courts to interpret and apply the Constitution’s abstract
clauses by uncovering the fundamental moral principles they were in-
tended to embody.160
This is no easy task. A virtually endless assortment of interpreta-
tions is possible for the Constitution’s open-ended provisions.
Dworkin, however, has fashioned a two-prong standard to test the vi-
ability of a given constitutional theory. It incorporates both back-
ward- and forward-looking elements, requiring that any contender be
sufficiently descriptive of past precedents and prescriptive for future
practice.161 The goal of this standard is to unite constitutional princi-
154. See id. at 3.
155. See id. at 3, 12-15.
156. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 151, at 149.
157. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 151, at 7-8; see also infra note 79 and ac-
companying text (presenting Ely’s position).
158. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 151, at 8 (discussing the age requirement
for the President mandated in U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5); see also supra note 80 (citing Ely’s
discussion of the same subject).
159. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 151, at 7 (discussing the Free Speech
Clause, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); see
also supra note 81 (citing Ely’s similar discussion of the Eighth Amendment). But see supra
notes 87-91 (discussing Ely’s emphasis on the procedural, rather than substantive, purpose of
other constitutional provisions).
160. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 151, at 2.
161. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 151, at 225 (“[L]egal claims are interpretive
judgments and therefore combine backward- and forward-looking elements; they interpret con-
temporary legal practice seen as an unfolding political narrative.”). Dworkin has likened this
process to a group of authors writing a chain novel:
In this enterprise a group of novelists writes a novel seriatim; each novelist in the
chain interprets the chapters he has been given in order to write a new chapter,
which is then added to what the next novelist receives, and so on. Each has the job of
writing his chapter so as to make the novel being constructed the best it can be, and
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ple with legal practice, seeking the best path for the future while not
forgetting the road that has already been traveled.162
1. Fit. The first prong is “fit.” A constitutional theory must fit
the constitutional background; it must be consistent with text,
context, and precedents.163 An interpretation that cannot be squared
with the historical record must be rejected regardless of its normative
appeal. Judges are collaborators with courts of the past and future,
refining and evolving a body of law built on a foundation of
yesterday’s decisions with grave implications for the cases of
tomorrow. A coherent theory is only possible when courts ensure
that their contribution to the ongoing chronicle fits with what has
passed before them.164 This threshold factor restrains the judiciary in
its constitutional analysis, disqualifying theories congenial to
personal preferences but at odds with legal history.165 In interpreting
constitutional provisions, judges do not write on a blank slate. The
methodology of the fit prong examines all the major sources of
interpretation. A theory must be generally consistent with the major
case precedents of a constitutional provision. The Constitution’s
structure and text should support the interpretation. And the
historical context of a provision’s enactment should provide an
amenable background.166
History is clearly germane to Dworkin’s approach, but a consti-
tutional theory need not fit every single case.167 Some precedents will
have been expressly rejected or discredited; others will have vitality
                                                                                                                                     
the complexity of this task models the complexity of deciding a hard case under law
as integrity.
Id. at 229.
162. See id. at 410-13.
163. See id. at 230-31, 240-48; DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 151, at 8-12.
164. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 151, at 10 (“[Judges] must regard them-
selves as partners with other officials, past and future, who together elaborate a coherent con-
stitutional morality, and they must take care to see that what they contribute fits with the
rest.”).
165. See id. at 10-11 (arguing that the requirement of integrity prohibits judges from
“read[ing] their own moral convictions into the Constitution . . . unless they find it consistent in
principle with the structural design of the Constitution as a whole, and also with the dominant
lines of past constitutional interpretation by other judges”).
166. See id. at 8 (“History is crucial . . . because we must know something about the circum-
stances in which a person spoke to have any good idea of what he meant to say in speaking as
he did.”).
167. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 151, at 230.
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only in law school casebooks.168 The analysis of constitutional text and
context must also focus on the level of generality provided in the
provision’s language. We are bound as a nation to the words of the
Constitution and the principles they announce, but not by any extra-
neous clues as to how the Framers might have applied particular pro-
visions to a given case.169 This can be characterized as the distinction
between “concepts” and “conceptions.” The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, for example, maintains that a state government may not “deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”170 The concept underlying the provision, Dworkin argues, is
that all individuals must receive equal status and concern.171 How that
general principle is to be applied in concrete situations is a particular
conception of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Framers clearly did
not anticipate that the Amendment would prohibit racial segregation
in schools, or discrimination against women and homosexuals.172 That
conception, however, is neither dispositive nor binding on future
generations. It is the underlying moral concept—equal status and
concern for all persons—that must be interpreted and applied in a
contemporary setting.173
The fit prong can also evaluate a constitutional theory by ex-
panding the analysis “in a series of concentric circles”174 beyond the
168. For example, a theory need not square with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(upholding racial segregation). See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954)
(expressly overruling Plessy). Likewise, a theory might choose to reject those cases that are still
law but suffer from desuetude or have been thoroughly repudiated outside of the judiciary. See,
e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding a statute forbidding group libel);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the internment of Japanese-
Americans in detention camps during World War II); see also Richard Primus, Canon, Anti-
Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998) (discussing other examples which illus-
trate the evolution of doctrinal precedent). The fit prong is also not a process of case-counting.
Fitness “cannot be a merely mechanical decision; [a judge] cannot simply count the number of
past decisions that must be conceded to be ‘mistakes’ on each interpretation.” DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 151, at 247. “[A judge] must take into account not only the numbers
of decisions counting for each interpretation, but whether the decisions expressing one princi-
ple seem more important or fundamental or wide-ranging than the decisions expressing the
other.” Id.
169. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 151, at 10.
170. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 2.
171. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 151, at 10.
172. See id. at 9.
173. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 151, at 134-36 (distinguishing
between broad concepts, which should guide future action, and narrower conceptions, which
merely represent an individual’s views on an issue).
174. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 151, at 250.
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particular provision at hand. The Constitution is not a set of dis-
jointed propositions that happen to occupy a single document.175
Rather, it is a lattice of principles that share the same underlying
goals in establishing a form of government. An interpretation of a
clause or amendment can be tested by its fit with other constitutional
terms, demonstrating its descriptive power outside the narrow con-
fines of the issue at hand.176 Allied areas of constitutional law can
shed light on a particular interpretation by emphasizing overarching
goals and limitations. A theory of the Self-Incrimination Clause,177 for
instance, could be judged against the larger body of due process law
developed in the criminal justice system.
2. Justification. A theory of the Constitution must incorporate
not only the essence of the decisions analyzed in the fit prong, but
also the broad principles that justify these earlier conclusions.178
Therefore, the second prong is forward-looking—it asks whether a
given interpretation creates a comprehensive constitutional theory
that provides guidance in future cases. As such, the second prong
demands that a theory justify and unite discrete legal precepts under
a single vision of the Constitution.
As an example, First Amendment jurisprudence has flourished
under the “marketplace of ideas” theory.179 As first argued by Milton
in the mid-seventeenth century, societal interests are best served
when ideas are aired “in a free and open encounter.”180 The good and
the bad, truths and falsehoods, should all be allowed to fight it out in
a symbolic marketplace.181 The ideas still standing after vigorous de-
bate and scrutiny, as judged by the public consumer, will be adopted
by society. Only by allowing that initial unimpeded grapple can the
citizenry distinguish the truly worthy speech from the undeserving.
The “marketplace of ideas” theory can also justify a wide range of
175. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Constitution “is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of [particular provi-
sions]”).
176. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 151, at 245.
177. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3.
178. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 151, at 227-28.
179. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
180. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 52 (John W. Hales ed., London, Oxford Clarendon
Press 1882) (1644).
181. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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First Amendment decisions, from cases protecting flag desecration182
to those placing limitations on libel law.183
Some would argue that authorizing the judiciary to adopt its
constitutional theory of choice implicates the countermajoritarian
difficulty: an elite, unelected band of judges are allowed to override
the will of the people based solely on subjective value judgments. But
Dworkin rejects the difficulty outright—it simply does not exist. The
goal of democracy is not to ensure that a majority of the citizens nec-
essarily or usually gets its way.184 Instead, it demands that each indi-
vidual in the community be accorded equal concern and respect by
the institutions of government that formulate and execute policy de-
cisions.185 Dworkin’s constitutional conception of democracy is gener-
ally consistent with majority rule—elected officials, for example,
should be chosen by popular vote. But majoritarian procedures are
adopted to guarantee equal status for individuals, not to satisfy the
goals of majority rule. When majoritarianism fails to respect the
moral equality of all citizens, it can and should be rejected without
remorse in favor of other principles.186 And once majority rule is dis-
missed as the defining characteristic of democracy, there is no reason
why the Court should be denied final interpretive authority over the
Constitution.187
182. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989) (overturning a conviction for burning
an American flag).
183. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (stating that the First
Amendment “‘was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people’” (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957))).
184. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 151, at 16-17 (rejecting the “majoritarian
premise,” and positing that the “defining aim of democracy [is] that collective decisions be
made by political institutions whose structure, composition, and practices treat all members of
the community, as individuals, with equal concern and respect”).
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. “Democracy does not insist on judges having the last word, but it does not insist that
they must not have it.” Id. at 7. Further:
[R]ejecting the majoritarian premise means that we may look for the best interpreta-
tion with a more open mind: we have no reason of principle to try to force our prac-
tices into some majoritarian mold. If the most straightforward interpretation of
American constitutional practice shows that our judges have final interpretive
authority, and that they largely understand the Bill of Rights as a constitution of
principle—if that best explains the decisions judges actually make and the public
largely accepts—we have no reason to resist that reading and to strain for one that
seems more congenial to a majoritarian philosophy.
Id. at 34-35.
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B. Sovereignty Theory
In the end, Dworkin does not present an all-purpose algorithm
for constitutional analysis.188 Instead, he provides a “big tent” under
which a variety of legal theories can grow and prosper.189 The moral
reading, in fact, might be better understood as a constitutional theory
on creating constitutional theories: look to the past with aspirations
for the future to solve present cases. There is no revolutionary con-
tent, no Rosetta stone. You do not have to approve of Dworkin’s
precise moral analysis to agree that his methodology provides a use-
ful framework for constructing a principled constitutional theory.
Using this structure, a sovereignty theory of the Constitution can
be developed and then applied as a model of the Fourth Amendment.
But before attempting this task, I would like to present a brief cri-
tique of the theory underlying current search and seizure doctrine.
1. The Failure of Privacy. As previously noted, contemporary
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence analyzes issues under the aegis of
privacy.190 Search and seizure case law has adopted the privacy
formulation as the primary test of constitutionality.191 And while
critics may disagree with the Court’s application of the concept, their
scholarship nonetheless works within the privacy framework.192 Few
have strayed beyond the linguistic boundaries set by the judiciary and
subsequently accepted by the academy.193
Although privacy may have been a promising theory of the
Fourth Amendment at one time, it has now lost much of its luster and
utility. The Court has interpreted privacy to be a question of fact
rather than a constitutional value.194 As such, privacy becomes a mere
188. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 151, at 412.
189. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1335,
1353 (1997).
190. See supra Part I.B.
191. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469, 474 (1998) (upholding a warrantless
search of an apartment because the defendants were there for purely business reasons, and thus
lacked any legitimate expectation of privacy).
192. See, e.g., Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1357-
74 (discussing Fourth Amendment privacy).
193. For an innovative exception, see Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment, supra
note 24 (offering a paradigm of trust as an alternative to privacy). See also, William J. Stuntz,
Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016 (1995)
(critiquing the use of privacy in criminal procedure doctrine).
194. See Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment, supra note 25, at 1760 (“[T]he Court is
not asking whether bank or phone records should be kept private (thus invoking privacy as a
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interest which is weighed against and can be defeated by other inter-
ests, even rather pedantic policy considerations. This rendition of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment contradicts the very purpose
of a constitutional liberty—to provide individuals with “political
trumps”195 against majorities and the government institutions they
control. Policy interests, even quite strong ones, should be insuffi-
cient to deny constitutional guarantees. The very meaning of “rights”
allows you to act or remain motionless, speak or remain quiet, de-
spite a public interest in restraining your freedom.196
This demotion from right to interest is only exacerbated by a cir-
cularity in definition.197 Each governmental intrusion creates a new,
lower baseline of privacy, allowing gradual deterioration of Fourth
Amendment protection.198 Public acceptance of the narrower scope
soon follows, with the privacy we expect being a function of the pri-
vacy we are given.199 Scholarly attempts at a normative foundation for
privacy have been too scattered to provide relief.200 Definitions have
included everything from one’s right to “inviolate personality,”201 to a
check on totalitarianism,202 to a prerequisite for “respect, love, friend-
ship and trust.”203 As argued by Judith Jarvis Thomson, “the most
                                                                                                                                     
value), but, rather, whether we as a factual matter expect others to see and use those records
(thus viewing privacy as a measurable fact).”) (footnote omitted) (citing Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (holding that telephone users do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the numbers they dial because the telephone company routinely records such infor-
mation for business purposes); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (holding that
no legitimate expectation of privacy attaches to personal banking documents such as checks
and deposit slips because the documents “contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the
banks”)).
195. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 151, at xi.
196. See id. at 269.
197. Cf. Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-
Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510 (1986) (offering an excellent cri-
tique of interest balancing).
198. See Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 1759-63.
199. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1129, 1146 (1986) (“[W]hat people want is sometimes a product of what they can get.”);
Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 1, at 103 (“The amount of privacy we demand is, at least
in part, a product of the amount of privacy we are accustomed to having.”).
200. See Gormley, supra note 192, at 1336-39 (cataloging the various foundations proposed
to define the right to privacy); Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 1, at 59 (listing points of
disagreement relating to the nature of privacy).
201. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
205 (1890).
202. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 783-84 (1989).
203. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968). For other privacy theories, see
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (“Privacy is the claim of individuals,
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
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striking thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have
any very clear idea what it is.”204
The definitional quandary is compounded by a Supreme Court
arguably out of touch with society’s true expectations of privacy.205
Whether infected by some form of hindsight bias,206 or a distancing
effect,207 the Court has allowed increased police discretion in surveil-
lance activities despite the privacy expectations of most citizens. Law
enforcement may ignore “no trespassing” signs and jump over locked
fences to sneak onto the property surrounding homes.208 They may
snoop into the buildings adjacent to a residence, peering at even the
most private activity occurring in sheds or barns.209 Police may parse
through garbage bags to uncover everything from what someone eats
and reads to the medicine she takes.210 Government officials can ob-
tain the telephone numbers that individuals dial from their homes in
order to determine who they have called, whether it be their mothers,
paramours, or lawyers.211 And law enforcement may fly over homes in
planes or helicopters, spying on backyard barbeques, sunbathing, and
                                                                                                                                     
about them is communicated to others.”); J. Braxton Craven, Jr., Personhood: The Right to Be
Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699, 701 (suggesting “judicial recognition of a universal right of
‘personhood’ which protects individuals from arbitrary and capricious governmental action, but
which, in appropriate situations, can be outweighed by a demonstrated state interest”); Ruth
Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980) (“Our interest in pri-
vacy . . . is related to our concern over our accessibility to others: the extent to which we are
known to others, the extent to which others have physical access to us, and the extent to which
we are the subject of others’ attention.”); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 233, 236 (1977) (“Privacy will be defined here as an autonomy or control over the in-
timacies of personal identity. Autonomy, identity, and intimacy are all necessary (and together
normally sufficient) for the proper invocation of the concept of privacy.”); Louis Henkin, Pri-
vacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1425 (1974) (describing the judicially recog-
nized right of privacy as a “zone of prima facie autonomy, of presumptive immunity from
regulation, in addition to that established by the first amendment”).
204. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 295 (1975).
205. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Pri-
vacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Rec-
ognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993) (reporting an empirical study
finding that the Supreme Court’s views on expectations of privacy are often inconsistent with
those of society).
206. See id. at 761 (stating that the degree of intrusiveness is underestimated because courts
are aware of police objectives and all challenged searches have uncovered evidence of a crime).
207. See id. at 760-61 (arguing that the Justices “are unlikely to have experienced any type
of police intrusion, much less the type of intrusion they are asked to analyze in a particular
case”).
208. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
209. See id.
210. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
211. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-44 (1979).
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romantic interludes.212 According to the Supreme Court, no reason-
able expectation of privacy is implicated in any of these contexts. The
intrusions can be undertaken without judicial oversight and in the ab-
sence of a warrant or probable cause.
Privacy theory also suffers from the twin vices of over- and un-
derinclusiveness. The Court has stretched the definition of privacy to
include a variety of topics that have little in common. The rights to
contraceptives213 and abortions214 have been incorporated within the
mantra of privacy, yet these guarantees are really about decisional
autonomy—the right to make certain decisions without governmental
interference. It is hard to argue that purchasing a condom in a drug
store has anything to do with privacy as that term is commonly un-
derstood.215 Conversely, privacy theory does not capture the full im-
port of the Fourth Amendment. Although it guarantees privacy
against certain types of governmental intrusions, constitutional pro-
tection goes beyond a right to solitude and frequently has nothing to
do with privacy at all.216 An illegal arrest on a city street certainly is
not private, but it does implicate the Fourth Amendment.217 Police
shooting at a fleeing felon is not an intrusion upon a private act, but it
also implicates search and seizure guarantees.218 And compelled sur-
gery to withdraw evidence of a crime may not invade privacy except
in some strained sense, but it nonetheless involves Fourth Amend-
ment rights.219
For all these reasons and many more, privacy theory fails to pro-
vide sufficient content and guidance for the Court. The Fourth
Amendment must be reexamined in light of its underlying purpose,
212. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1989) (admitting “naked eye” observations
from a police fly over); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-14 (1986) (same).
213. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding the use of contracep-
tives to be within the “zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guaran-
tees”); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that the right of access to
contraception found for married people under the Due Process Clause in Griswold must be
extended to single people under the Equal Protection Clause).
214. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (“[T]he right of personal privacy includes
the abortion decision.”).
215. One commonly used dictionary defines privacy as “being apart from company or ob-
servation: seclusion.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 927 (10th ed. 1996).
216. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
217. See id. at 350 n.4.
218. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (“[A]pprehension by the use of deadly
force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”).
219. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
may prohibit “compelled surgical intrusion into an individual’s body for evidence” of a crime).
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its place within the framework of the Constitution, and the connec-
tion it can make with constitutional theory. In the following sections,
a sovereignty theory is developed as an appropriate substitute for
privacy theory.
2. Sovereignty as Solution. “Sovereignty” refers to the supreme
and absolute power to act. It is the source of authority, the right to do
anything and everything within a given domain. The sovereign may
wield this power however it sees fit. It is independent and
unaccountable; the sovereign has no superior. Most people identify
sovereignty with government authority. The king, the czar, the
legislature, the citizenry—these are the ultimate sources and
commanders of authority in a state. By virtue of its sovereign powers,
a state may enact laws, levy taxes, regulate commerce, imprison
criminals, and conduct all other functions commonly associated with
government. The boundaries of this legal and political control are
geographically defined, with sovereignty extending to a state’s
borders but going no further.
The idea of personal sovereignty may be unfamiliar to many and
strike others as a non sequitur, but it can nonetheless provide a co-
gent theory of rights.220 The sovereign individual exercises auton-
omy—the power of self-government—within his or her boundaries.
He is the ultimate source of authority in his domain, making choices
and implementing personal policies at will. Individual sovereignty is
merely an analog of state sovereignty, describing a moral agent as in-
herently sovereign over himself, just as the state is over its holdings.
As with the power of government, individual sovereignty is circum-
scribed by a territorial boundary. Beyond that border lie other sover-
eigns—most notably, the political state. When an individual intrudes
on the sovereignty of another, be it a distinct person or the govern-
ment, he can no longer claim unimpeded authority. Conversely, the
state cannot interfere with the individual’s autonomy while he acts
within his sovereign domain. This division of ultimate power between
the individual and the state is the defining characteristic of the sover-
eignty theory.221
220. See Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitu-
tion?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 451 (1983) (“[The person is] a moral agent and possessor
of rights, as ‘naturally sovereign’ over its self as the state is over its territory.”).
221. The Court has occasionally spoken in terms of divided sovereignty between citizens
and government. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (“[T]here is a
realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.”); Thornburgh v. American
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Various modern scholars have explored the concept of personal
sovereignty as a limitation on government. Isaiah Berlin has argued
that “there ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal free-
dom which must on no account be violated . . . . [A] frontier must be
drawn between the area of private life and that of public authority.”222
Likewise, Charles Reich argued in his groundbreaking work, The
New Property, that “[t]here must be sanctuaries or enclaves where no
majority can reach.”223 A quarter century later, Reich expanded on
this idea, proposing an “individual sector” where the citizen is sover-
eign rather than the holder of only such powers as remain unclaimed
by government.224
Demarcating regions of individual sovereignty is a promising
venture, and I will list but a few of the advantages. A healthy demo-
cratic government demands individuals who can stake out sovereign
zones.225 Vigorous public debate and political dissent is premised on
such sovereignty—without it, the status quo of the prevailing major-
ity would go unchallenged by enlightened but fearful critics. Spirited
public discussion about the fate of government requires an inviolate
margin between the state and members of the body politic.226 Like-
wise, personal sovereignty promotes a healthy citizenry. Space is
needed to develop one’s talents and capacities, skills and mental fac-
                                                                                                                                     
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (“[A] certain private sphere
of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government.”); Jacobson v. Mas-
sachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (“There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual
may assert the supremacy of his own will and rightfully dispute the authority of any human
government . . . to interfere with the exercise of that will.”).
222. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, supra note
150, at 118, 124. Robert Nozick made similar arguments in his opus, Anarchy, State, and Uto-
pia. See Nozick, supra note 150. Other modern advocates of sovereignty-type limitations on
government include John Rawls, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jurgen Habermas. Historical propo-
nents include John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century, Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth cen-
tury, and John Locke in the seventeenth century.
223. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 787 (1964).
224. See Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 1409, 1409 (1991)
[hereinafter Reich, Individual Sector]. Similarly, Professor Joel Feinberg has opined that “there
is a domain in which the individual’s own choice must reign supreme. On the boundaries of this
‘zone’ is a ‘wall’ against state interference.” Feinberg, supra note 220, at 483 (footnote omit-
ted).
225. See Reich, Individual Sector, supra note 224, at 1409 (“Without a secure and suppor-
tive habitat for the individual—a protected personal space—there can be no liberty.”).
226. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 1, at 109 (“[P]reservation of some private
space may be a prerequisite to robust public dialogue. Without such space, it is likely that a
public consensus, once established, would be able to replicate itself endlessly.”).
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ulties.227 Transparent cages are good breeding grounds for lab rats but
not people. Individuals need to know that they may cultivate their
own thoughts and abilities without the threat of surveillance or inter-
ference by government. Generally it is the person, not the state, that
recognizes the best path for this development. Nor should it be for-
gotten that ours is a nation founded on robust individualism and non-
conformity.228 Only by guaranteeing a sphere of sovereignty can the
idiosyncratic individual and the unique minority be allowed to pros-
per alongside the assimilated majority. Individual sovereignty is con-
sistent with toleration, one of the better angels of our nature.
A theory of sovereignty can also respond to the basic human
need for spatial definition. Individuals and, I would argue, their gov-
ernments, require clear and reliable boundaries of power. Clean de-
lineations of sovereignty satisfies the basic, animalistic need to stake
out one’s turf. People naturally create fences, walls, and borders; they
long to proclaim: “This is mine, this is yours, this belongs to the
community.”229 These desires provided the very underpinnings for the
concept of property and spurred the development of a distinct body
of jurisprudence where individuals are accorded the right to act as
they please on their own property, to exclude others from their land,
and to be free from intrusion by private citizens or public officials.230
In addition, trustworthy zones of sovereignty allow individuals to or-
227. See, e.g., Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, supra note 222, at 124 (arguing that in-
fringement of “a certain minimum area of personal freedom” would cause the “individual [to]
find himself in an area too narrow for even that minimum development of his natural faculties
which alone makes it possible to pursue, and even to conceive, the various ends which men
hold good or right or sacred”); cf. Reich, Individual Sector, supra note 224, at 1410 (“[A]
healthy individualism supports relationships, family, and community, creates wealth, beauty,
and spiritual meaning, respects the rights of others, and performs the duties of sovereign demo-
cratic citizenship.”).
228. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (invalidating a va-
grancy ordinance because, inter alia, walking, strolling, and wandering “have been in part re-
sponsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of
creativity. These [activities] have dignified the right of dissent and have honored the right to be
nonconformists”).
229. Reich, Individual Sector, supra note 224, at 1413.
230. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 190 n.10 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“[O]ne of the purposes of the law of real property . . . is to define and enforce privacy inter-
ests—to empower some people to make whatever use they wish of certain tracts of land with-
out fear that other people will intrude upon their activities.”); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
144 n.12 (1978) (“One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others.”);
id. at 153 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[P]roperty rights reflect society’s explicit recognition of a
person’s authority to act as he wishes in certain areas, and therefore should be considered in
determining whether an individual’s expectations of privacy are reasonable.”).
Luna to Printer.doc                   04/29/99 4:49 PM
832 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [48:787
der their affairs. People will only prepare and invest for the future if
they know that the lines set today will not vacillate or simply disap-
pear tomorrow. Sturdy boundaries of power provide this confidence.
Likewise, government officials need predetermined, understandable
limitations for their day-to-day conduct. The “good cop” wants clear
guidance; the “bad cop” must be constrained by legal barriers.231 Indi-
vidual sovereignty serves both goals.
The most important aspect of sovereignty theory is its bottom
line. By articulating zones of individual sovereignty, it provides a
solid floor for all government activity. In essence, the theory pro-
claims to the state that it may freely govern to the point where indi-
vidual sovereignty begins—but it may then go no further. Sovereignty
theory articulates an inviolate baseline of rights for all citizens, pro-
hibiting both blunt intrusions and stealthy encroachments, and cre-
ates an embankment on the slippery slope. Dworkin’s moral reading
established a constitutional floor which was beyond the power of po-
litical majorities,232 and sovereignty theory shares this commitment to
fundamental individual rights.
C. Scholarly Criticism
Moral theories are subject to a variety of criticisms. Such theo-
retical approaches tend to adopt vague principles at a high level of
abstraction. Although they may sound functional, some scholars con-
tend that moral principles are generally useless in determining con-
crete cases. Their terms are “reminiscent of the rhetoric of Mother-
hood and Apple Pie,”233 universally accepted but entirely empty of
tangible content. Dworkin’s moral reading of the Constitution has
been particularly vulnerable to this critique. “His addiction to ab-
straction,” argues Raoul Berger, “dogs his every step.”234
231. See Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing
“Bright Lines” and “Good Faith”, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 320-21 (1982) (arguing that a simple
rule should be preferred to one which is theoretically superior but difficult to apply).
232. See McCaffery, supra note 151, at 1081 (“In Dworkin’s model, courts are the last bas-
tion of fundamental individual rights; they set a floor of minimally equal concern and re-
spect.”).
233. TUSHNET, supra note 64, at 140.
234. Raoul Berger, Ronald Dworkin’s The Moral Reading of the Constitution: A Critique,
72 IND. L.J. 1099, 1100 (1997) (reviewing DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 151); see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, NEW
REPUBLIC, May 13, 1996, at 35, 38 (reviewing DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 151,
and observing that Dworkin “works almost entirely from philosophical abstractions”).
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Even if moral principles could be forged for earthly application,
critics contend that there is no deep-seated rationale for picking one
principle over another or for choosing a particular moral theory
rather than its competitor. There is simply no reason to believe that
two people will come to the same moral solution for a particular con-
stitutional dispute; in fact, a controversy is likely to produce as many
answers as there are commentators given the endless variety of moral
theories. “There is not just one moral reading,” points out Professor
Cass Sunstein in his critique of Freedom’s Law.235 “And Dworkin’s
adversaries—including [Robert] Bork and [Learned] Hand—are
making moral claims, and offering moral readings, of their own.”236
What’s worse, critics argue, is that moral theory allows political
agendas to be smuggled into constitutional law under the cover of
principled analysis. Moral theory can plausibly be invoked to support
any cause or outcome.237 Numerous scholars have attacked Dworkin’s
moral reading of the Constitution on precisely this count, noting the
blatant selectivity in his use of precedents and history.238 Such chican-
ery has no place in constitutional adjudication, critics maintain.
Moral theory collapses interpretation and constitutional amendment
into a single judicial enterprise, transforming judges into moral phi-
losophers who pick and choose among subjective value judgments.
But judges are not inherently superior moral theorists; there are no
“philosopher-kings” in America.239 Instead, judges are just men and
women, largely selected from an elite band of society. In fact, their
insulation from the trials and tribulations of the average citizen may
make courts the least competent branch of government to assess con-
235. Sunstein, supra note 234, at 37.
236. Id.
237. See ELY, supra note 4, at 50 (“[Y]ou can invoke natural law to support anything you
want. . . . Thus natural law has been summoned in support of all manner of causes in this coun-
try . . . and often on both sides of the same issue.”).
238. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 234, at 1104 & n.46, 1107; Richard A. Epstein, The First
Freedoms, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1996, § 7 (Magazine), at 2 (reviewing DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S
LAW, supra note 151, and criticizing Dworkin’s “selective invocation” of the liberty provisions
of the Constitution); Sellers, supra note 151 (noting Dworkin’s attempt to “redefine the word
‘democracy’ to mean not ‘majority rule’ or rule by elected representatives, but whatever struc-
ture will most likely ‘treat all members of the community, as individuals, with equal concern
and respect’”); Sunstein, supra note 234, at 38 (“Readers will be frustrated to find that Dworkin
rarely puts counter-arguments in their strongest form.”); Adam Wolfson, Telling the Court
What to Think, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1996, at A9 (“In the end, Mr. Dworkin simply evades the
question of why human fetuses do not have a right to life.”).
239. See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958) (“For myself it would be most
irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians.”).
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temporary morality. When the judiciary strikes down government ac-
tion based on some moral theory, it is tough to show that the court is
doing anything more than substituting its value judgments for that of
the political majority.
Much of this criticism, however, can be rebutted. Generally,
those who attack Dworkin’s moral reading present “inside” rather
than “outside” objections: they agree with the theory’s basic structure
but disagree with its application in a given context.240 Such criticism
jeopardizes only a particular application of the moral reading, not the
theory itself.241 Moreover, Dworkin readily admits that his liberal
leanings are reflected in his legal analysis. In fact, he contends it is
not only acceptable to incorporate one’s moral judgments into consti-
tutional theory, it is inevitable.242 To do otherwise is to hide from
public scrutiny and debate the true grounds for judicial decision-
making.243 Other scholars of different political persuasions are invited
to provide superior moral readings of the Constitution.244
It can be argued, however, that these responses do not address
the devastating postmodern critique of moral theory. There is no uni-
versal good, critics argue, no predetermined set of moral rights or
principles that can be taken as a given. The “given” incorporated into
modernist approaches is not handed down from on high but is instead
constructed by individuals based on experience or other evidence. In-
terpretation endows the given with an epistemological status but only
on the basis of preconceived beliefs held by the interpreter. The im-
240. See McCaffery, supra note 151, at 1046 (distinguishing between “Dworkin’s interpre-
tive method, on the one hand, and his own particular instantiations of that practice, or within it,
on the other”).
241. Professor James Fleming “distinguish[es] between Dworkin’s . . . moral reading and
Dworkin’s own application of it, and urge[s]: ‘Do as Dworkin says, not as he does.’” Fleming,
supra note 189, at 1349.
242. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 151, at 36-37 (“Of course my constitu-
tional opinions are influenced by my own convictions of political morality. So are the opinions
of lawyers who are more conservative and more radical than I am. . . . I not only concede but
emphasize that constitutional opinion is sensitive to political conviction.”).
243. See id. at 37 (“Constitutional politics has been confused and corrupted by a pretense
that judges . . . could use politically neutral strategies of constitutional interpretation. . . . The
actual grounds of decision are hidden from both legitimate public inspection and valuable pub-
lic debate.”).
244. See id. at 38:
My arguments can certainly be resisted. But I hope they will be resisted in the right
way: by pointing out their fallacies or by deploying different principles—more con-
servative or more radical ones—and showing why these different principles are bet-
ter because they are grounded in a superior morality, or are more practicable, or are
in some other way wiser or fairer.
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port of these beliefs stems from an interpretation of their meaning
against the background of other beliefs and interpretations, which in
turn are founded on still other beliefs and interpretations, and so on.
Not only is interpretation caught in a terminal spiral of yet more in-
terpretation, but the number of possible constructions is limited only
by the number of interpreters.245
Postmodernism employs a “deconstruction” methodology to de-
stroy all universalist claims. Every time a scholar constructs a univer-
sal theory founded on undeniable first principles, the postmodernist
deconstructs the theory by demonstrating that the principles are only
made fundamental by excluding other feasible precepts.246 The critic
can then construct an equally plausible theory based on these alter-
nate principles. In the end, universal theories can only survive by de-
nying the validity of other perspectives and interpretations.
This moral skepticism is the foundation of the Critical Legal
Studies (CLS) movement and its marxist, feminist and racial-inquiry
cognates. Contemporary society is riddled with illegitimate hierar-
chies of power resulting from the alleged universalism of modernist
thought, CLS theorists argue.247 By excluding the viewpoints of
women, racial minorities, the poor, and other marginalized groups,
society has constructed narrow moral standards of reason, truth, and
goodness. These principles are then converted into law, backed by
the authority of the state, and utilized by the politically powerful to
maintain their strength while oppressing those of different perspec-
tives.
Postmodernism in general and the CLS movement in particular
attempt to expose universalism as a fraud. And, quite frankly, mod-
ernism cannot muster a credible response. American society has his-
torically subjugated women, oppressed minorities, and castigated the
poor. It is simply undeniable in the face of slavery, disenfranchise-
ment, segregation, professional disability, and official caste crea-
245. Cf. JACQUES DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA (David B. Allison trans., 1973).
246. See Andrew M. Jacobs, God Save This Postmodern Court: The Death of Necessity and
the Transformation of the Supreme Court’s Overruling Rhetoric, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1144
(1995) (“[P]ostmodernism attacks the foundationalism of modernism, or the modernist belief
that knowledge rests on some ultimately verifiable truths.”).
247. See Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 829, 852
(1983) (“[C]ontract doctrine is created and perpetuated as a belief system to conceal the reality
of economic injustice in society. Society is composed of illegitimate hierarchies in which domi-
nant economic groups systematically exploit their subordinates [by] inducing acceptance of
values and institutions that appear to support the status quo.”).
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tion.248 But, that said, postmodernism fails to provide a solution. It
simply knocks down the current legal regime without proposing an
alternate system; deconstruction taken to the extreme is nihilism un-
der another title. In reality, absolute skepticism is both untenable and
unpalatable to postmodern scholarship. Even the most skeptical
skeptic agrees that slavery and genocide are wrong, for example, and
therefore represent “universal” principles.249 Moreover, “the internal
skeptic can’t be skeptical all the way down,” argues Dworkin,
“because he builds his skepticism on some positive moral position. If
he claimed that no moral judgment or conviction or instinct of any
kind could be true, he would condemn his own theory.”250
Nonetheless, postmodernism offers two interrelated caveats for
moral theory. First, ostensibly universal moral principles can be the
source of oppression by excluding other perspectives. Second, only
constant critical analysis can reveal such covert injustice. The solu-
tion, I argue, is to accept the postmodern challenge as a necessary
limitation of any moral theory. The goal should still be finding uni-
versal moral principles, but with an understanding that what seems
fundamental and just in modern society may be uncovered as coer-
cive and unjust in the future. A moral theory, therefore, cannot be ar-
rogantly self-confident; it must instead be humbly self-critical.
Individual sovereignty, I believe, offers a post-postmodern the-
ory of the Constitution which meets this heightened standard of va-
248. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 9, art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (constitutional provisions implic-
itly allowing slavery) (amended by U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XV); U.S. CONST. amend. XV
(enfranchising African Americans in 1870); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (enfranchising women in
1920); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (prohibiting poll taxes in 1964); Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941) (invalidating a statute barring the entry of indigents into the state); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (upholding racial segregation under the “separate but
equal” theory); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (upholding a ban on women
practicing law); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that, inter alia,
African-American slaves were not members of the American political community entitled to
legal recognition).
249. But the postmodern skeptic is unlikely to call them “universal principles”:
He [will deny] that these practices are really wrong, or that their wrongness is “out
there” in reality. He insists, rather, that the wrongness is “in here,” in our own
breasts, that we have “projected” moral quality onto reality, that events are not, in
themselves, right or wrong good or bad, apart from our emotions or projects or con-
ventions, that our moral convictions are not, after all, true or false or part of what we
do or do not know, but are only, in complex ways, products of our invention or
manufacture. He is skeptical, in other words, not about convictions but about what
we might call the “face value” view of these convictions.
Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 92
(1996).
250. Id. at 94.
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lidity. Underlying this theory is a universal interest shared by all indi-
viduals—the interest in living life according to one’s own judgments,
consistent with all other individuals having that same right. In other
words, each individual would agree to maximize her personal sover-
eignty so long as other persons also maintain equivalent areas of
autonomy. These spatial zones of sovereignty would be adopted by a
citizenry in the “original position.”251 Behind the “veil of igno-
rance,”252 denied knowledge of what their particular circumstances
entail, individuals would choose these sovereign areas to be protected
against governmental intrusion. But whatever zones are chosen, sov-
ereignty theory must remain vigilantly self-conscious. The areas of
individual sovereignty supported in history, precedent, and contem-
porary values of today may provide insufficient protection or be
normatively unjustified tomorrow.
D. A Model of the Fourth Amendment
The difficult task then is to locate the domains of individual sov-
ereignty that must be protected by the Fourth Amendment in the
here and now. Drawing borders between citizens and the state re-
quires near certainty to avoid claims of arbitrary selection or hidden
political agendas. Criticism can only be met by constructing zones
that will stand as archetypes of individual sovereignty—places gar-
nering a moral consensus among the population. Although substan-
tial disagreement is likely as the list of potential candidates expands,
I believe that, at the very least, two relevant domains of personal
sovereignty will be on everyone’s list: body and home. They represent
conspicuous elements of the sovereign individual in contemporary
society. These zones are not perfect, nor do they perfectly reflect the
entirety of individual sovereignty. It is quite possible that other areas
of individual autonomy exist and should be recognized.253 But I be-
lieve they offer the “best” zones of sovereignty and can help make
251. RAWLS, supra note 149 at 12 (describing a situation in which “no one knows his place
in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribu-
tion of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength and the like”).
252. Id.
253. In fact, I have elsewhere constructed an individual rights model of criminal procedure
that incorporates a third zone of personal sovereignty—the mind. See Luna, supra note 125
(manuscript at 58-71). The government can “search” the mind through scientific innovations
such as the lie-detector or medieval torture devices like the rack. But for the most part,
searches and seizures of the mind will be covered by the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See id.
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the Fourth Amendment the very best it can be in the context of mod-
ern America.
The importance of these paradigms as historical and contempo-
rary concepts is the subject of countless works, but I nonetheless will
add a few words on why the body and the home are appropriate ar-
chetypes for the sovereignty theory. As will be discussed in the next
section, the body and home occupy a unique position in the Court’s
jurisprudence; it has gone out of its way to protect rights associated
with these areas. In other words, the body and home paradigms “fit”
the case precedents. They also square with the spatial orientation of
the Constitution in general and the Fourth Amendment in particu-
lar.254 In their daily practice, government agents would be provided
with definitive limitations. Although tough questions cannot be
avoided,255 both the beat cop and the average citizen understand when
someone’s body or home is being invaded. And it can be forcefully
argued that the exercise of all rights in society presupposes individual
sovereignty in these areas. Without autonomy over the home and
body, the rights to free speech and due process would be shallow
guarantees.256
These sovereign zones also have great normative appeal. Control
over one’s body and home is the very essence of personhood. We de-
fine ourselves by our physical beings and the area where we conduct
both basic and intimate activities: This is who I am. This is where I
live. Deference to these zones is central to personal dignity. When
society protects an individual’s body and home, it recognizes him as a
moral agent deserving of respect. It announces to the community that
his personal choice, his very way of life is legitimate and that his
means of self-description must be tolerated.
But, most importantly, it allows an individual to control his own
destiny. We all have dictators in the recesses of our minds—we long
for power and control over something, anything. Clearly, unbounded
autonomy is inconsistent with organized society. It is, in fact, anarchy.
An individual’s personal choice of public policy will often be rejected
for lack of popular support. The fact that “I Like Ike” does not pre-
ordain a presidential election. But by reserving the body and home to
254. See infra Part IV.A.1.
255. For example, should a homeless man’s tent and a traveler’s R.V. be deemed “homes”?
256. See Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, in
POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 87, 97 (Claude R. Sowle ed., 1962) (“Security in
one’s home and person is the fundamental without which there can be no liberty.”).
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the individual—that which is the very essence of his being—we allow
him to maintain very real control over his own life.
Reverence for the body and home is not a new concept; it has
roots in the dawn of man, expressed in biblical times and invoked in
the first laws.257 Enlightenment liberalism claimed these concepts as
fundamental. In his Second Treatise of Government, Locke argued
that “every man has a property [right] in his own person. This nobody
has any right to but himself.”258 The writ of habeas corpus and the
demise of indentured servitude represented the moral truth that a
person’s body belongs to himself and not to others. Likewise, the ax-
iom that “a man’s home is his castle” derives from visions of individ-
ual sovereignty.259
The body and home have remained archetypes of sovereignty in
modern society. People view governmental activity in these personal
domains as particularly intrusive.260 There is, in fact, a psychological
need for “some locus that is inviolable by others except at the per-
son’s express invitation.”261 In literature, the visceral dread invoked
by negative utopias stems in large part from the unmitigated invasion
of fictional governments into the individual’s home and body.262 The
257. See Gavison, supra note 203, at 464 n.131 (“A certain sphere of privacy has been pro-
tected from the earliest times. Anglo-Saxon law and German tribal law protected the peace
that attached to every freeman’s dwelling, and offered compensation for damage to property,
insulting words, and the mere act of intrusion.”); Milton R. Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A
Philosophical Prelude, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 272, 272 (1966) (describing Adam, Eve,
and Noah as biblical figures concerned with maintaining bodily privacy); Jason S. Marks, Mis-
sion Impossible? Rescuing the Fourth Amendment from the War on Drugs, 11 CRIM. JUST. 16,
16-17 (1996) (citing Roman legal codes for the proposition that “autonomy and inviolability of
the person and the home stand as the first principle of natural law”).
258. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27 (1690), reprinted in TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967).
259. Cf. William Pitt, Speech on the Excise Bill, quoted in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,
378-79 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting):
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may
be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through it—the storm may enter,
the rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter—all his force dares not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!
See generally Luna, supra note 125 (manuscript at 60 nn.213 & 215) (listing sources supporting
the sovereignty of the home).
260. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 205, at 737-38 (reporting survey that shows
people perceive government searches of homes and bodies as among the most intrusive
searches imaginable).
261. Sidney M. Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 307, 310 (1966).
262. See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 4 (1949):
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sanctity of these zones has also been enshrined in the constitutions
and fundamental law of foreign nations throughout the world.263 Even
primitive cultures respect the hallowed nature of the body and
home.264 By maintaining these zones of individual sovereignty, ex-
plicit recognition is given to societal norms that transcend history and
are linked to human existence.
This conception of the sovereignty theory is both consistent with,
and provides content for, an individual rights model of the Fourth
Amendment. According to this model, the Amendment guarantees
individual liberties to every citizen. It defends substance rather than
procedure, ensuring a baseline of constitutional protection to each
moral agent. Fair process alone is insufficient. The government may
not conduct surveillance activities below the constitutional floor de-
spite the otherwise equitable nature of its procedures. Sovereignty
theory, in turn, provides the content of that constitutional floor—the
substantive zones of individual sovereignty.
The individual rights model of the Fourth Amendment is fairly
straightforward: the strongest presumption265 of invalidity attaches to
government searches and seizures of an individual’s body or home.
                                                                                                                                     
In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for an in-
stant like a blue-bottle, and darted away again with a curving flight. It was the Police
Patrol, snooping into people’s windows. . . . Any sound that Winston made [in his
home], above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up by [the telescreen];
moreover, so long as he remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque
commanded, he could be seen as well as heard.
See also ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932) (depicting official use of severe elec-
tric shocks to condition infants to hate books and flowers).
263. See generally S.E. FINER ET AL., COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS 116-17, 128, 131, 133,
233, 252, 300 (1995).
264. See WESTIN, supra note 203, at 15:
Whether the primitive household is nuclear or extended, most societies have rules
limiting free entry into the house by nonresidents, as well as rules governing the out-
sider’s conduct once he enters. Even in those societies where entry is fairly free,
there will usually be rules limiting what a person may touch or where he may go
within the house.
Individual sovereignty, moreover, appears to be an animalistic rather than a solely human con-
cept:
One basic finding of animal studies is that virtually all animals seek periods of indi-
vidual seclusion or small-group intimacy. That is usually described as the tendency
toward territoriality, in which an organism lays private claim to an area of land, wa-
ter, or air and defends it against intrusion by members of its own species.
Id. at 8.
265. See, e.g., Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Revision of Norms, 100 ETHICS 756, 759
(“presumptions operate as corrective devices which regulate in advance the direction of error,
where errors are believed to be inevitable”). See also Jeremy Bentham, Treatise on Judicial
Evidence 197-98 (1825) (“in doubtful cases [the judge should] consider the error which acquits
as more justifiable, or less injurious to the good of society, than the error which condemns”).
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Relevant examples are endless, including arrests, entries into domi-
ciles, collection of bodily fluids, and any other intrusion into the
home or body. In such circumstances, the state has invaded a zone of
individual sovereignty—the area where a citizen exercises ultimate
power without accountability. By searching the body or home, the
government deprives the individual of his right to decide, to act, and
to exclude without interference. At the same time, the government
appropriates this power and establishes itself as de facto sovereign.
These acts are ultra vires, beyond the boundaries of official authority.
On its face, the individual rights model appears to provide an
impregnable barrier between government and individuals. But al-
though the boundary is robust, it is not insurmountable: there is no
such thing as an absolute right.266 Because individual liberties will al-
ways have exceptions, the goal is that the limitations be few and
wholly consistent with the right. In other words, the exceptions
should prove the rule rather than become the rule.
The sovereignty-based model is compatible with three discrete
exceptions to an otherwise irrebuttable presumption of unconstitu-
tionality. First, the individual can consent to a search of his home or
body. As a practical matter, the criminal justice system would be se-
riously impeded if consent became an insufficient predicate for a
valid search. More importantly, this limitation is wholly consistent
with the underpinnings of the sovereignty theory. If an individual
consents to a search or seizure, she is exercising primary authority.267
The right to exclude necessarily implies the right to include, and as
long as the final determination is made by the person whose body or
home is being searched, sovereignty remains with the individual.268
The second exception is when the government agent possesses
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. A suspicion-based departure
266. There may, however, be “core” applications of a right that are absolute. See, e.g., Grif-
fin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege
against self-incrimination bars a prosecutor from commenting on the accused’s silence and
likewise bars a judge from instructing a jury that such silence may be considered evidence of
guilt).
267. Arguably, an individual who is unable to consent to a search is not truly sovereign.
268. This limitation, of course, assumes that the consent is voluntary. Coerced consent and
its philosophical cousin, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, are beyond the scope of this
Article. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (establishing Fourth Amendment
standard for assessing voluntary consent to search); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court,
1987 Term—Forward: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988) (critiquing unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989) (same).
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from the individual rights model conforms to both constitutional text
and context and the underlying philosophy of the sovereignty theory.
The Fourth Amendment expressly allows searches and seizures based
on a particular quantum of suspicion—that is, “probable cause”269—
thereby delimiting a circumstance when the citizen is not sovereign.
Since the Framers’ time, individualized suspicion has been viewed as
a necessary component of valid searches and seizures,270 particularly
when the government seeks to invade a person’s body271 or home.272
Individualized suspicion provides an objective standard or
“yardstick” with which to measure the constitutionality of police ac-
tivities.273 The government must justify a search or seizure with exter-
nal, articulable facts—facts which are beyond the state’s control. It
may intrude upon a zone of sovereignty if and only if a citizen’s ac-
tions give rise to individualized suspicion.274 The standard sets up a
269. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
270. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 667 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“For most of our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless searches have been generally con-
sidered per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Skinner v. Rail-
way Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 655 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (invoking the
“time-honored and textually based principles of the Fourth Amendment—principles the Fram-
ers of the Bill of Rights designed to ensure that the Government has a strong and individual-
ized justification when it seeks to invade an individual’s privacy”); Thomas K. Clancy, The Role
of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U.
MEM. L. Rev. 483, 487-517 (1995) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment’s historical context
demonstrates that the Framers intended to prohibit suspicionless searches and seizures).
271. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966):
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects
forbid any [bodily] intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be ob-
tained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found,
these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such
evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search.
272. In fact, individualized suspicion without a warrant has been deemed insufficient to jus-
tify a search or seizure in the home. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (citations
omitted) (“‘Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling
house furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant.’ That basic rule
‘has never been questioned in this Court.’”).
273. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 359 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
274. See Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurispru-
dence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1458-59 (1996) (describing the “paradoxical” feature of the
Fourth Amendment that creates “an individual right, the scope of which is defined by a matter
extrinsic to the individual and his or her conduct and culpability: what the government
knows”); Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 1766-67 (“If undertaken
without adequate individualized suspicion, a search or seizure to which the Warrant Clause ap-
plied could not be redeemed through policy arguments as to why the intrusion should have
been allowed anyway or by a broad appeal to societal approval of the government's actions.”).
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simple procedure which provides a degree of certainty275 by disci-
plining government agents and supplying predictability for members
of society. Moreover, individualized suspicion is the Fourth Amend-
ment’s central protection against arbitrary and invidious state ac-
tion.276 It limits official intrusions to circumstances that provide a
level of confidence in the eventual success of a given search or sei-
zure.277 Particularized suspicion also supports the philosophical un-
derpinnings of the criminal justice system: people should be punished
for their past deeds and not their future propensities.278 Suspicionless
searches and seizures are premised on what an individual is likely to
do rather than what he has already done. They presume an individual
guilty in contravention of the great first principle of American crimi-
nal procedure—each citizen is legally innocent until proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.279
Most importantly, individualized suspicion is consistent with a
zone of personal sovereignty secured to each citizen. It empowers the
individual, ensuring initial autonomy over his domain. “Searches
based on individualized suspicion,” argued Justice O’Connor, “afford
potential targets considerable control over whether they will, in fact,
be searched, because a person can avoid such a search by not acting
in an objectively suspicious way.”280 If a person goes about his life
275. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the term
“probable cause” “rings a bell of certainty that is not sounded by phrases such as ‘reasonable
suspicion’”); cf. Erik G. Luna, Welfare Fraud and the Fourth Amendment, 24 PEPP. L. REV.
1235, 1284-85 (1997) (footnotes omitted):
As its name implies, probable cause deals with probabilities—the likelihood that a
certain fact will be found true. The appropriate considerations “are not technical;
they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Probable cause is a “fluid concept”
which accommodates the factual and legal scenario at hand. Although it cannot be
“reduced to a neat set of legal rules,” probable cause in the criminal context can be
roughly defined as “a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” “Probable cause exists
where the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being commit-
ted.”
276. See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 457-58 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
277. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (stating that individualized sus-
picion requires “a clear indication” that the desired evidence will be found). See generally Colb,
supra note 274.
278. Cf. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (invalidating vagrancy
ordinance that allowed arrest for innocuous activity).
279. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (stressing that the “reasonable-doubt stan-
dard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure”).
280. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 667 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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without making a scene or raising suspicions, he retains the right to to
be left alone. Primary power and control, the necessary incidents of
personal sovereignty, belong to the citizen. The government demon-
strates respect for the individual, for her zones of sovereignty and her
basic dignity, when it acts only with the predicate level of suspicion.281
The final exception to the model stems from the sovereignty of
individuals other than the person subject to the search or seizure.
Constitutional liberties are powers or immunities which may be exer-
cised by each and every citizen; the vesting of a right in one person
presupposes that all other individuals possess that same right. But the
very existence of the same right in all moral agents has an implicit
limitation: an individual may not exercise that right to the derogation
of the rights of another.282 “Your right to swing your arms,” quipped
281. The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment demands a particular level of indi-
vidualized suspicion presented in a specific manner: warrant-based searches and seizures are
only valid if based on a neutral and detached magistrate’s determination of probable cause.
The warrant itself is intended to prevent random or arbitrary state action by injecting a judicial
officer into the process. In theory, the warrant requirement will force government agents to
articulate the relevant facts as a coherent theory of probable cause that can then be thoroughly
scrutinized by the magistrate. Real-world practice, however, is not so clean. Some scholars have
argued that magistrates take their responsibilities less than seriously, serving as “rubber
stamps” for searches and seizures. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 196, 172
(1980); William A. Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Ex-
clusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1412 (1981). There are also a variety of situations that pre-
clude law enforcement from securing a warrant before acting. When police are chasing a flee-
ing felon who darts into a residence, it would be impractical (and a little bit absurd) to require a
warrant before allowing the pursuit to continue. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43
(1976) (holding that the “hot pursuit” doctrine permits police to search a suspect who has re-
treated from a public area into her home); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967)
(holding that police may make a warrantless search of a home into which a robbery suspect has
just entered). Although the process must generally be respected, some exigent circumstances
should excuse the warrant requirement. Likewise, there are situations which justify a lower
level of suspicion than probable cause. For example, beat cops arguably need the power to
conduct a “stop and frisk” on less than probable cause when they have a reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (emphasizing that the
“stop and frisk” exception allows an officer to “protect[] . . . himself and others . . . and neu-
tralize the threat of harm if it materializes”). These issues, however, are beyond the scope of
this Article. The thrust of this exception to the sovereignty-based model is the need for indi-
vidualized suspicion: an objective, external set of facts justifying an intrusion into a person’s
zone of sovereignty.
282. The French Revolutionaries recognized this principle over two centuries ago: “[T]he
only limitations on the individual’s exercise of his natural rights are those which ensure the en-
joyment of these same rights to all other individuals.” THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF
MAN AND THE CITIZEN Art. 4 (1789), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 744, 744
(Albert P. Blaustein et al. eds., 1987).
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Zachariah Chafee, “ends just where the other man’s nose begins.”283
In terms of the Fourth Amendment model, an individual’s sover-
eignty cannot be invaded as a matter of governmental policy unless
the personal sovereignty of others is directly and substantially endan-
gered.
The philosophical basis for this limitation was first articulated by
John Stuart Mill in 1859. In his timeless piece, On Liberty, Mill de-
lineates the “harm principle” as prescribing government’s power to
impede individual autonomy.284 That “one very simple principle . . . is,
that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number . . . is to prevent harm to others.”285 Mill distinguishes be-
tween “self-regarding” harm and “other-regarding” harm: self-
regarding activities have primary and direct affect only on the inter-
ests of the decisionmaker. In contrast, other-regarding activities af-
fect “directly and in the first instance” the interests of individuals
other than the actor. Self-regarding harm, therefore, primarily and
substantially injures the decisionmaker only, while other-regarding
harm directly injures other persons.
If I get drunk in my apartment, for example, make a huge mess,
cut my hand on a broken bottle, and then pass out on the couch, I
have inflicted self-regarding harm. It is my apartment, my hand, and
my hangover. As long as I was quiet, no other person is worse for the
wear. In contrast, if I become intoxicated and then get behind the
wheel of a car, I pose the very real threat of both self-regarding and
other-regarding harm. Not only could I end up injuring or killing my-
self, but I could maim or kill other drivers or pedestrians.
Clearly, self-regarding harm can have ripple effects on other in-
dividuals. The hangover I suffer might affect my performance in class
or the courtroom, and hence my students or my clients. But these are
the indirect, remote effects of my self-regarding activities. According
to Mill, government can regulate only those acts which primarily,
chiefly, or directly harm other individuals.286 Injury or the substantial
283. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (1941).
284. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in ON LIBERTY, REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN: THREE ESSAYS BY JOHN STUART MILL (Oxford
Univ. Press 1912). It should be noted that Mill has typically been characterized as a utilitarian
rather than an advocate of universal moral rights. But despite its obstensible origin in
Benthamite thought, Mill’s “harm principle” is consistent with neo-Kantian moral theory.
285. Id. at 14-15.
286. See id. at 99-101.
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possibility of injury to others can be viewed as jurisdictional in na-
ture, providing the prerequisite for government intrusion into zones
of personal sovereignty.287 When the first-order harm accrues solely
to the decisionmaker, state interference is intolerable. Only direct
injury to other persons provides license to regulate or prohibit.288
The harm principle possesses both practical and theoretical
merit. It prevents arguably gratuitous, paternalistic limitations on in-
dividual autonomy. Paternalism seeks to protect or promote the citi-
zenry’s physical, moral or economic well-being regardless of personal
choice. Such action is not only degrading, but often incorrect. Each
individual has his own vision of the good life which can be achieved
only through state respect for autonomy and free will. The ability to
choose one’s path is just as important as the path itself. There is also
little empirical support justifying prohibitions on sheerly self-
regarding activity such as drug use.289
Most importantly, the harm principle can be squared with the
sovereignty-based model of the Fourth Amendment. An individual’s
sovereignty over his body and home cannot be defeated by ordinary
policy considerations. The belief that mass residential searches will
uncover evidence of tax fraud, for instance, should be an insufficient
predicate for government action. What can defeat an individual’s
claim of sovereignty is a real, direct and substantial threat to the sov-
ereign zones of other citizens.
A “real” threat is one that is self-evident under the circum-
stances or empirically demonstrable. This incorporates a quasi-
statistical, probabilistic element into the formula. The possibility that
287. See id. at 92-93:
As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others,
society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or
will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion. But there is
no room for entertaining any such question when a person’s conduct affects the in-
terests of no persons besides himself. . . . In all such cases there should be perfect
freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences.
288. The leading modern scholar on the harm principle is Professor Joel Feinberg, who has
written extensively on the matter. See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS (1984); 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985); 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF (1986); 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988).
289. See generally Erik G. Luna, Our Vietnam: The Prohibition Apocalypse, 46 DEPAUL L.
REV. 483 (1997) (discussing the failure of drug prohibition); Robert W. Sweet & Edward A.
Harris, Just and Unjust Wars: The War on the War on Drugs—Some Moral and Constitutional
Dimensions of the War on Drugs, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1302 (1993) (reviewing THOMAS SZASZ,
OUR RIGHT TO DRUGS: THE CASE FOR A FREE MARKET (1992)) (same).
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a police officer might accidentally shoot and kill an innocent individ-
ual is real: it happens every year, in every major city, to very real vic-
tims.290 But the chance that a secretary might stab a co-worker in the
chest with a sharp pencil is largely imaginary. By “direct,” I mean
that a primary, first-order injury will be sustained by an individual
other than the person being searched. This is the previously discussed
distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding harm. A
“substantial” threat is one that poses irremediable consequences of a
tragic or disastrous nature. This will invariably involve a danger to
physical safety in one’s body or home—a shooting, an explosion, a
raging fire. When a real, direct and substantial threat to the body or
home of other citizens is presented, a search and seizure regime can
be consistent with the sovereignty theory. Although government may
be invading the sovereignty of the individual searched, it is doing so
only to protect the sovereignty of others. In modern constitutional
parlance, there must be a tight fit between ends and means when the
government seeks to invade the home or body. The means—invading
an individual’s sovereignty—must be justified by a compelling end—a
real, direct, and substantial threat to the sovereignty of others.
The individual rights model of the Fourth Amendment based on
the sovereignty theory can be described very simply. Government
searches and seizures of an individual’s body or home receive the
strongest presumption of unconstitutionality. Only three exceptions
can be invoked to justify a body or home search: (1) voluntary con-
sent; (2) individualized suspicion of wrongdoing; or (3) real, direct
and substantial threats to the bodies or homes of other individuals.291
Searches and seizures that do not implicate the body or home might
also carry an initial presumption of invalidity. But that presumption
should not be fatal. Beyond the body and home, society as a whole is
sovereign, not the individual.292
290. See, e.g., Editorial, Overkill, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 9, 1999, at 16A (criticizing shooting
of unarmed man by New York police officers); Editorial, Deadly Crises Series, ST. PE-
TERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 23, 1998, at 8A (discussing “questionable shootings by police in recent
years involving suspects who were unarmed, acting strangely, victims of mistaken identity or
shot in the back,” shootings that raise “questions about whether officers are adequately trained
and disciplined in the use of deadly force”).
291. Moreover, searches generally must be pursuant to a judicially issued warrant absent
exigent circumstances. I leave the parameters of the warrant requirement for another day. See
supra note 281.
292. By employing the zones of sovereignty and the enumerated exceptions, the individual
rights model of the Fourth Amendment can address (virtually) all search and seizure issues.
But as I articulate elsewhere, the individual rights model of criminal procedure cannot directly
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Once the individual rights model of the Fourth Amendment is
understood, the question becomes whether the zones of sovereignty
are consistent with a moral reading of the Constitution.
1. Fit. The body and home archetypes “fit” the constitutional
record. First and foremost, the text of the Fourth Amendment
supports these zones of sovereignty. It expressly guarantees the right
to be secure in one’s “person[]” and “house[]” from unreasonable
searches and seizures.293 Other constitutional terms buttress these
areas of individual sovereignty. The Thirteenth Amendment outlaws
the institution of slavery.294 The Third Amendment forbids the
quartering of soldiers in a person’s home without the owner’s
consent.295 These and other textual provisions of the Constitution are
consistent with each citizen being the ultimate sovereign over her
body and home.
The context of the Fourth Amendment is also compatible with
the sovereignty theory. The “hated hallmark of colonial rule” was the
writ of assistance issued by the British Crown.296 This instrument gave
royal customs inspectors the unfettered right to intrude into a home
without justification in order to search for contraband.297 A similar
device, the general warrant, had been used in England to stamp out
seditious libel but was eventually condemned.298 A search of an indi-
vidual’s home pursuant to a general warrant, argued British jurists,
was “totally subversive of the liberty of the subject”299 and “worse
than the Spanish Inquisition.”300
The American colonists held similar sentiments against the writ
of assistance. They vehemently complained that “our houses and
even our bed chambers are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes,
chests, and trunks broke open, ravaged and plundered” by customs
                                                                                                                                     
answer various problems in the criminal justice system by reference to the sovereign zones. In-
stead, a number of conceptual tools consistent with individual sovereignty are required to com-
plete the criminal procedure model. See Luna, supra note 125 (manuscript at 67-69).
293. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
294. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
295. See U.S. CONST. amend. III.
296. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring).
297. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981).
298. See id.
299. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498 (K.B. 1763).
300. Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (K.B. 1763).
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agents.301 An attorney for aggrieved Colonists argued that “the free-
dom of one’s house” was “one of the most essential branches of Eng-
lish liberty.”302 “A man’s house,” he continued, “is his castle; and
while he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle.”303 The
abuse of the writs to intrude on the sovereignty of the home became
a precipitating cause of the American Revolution304 and the motiva-
tion for the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.305
Most importantly, the home and body archetypes fit the Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence. In the Fourth Amendment context, a
search of the body “instinctively gives us the most pause.”306 The
Court has noted that an “intrusion into an individual’s body . . . im-
plicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that
the intrusion may be ‘unreasonable’ even if likely to produce evi-
dence of a crime.”307 Such bodily intrusions threaten the individual’s
“most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.”308 Outside
of search and seizure law, the Court has strictly scrutinized state acts
against the body that “represent[] a substantial interference with that
301. ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776–1791, at 25
(1955).
302. TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 37 (1969)
(citation omitted).
303. Id.
304. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967) (stating that the writs were “a moti-
vating factor behind the Declaration of Independence”); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating that hatred for the writs was “so deeply felt
by the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution”); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 159 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating that abuse of the writs “more than
any one single factor gave rise to American independence”); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 625 (1886) (stating that the writs “were fresh in the memories of those who achieved our
independence”).
305. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 582 (1980) (“It is familiar history that indis-
criminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants’ were the
immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”)
(footnote omitted); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment
was most immediately the product of contemporary revulsion against a regime of writs of assis-
tance . . . .”). For authoritative discussions of the writs of assistance and the history of the
Fourth Amendment, see LANDYNSKI, supra note 2, at 19-48; LASSON, supra note 2, at 13-78;
TAYLOR, supra note 302, at 24-44. Although the Framers of the Constitution were not immedi-
ately concerned with searches and seizures of the body, their reverence for the body as an ar-
chetype of sovereignty in general can be inferred from the protection of the writ of habeas cor-
pus, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, the prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments,” U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII, and the general provisions of the Due Process Clause, see U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
306. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979).
307. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985).
308. Id. at 760.
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person’s liberty,”309 inflict “irreparable injury,”310 and “shock[] the
conscience.”311 It has recognized that such acts are offensive to
“human dignity.”312 Likewise, Chief Justice Earl Warren maintained
that government agents “must stop short of bruising the body,
breaking skin, puncturing tissue or extracting body fluids, whether
they contemplate doing it by force or by stealth.”313 “Every violation
of a person’s bodily integrity is an invasion of his or her liberty,”314
Justice Stevens has argued. Such violations “engender ‘deep degrada-
tion’ and ‘terror’”315 in the individual and deny the “moral fact that a
person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole.”316
The sovereignty of the body can be demonstrated by a few case
examples. In Schmerber v. California,317 the Court found that gov-
ernment agents may obtain a blood sample when they have probable
cause to believe that the individual was driving while intoxicated.318
But without that quantum of individualized suspicion, such searches
would be intolerable. “[W]ith respect to searches involving intrusions
beyond the body’s surface,” argued Justice Brennan, “[t]he interests
in human dignity . . . which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid
any such intrusions based on the mere chance that desired evidence
might be obtained.”319 When individualized suspicion is lacking, a
person’s control over his own body must receive deference.
Two decades later, the Court held that there are situations where
even individualized suspicion cannot defeat the sovereignty of the
body. In Winston v. Lee,320 the government had probable cause to be-
lieve that a bullet from a failed armed robbery was lodged in the de-
fendant’s body.321 But the Court held that “a more substantial justifi-
309. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (citation omitted).
310. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
311. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
312. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966).
313. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 442 (1957) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
314. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
315. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 593 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
316. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777
n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted). The lower federal courts have likewise
found that “breaches of the ‘integrity of the body’ result in the greatest invasion of privacy.”
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D.N.J. 1986).
317. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
318. See id. at 770-72.
319. Id. at 769-70.
320. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
321. See id. at 757.
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cation is required” before the state can intrude on an individual’s
bodily integrity.322 “A compelled surgical intrusion into an individ-
ual’s body for evidence . . . implicates expectations of [bodily] secu-
rity of such magnitude that the intrusion may be ‘unreasonable’ even
if likely to produce evidence of a crime.”323 Official action of this type
“involves a virtually total divestment of [an individual’s] ordinary
control” over his body.324
And in Tennessee v. Garner,325 the Court considered the use of
deadly force against a fleeing felon.326 The police in that case clearly
had probable cause to seize the suspect. The problem was the effect
deadly force had on the individual’s bodily sovereignty: “The intru-
siveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched. The sus-
pect’s fundamental interest in his own life need not be elaborated
upon.”327 When the suspected criminal is “nonviolent,” law enforce-
ment may not use deadly force.328 In such circumstances, the individ-
ual’s sovereignty over his body and his very life must be given the
utmost respect.
The Court has also vindicated bodily sovereignty outside of the
Fourth Amendment context. Due process forbids the government
from pumping a suspect’s stomach for evidence329 or involuntarily
administering antipsychotic drugs to a defendant on trial.330 Sterilizing
an inmate violates equal protection by “forever depriv[ing him] of a
basic liberty.”331 Penalizing an individual for his physical status, dis-
ease or disorder constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.332 The Court’s death penalty jurisprudence can
be viewed as a recognition of the sanctity of the corporeal being and
an attempt to restrict those situations when the state may take life
322. Id. at 767.
323. Id. at 759.
324. Id. at 765.
325. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
326. See id. at 3.
327. Id. at 9.
328. Id. at 11.
329. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (holding that obtaining evidence
through stomach pumping is a “method[] that offend[s] the Due Process Clause”).
330. See Riggins v. Nevada., 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (holding that a state may not coer-
cively administer antipsychotic drugs “absent a finding of overriding justification and a deter-
mination of medical appropriateness”).
331. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
332. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (invalidating a statute that had
made “the ‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal offense”).
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from the body.333 And the line of reproductive freedom cases stands
for the right of individuals to control both their intimate bodily activi-
ties334 and the procreative function of their bodies.335
The individual sovereignty in the home also finds support in Su-
preme Court language and precedents. “A special respect for indi-
vidual liberty in the home has long been part of our culture and our
law,”336 the Court has opined, “embedded in our traditions since the
origins of the Republic.”337 The American citizenry has chosen “to
dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance,”338 as re-
flected in the Fourth Amendment. “At the very core stands the right
of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unrea-
sonable governmental intrusion.”339 The “sanctity of private dwell-
ings,” therefore, has been “afforded the most stringent Fourth
Amendment protection.”340 The Court has placed a greater burden on
officials who invade the home.341 That protection extends both to the
“area intimately linked to the home”342 and to nontraditional residen-
tial dwellings, such as apartments343 and hotel rooms.344 In sum, the
333. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding
that Georgia’s and Texas’s practices of imposing the death penalty violated the Eighth
Amendment); id. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The calculated killing of a human being by
the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person’s humanity.”); id. at 306
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal pun-
ishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. . . . And it is unique . . .
in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.”).
334. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that “a [marital] rela-
tionship [lies] within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guaran-
tees”); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.”) (citations omitted).
335. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy . . . is broad enough
to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
336. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994) (citation omitted).
337. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (footnote omitted).
338. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
339. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (citations omitted).
340. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (citation omitted).
341. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)
(speculating that “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed”).
342. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
343. See Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 158 (1964) (excluding evidence obtained by a
listening device lodged in wall dividing two apartments).
LUNA TO PRINTER.DOC 04/29/99 4:49 PM
1999] SOVEREIGNTY AND SUSPICION 853
home is the “archetype”345 of individual sovereignty protected by the
Fourth Amendment.
Supreme Court decisions almost invariably accord deep respect
for the home even when there are weighty countervailing interests.
Beginning with a string of Prohibition-era cases, the Court has
“drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.”346 The search of a
residence without a warrant has long been deemed “in itself unrea-
sonable and abhorrent to our laws.”347 Even probable cause will not
ordinarily justify the warrantless search of a home.348 Law enforce-
ment may not make a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a sus-
pect’s home to make an arrest.349 Nor can police enter a third party’s
dwelling to arrest a suspect in the absence of a warrant or exigent cir-
cumstances.350 Likewise, the arrest of a suspect outside of his home,
only a few feet from the front steps, will not justify a subsequent
search of the residence.351 And even when a suspect is validly arrested
in his home, a warrantless search of the entire house violates the
Fourth Amendment.352 Moreover, the Court has strictly limited those
exigencies that might excuse a warrant to major offenses involving an
                                                                                                                                     
344. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (“No less than a tenant of a house, or
the occupant of a room in a boarding house, a guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”) (citations omitted).
345. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980) (quoting Dorman v. United States, 435
F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
346. Id. at 590.
347. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925); see also Taylor v. United States, 286
U.S. 1, 5 (1932) (holding that a warrantless entry of a garage adjacent to a dwelling in a search
for contraband whiskey was unreasonable); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921)
(denying that a suspect’s constitutional rights were waived when his wife admitted officers to
their home to conduct a warrantless search).
348. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (observing that there are few situations in
which a warrantless search of a dwelling, even with probable cause, will withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny); Agnello, 269 U.S. at 33 (“Belief, however well founded, that an article sought
is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a
warrant.”).
349. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 583, 603 (1980).
350. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 93 (1990) (holding that police may not make a
warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a house to arrest a suspect who is a guest there); Steagald
v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1981) (holding that a police officer may search for the
subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party only after obtaining a search warrant
or when exigent circumstances are present).
351. See Vale, 399 U.S. at 33-34 (“If a search of a house is to be upheld as incident to an
arrest, that arrest must take place inside the house, not somewhere outside—whether two
blocks away, twenty feet away, or on the sidewalk near the front steps.”) (citations omitted).
352. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (“The search here went far beyond
the petitioner’s person and the area from which he might have obtained either a weapon or
something that could have been used as evidence against him.”).
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immediate danger of violence.353 Once the threat dissipates, police
may not conduct warrantless home searches to investigate even the
most heinous completed crime: there is no “murder scene exception”
to the Fourth Amendment.354
The juxtaposition of two modern Fourth Amendment cases fur-
ther demonstrates the Court’s reverence for the home. In United
States v. Knotts,355 federal officials placed a tracking device inside a
can of chloroform which was subsequently purchased by the sus-
pect.356 With the aid of the “beeper,” the agents were able to trace the
chloroform to a secluded cabin.357 The Court found no Fourth
Amendment violation in the use of the beeper to track the suspect’s
route. The government action “amounted principally to the following
of an automobile on public streets and highways,”358 and the use of
“scientific enhancement of this sort raises no constitutional issues
which visual surveillance would not also raise.”359 One year later, the
Court considered essentially the same fact pattern. In United States v.
Karo,360 law enforcement officers attached a beeper to a can of ether
which was picked up by the defendant.361 This time the agents used
the beeper not only to follow the public movements of the can, but
also to determine that it was “actually located at a particular time in
[a] private residence and is in the possession of the person . . . whose
residence is being watched.”362 This additional fact made the govern-
ment surveillance unacceptable to the Court.363 The Fourth Amend-
ment forbids officials from invading the sovereignty of an individual’s
353. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (striking down warrantless home ar-
rest for a traffic offense and noting that “an important factor to be considered when determin-
ing whether any emergency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is
being made”); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (“[W]hen the police come
upon the scene of a homicide they may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if
there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises.”).
354. See Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21 (1984) (per curiam); Mincey, 437 U.S. at
395.
355. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
356. See id. at 278.
357. See id. at 278-79.
358. Id. at 281.
359. Id. at 285.
360. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
361. See id. at 708.
362. Id. at 715.
363. See id. at 716 (“Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from
public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home . . . .”).
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home, whether by stealth or by force, and regardless of those sur-
veillance activities that might be acceptable away from the home.
The home archetype also receives constitutional support outside
the search and seizure context. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,364
an ordinance that restricted the family members who could live in a
residence was struck down under the Due Process Clause.365 The
Court “acknowledged a ‘private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter,’” particularly “when the government intrudes on
choices concerning family living arrangements” in the home.366 In
concurrence Justice Stevens argued that the ordinance violated “a
fundamental right” of a home owner “to decide who may reside on
his or her property.”367 In Stanley v. Georgia,368 the Court reversed a
conviction for possessing obscene material in one’s home.369 The right
to free speech “takes on an added dimension” when a person’s home
is involved.370 “If the First Amendment means anything,” argued Jus-
tice Marshall, “it means that a State has no business telling a man, sit-
ting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he
may watch.”371 Remarkably, the individual sovereignty of the home
has been invoked to both invalidate372 and uphold373 laws under the
364. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
365. See id. at 505-06.
366. Id. at 499 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
367. Id. at 520 (Stevens, J., concurring).
368. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
369. See id. at 538.
370. Id. at 564.
371. Id. at 565.
372. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994) (invalidating a municipal ordinance
that prohibited homeowners from displaying signs, including those with a political message, on
their properties); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142, 149 (1943) (striking down an
ordinance that forbade solicitors from summoning homeowners to their doors to distribute
handbills or circulars).
373. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476-77, 488 (1988) (upholding an ordinance that
prohibited persons from picketing before another individual’s private residence); FCC v. Paci-
fica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (upholding FCC restrictions on the broadcast of indecent
language, partly because broadcast media “confront the citizen . . . in the privacy of the home,
where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
outsider”); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (holding that
vendors of sexually explicit materials have no First Amendment right to send unwanted mate-
rial into the home of another, since persons need not be “captives” to objectionable speech in-
side their homes); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 644 (1951) (upholding a municipal ban
on door-to-door commercial solicitations, in part because salesmen infringe on “some house-
holders’ desire for privacy”); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949) (sustaining an ordi-
nance forbidding the use of “sound trucks” on public streets because loud and raucous noises
impair homeowners’ use of their properties).
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First Amendment. In upholding restrictions on sound trucks, solici-
tors, and picketers, the Court has often remarked on the unique na-
ture of the home, “the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the
sick,” and has recognized that “[p]reserving the sanctity of the home,
the one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from
the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important value.”374
And in striking down limitations on homeowner speech, the Court
has noted the “special respect for individual liberty in the home . . .
[which] has special resonance when the government seeks to con-
strain a person’s ability to speak there.”375
In sum, the body and home archetypes of individual sovereignty
fit the constitutional record. They are consistent with the text and
context of the Constitution and can be squared with the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence. And in particular, the body and home fit
nicely within the scheme of the Fourth Amendment.
2. Justification. A constitutional theory, however, must do more
than fit the historical record. It must also justify that record and
provide guidance for future decisions. The question is not whether
the home and body archetypes or the individual rights model are
compatible with the Fourth Amendment. Rather, the issue goes to
the very idea of sovereignty and sovereign zones within the
constitutional framework: Can sovereignty theory justify the Court’s
jurisprudence? Does it provide legitimacy for the Constitution?
Post-Enlightenment philosophy begins with a very simple pre-
cept: each individual is endowed with free will, capable of making de-
cisions and understanding the consequences of her choices. The dis-
tinguishing characteristic of humanity is the ability to reason, to make
and review judgments in a rational manner. Individuals can test their
belief systems, inventory their thoughts, challenge intuitions and con-
victions, and establish new beliefs based on the process of reason.
Free will and rationality serve as the very basis for treating all hu-
mans with respect and dignity.
But the concept goes further, beyond human ability to the issue
of human freedom—not only can individuals make moral choices and
accept responsibility for their actions, but they should be allowed to
do so. Each human is a discrete moral agent who must be afforded
the opportunity to exercise his free will in a way consistent with re-
374. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 (citations omitted).
375. Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 58.
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spect for the existence of other moral agents. Without the authority
to act on one’s beliefs, the ability to reason has little value. The only
way to respect individuals who inherently claim dominion of reason is
to acknowledge their right to exercise their beliefs. Human worth is
defined by voluntary actions based on reflective thought, and only
accomplishments achieved pursuant to personal autonomy can breed
dignity.376 If individuals are denied this right, the very concept of free
will is rejected.
Moreover, Immanuel Kant argued that denying free will and
autonomy violates the “categorical imperative”—that individuals
must be treated as ends in themselves, not merely means to another’s
ends.377 Although this ideal of moral equality is centuries old, it has an
eternal resonance: people are endowed with equal capacity for moral
reasoning, must be accorded equal respect and dignity, and cannot be
conduits to another human being’s goals.378 A moral system based on
free will and the categorical imperative would view personal auton-
omy as its highest value. An individual must be free to pursue his
own vision of the good life, to exercise his free will in a manner con-
sistent with the autonomy of others. And as a consequence, the only
moral form of government is one that accepts the idea of free will,
recognizes the moral equality of all citizens, and respects the individ-
ual’s right to autonomy.379
376. See ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATIONS
22-23 (1982).
377. See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 54-55 (Lewis
White Beck trans., 2d ed., MacMillan Publ’g Co. 1990) (1785).
378. As Berlin argued, the consequences of the categorical imperative are substantial:
[I]f the essence of men is that they are autonomous beings—authors of values, of
ends in themselves, the ultimate authority of which consists precisely in the fact that
they are willed freely—then nothing is worse than to treat them as if they were not
autonomous, but natural objects, played on by causal influences, creatures at the
mercy of external stimuli, whose choices can be manipulated by their rulers, whether
by threats of force or offers of rewards. To treat men in this way is to treat them as if
they were not self-determined. ‘Nobody may compel me to be happy in his own way,’
said Kant. ‘Paternalism is the greatest despotism imaginable.’ This is so because it is
to treat men as if they were not free, but human material for me, the benevolent re-
former, to mold in accordance with my own, not their, freely adopted purpose.
BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, supra note 222, at 136-37.
379. Dworkin has argued for this limitation as follows:
Government must treat those whom it governs with concern, that is, as human beings
who are capable of suffering and frustration, and with respect, that is, as human be-
ings who are capable of forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their
lives should be lived. Government must not only treat people with concern and re-
spect, but with equal concern and respect.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 151, at 272-73.
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If this all sounds familiar, it is. This is the concept of personal
sovereignty—an individual is the “uncommanded commander”380 of
his domain. He is both the source and the administrator of final
authority regarding his life. The only limitations on this power are
found at the borders, where the individual’s sovereignty ends and an-
other person’s autonomy begins. The sovereignty theory can there-
fore justify the Supreme Court’s precedents by adopting and vindi-
cating philosophical first principles: free will and moral equality.
A theory of individual sovereignty can also provide legitimacy
for the official use of coercive force. The American form of govern-
ment generally follows majority rule; the electorate chooses its repre-
sentatives who in turn select policies and enact statutes. This system
is clearly legitimate in the eyes of the political majority because it di-
rectly selects the decisionmakers and indirectly chooses the law. But
those who lose in the process are subject to policies that presumably
would not have been adopted had they been victorious at the polls.
This raises the issue of governmental legitimacy vis-à-vis the political
minorities: why are majoritarian decisions morally binding on the dis-
senters when they have not consented to the policies or politicians?
The best solution, I believe, comes from a sovereignty-based vi-
sion of the Constitution. Using the social contract metaphor, indi-
viduals relinquish a specific amount of authority to the political proc-
ess behind the veil of ignorance. Although each person is unaware of
whether he will stand with the victors or the losers, he nonetheless
agrees that certain issues must be collectively determined by society
and that majority rule is the only workable means of making the rele-
vant decisions. But the individual still retains areas of freedom, sub-
ject matters of decisional autonomy, or, in other words, zones of per-
sonal sovereignty. They are withdrawn “from the vicissitudes of
political controversy” and enshrined as constitutional rights, thereby
placed “beyond the reach of majorities and officials.”381 The conun-
drum of government legitimacy is solved: both the ex post winners
and losers agree in the ex ante to turn over certain powers to the ma-
joritarian process for the good of society while reserving zones of
personal sovereignty for the good of the individual.
380. Feinberg, supra note 220, at 448.
381. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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Moreover, this vision of the Constitution is consistent with the
historical record.382 As argued by John Locke, each individual is “free,
equal, and independent”383 in the pre-government world; he is abso-
lutely sovereign and cannot be “subjected to the Political Power of
another.”384 But because of “strong obligations of Necessity, Con-
venience, and Inclination,”385 he enters into a social contract to ensure
safety and peace. Each individual cedes a certain portion of his sov-
ereignty to the state for the protection of the common good.386 But
relinquishment of power is strictly circumscribed; the contract spe-
cifically enumerates those rights transferred to government and those
jealously held by the citizenry. Individuals retain, among other rights,
ultimate sovereignty over their homes and bodies.387
Locke’s writings were a primary authority for the Colonists and
his social contract furnished the political theory for both the Ameri-
can Revolution and the framing of the Constitution.388 Individuals
were the fount of all sovereignty; state power depended on the volun-
tary relinquishment of a portion of this sovereignty for its very exis-
tence. Governments were merely the “agents and trustees of the
people,”389 authorized to act only within proscribed limits. This politi-
cal philosophy ensured that the Constitution was more than just
words—it was, as Justice Holmes would later describe it, “a constitu-
ent act.”390 As a matter of structure, the document was clearly con-
cerned about sovereignty by its division of power between the federal
382. In one sense, this is a question of “fit.” Dworkin notes, however, that “[q]uestions of fit
arise at [the justification] stage of interpretation as well.” DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra
note 151, at 256.
383. LOCKE, supra note 258, § 95, at 348.
384. Id.
385. Id. § 77, at 336.
386. See id. § 95, at 348-49:
The only way whereby any one divests himself of his Natural Liberty and puts on the
bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a Commu-
nity, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a se-
cure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security against any that are not of
it.
387. See id. § 27, at 305 (“Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all
Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but him-
self.”).
388. See Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional
Law (pt. 2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 365, 395-404 (1928) (discussing Locke’s great influence on the
colonial and revolutionary generations).
389. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 330 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
390. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
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and state governments and then between the three branches of the
federal government. But more importantly, the Constitution estab-
lished the political and, I would argue, the physical boundaries be-
tween individuals and coercive government. Invasions into personal
sovereignty would violate the first principles of the social compact as
beyond the legitimate power of the state.391 Under the Constitution,
Alexander Hamilton argued, government could not “penetrate the
recesses of domestic life, and control, in all respects, the private con-
duct of individuals.”392 The individual retained these zones of sover-
eignty.
Since the framing, Supreme Court justices have reiterated that
the Constitution marks the border between individual sovereignty
and government authority.393 In particular, the first eight amendments
staked out sovereign zones for the citizenry, zones that are removed
from the political docket and outside the compass of majority rule.394
The final two amendments in the Bill of Rights affirmed this under-
standing. The Ninth Amendment declared that the enumeration of
rights did not deny the existence of other rights retained by the peo-
391. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (“An ACT of the Legislature (for I
cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be con-
sidered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.”).
392. 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 268 (2d ed. 1836).
393. See William J. Brennan, Jr., My Encounters with the Constitution, 26 THE JUDGES’ J. 7,
10 (1987) (“[T]he text [of the Constitution] marks the metes and bounds of official authority
and individual autonomy.”); see also Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865,
867 (1960):
The historical and practical purposes of a Bill of Rights, the very use of a written
constitution, indigenous to America, the language the Framers used, the kind of
three-department government they took pains to set up, all point to the creation of a
government which was denied all power to do some things under any and all circum-
stances, and all power to do other things except precisely in the manner prescribed.
394. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy . . . .”); see also Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 61 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(interpreting the Bill of Rights to have established “the maximum restrictions upon the power
of organized society over the individual that are compatible with the maintenance of organized
society itself”).
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ple.395 Conversely, the Tenth Amendment reminded government that
it possessed only those powers which had been expressly delegated.396
Probably the most eloquent articulation of the boundaries be-
tween the individual and government was delivered by Justice Bran-
deis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States:397
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions fa-
vorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They
knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life
are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men.398
By guaranteeing individual zones of sovereignty, we ensure that
“the right to be let alone” will always contain a baseline of constitu-
tional protection.
V. SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
MODELS
The vast majority of police activity would pass muster under
both the individual rights and the antidiscrimination models of the
Fourth Amendment. Most searches in the United States are con-
ducted pursuant to consent or individualized suspicion. The individ-
ual rights model expressly allows such intrusions; the antidiscrimina-
tion model takes a deferential position on searches that do not
implicate a malfunction in the political process. As such, consent- and
suspicion-based searches provide an inadequate arena in which to
test the models. The real proving ground is where the state lacks both
consent and individualized suspicion for its actions.
395. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“The
language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers of the Constitution be-
lieved that there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement,
which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitu-
tional amendments.”).
396. See id. at 490 n.5 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“The Tenth Amendment similarly made
clear that the States and the people retained all those powers not expressly delegated to the
Federal Government.”).
397. 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
398. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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A. Common Ground
Even in the area of suspicionless searches, the two Fourth
Amendment models would often reach the same conclusions, al-
though for very different reasons. Both would uphold one form of
checkpoint detention: stopping all vehicles in search of drunk driv-
ers.399 Everyone shares the burden of these detentions, the antidis-
crimination model would point out, and therefore the entire commu-
nity internalizes the associated costs. Under the individual rights
model, in contrast, these checkpoints constitute a seizure of the
driver, however brief, and interfere with her bodily autonomy. But
the grave danger to the sovereignty of others from intoxicated mo-
torists justifies the detention. Cars become lethal weapons when
placed in the hands of inebriated drivers, posing the real, direct, and
substantial threat of injuring or killing other motorists or pedestrians.
Statistical evidence only confirms this hazard.400
Likewise, each model would validate suspicionless searches of
regulated businesses, whether it be firearms dealers,401 automobile
junkyards402 or liquor licensees.403 Neither the home or body is impli-
cated by such state action, precluding the strictest scrutiny under the
individual rights model. Under the antidiscrimination approach, the
costs of these regulatory searches will be passed on to the average
consumer, ensuring that the burden is diffusely felt by the commu-
nity. Moreover, commercial enterprises exert substantial influence in
399. Cf. Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 445 (1990) (holding that “the
balance of the state’s interest in preventing drunken driving . . . [justifies] the degree of intru-
sion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped”).
400. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 10.8(d), at 690 (“Drunk drivers cause an annual death
toll of over 25,000 and in the same time span cause nearly one million personal injuries and
more than five billion dollars in property damage.”); see also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637,
657 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the
death toll of all our wars.”); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) (“The increasing
slaughter on our highways . . . now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battle-
field.”).
401. Cf. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (holding that a suspicionless in-
spection and seizure of sawed-off rifles pursuant to the Gun Control Act of 1968 was not unrea-
sonable).
402. Cf. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703-12 (1987) (holding that a warrantless search
of an automobile junkyard, conducted pursuant to a regulatory statute, was not unreasonable).
403. Cf. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (upholding an
act of Congress making it illegal for a liquor licensee to refuse admission to an inspector).
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the legislative process and possess sufficient political power to vindi-
cate their interests.404
Both models would also support Camara-style health and safety
inspections405 and searches at airports and government buildings.406
The building inspections approved in Camara were both routine and
areawide, guaranteeing that the entire community bore the costs of
such intrusions. Similarly, searches conducted at airports and gov-
ernment buildings directly affect all individuals entering these facili-
ties; there is little room for discretion and no individual or minority
group is selected for disparate treatment. If these types of intrusions
are unreasonable, the antidiscrimination model holds, the political
majority will demand reform and thereby protect the interests of all
citizens.
Under the individual rights model, the archetypes of individual
sovereignty are clearly invoked by these state actions. Health and
safety inspections demand entry into one’s home; airport and build-
ing searches can scour an individual’s body. But both government ac-
tivities are in response to the type of harm that can excuse otherwise
unacceptable intrusions—real, direct and substantial threats to the
sovereign zones of other citizens. “[F]ires and epidemics may ravage
large urban areas,” argued the Camara Court.407 The historic exam-
ples are legion, from the spread of contagious disease in Hell’s
Kitchen to the great fires in Chicago and San Francisco. The modern
exemplars are no less tragic. Airport and building searches attempt to
prevent the violent terrorist acts which have become all too familiar.
Whether spurred by the airline hijackings of the 1970s, the explosion
of Pan-Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, or the recent bomb-
ings in Oklahoma City and abroad, society has begun to require the
utmost security in airports and government buildings. By intruding
404. Both models would also uphold suspicionless search regimes of the work areas of gov-
ernment employees. Cf. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality
opinion) (upholding a search of an employee’s desk and file cabinets). According to the indi-
vidual rights model, there is no intrusion into the employee’s body or home; under the antidis-
crimination model, the burden of the search is spread across the entire “community” of em-
ployees, a group that is neither discrete nor politically insular.
405. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (noting that “fires and epi-
demics may ravage large urban areas”).
406. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674-75 & n.3
(1989) (noting that the government’s interest in preventing hijackings justifies suspicionless
searches of all airline passengers).
407. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535.
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on the sovereignty of the individuals searched, the state is preserving
the personal sovereignty of all citizens.
On the other hand, both models would strike down a regulatory
search scheme that was found to be constitutional. In Wyman v.
James,408 the Court held that welfare recipients could be required to
submit to suspicionless “home visits” by social workers in order to
maintain the receipt of benefits.409 The antidiscrimination model
would invalidate the search scheme as an exemplar of a political ma-
jority externalizing the law enforcement burdens on a powerless mi-
nority. Welfare recipients are insulated from the political process, of-
ten viewed as social pariahs, and frequently members of racial
minorities. Such an invasion into the sovereignty of the home is also
unjustified under the individual rights model—there was no individu-
alized suspicion, no voluntary consent, and no other-regarding harm
to be avoided at all costs. “It is the precincts of the home that the
Fourth Amendment protects,” argued Justice Douglas in his Wyman
dissent.410 It is “as important to the lowly as to the mighty.”411
B. Theoretical Divergence
Up to this point, the models lead to the same legal conclusions.
The decisive moment, however, is when they reach the theoretical
crossroads and take different decisional paths. It is there that each
model must be judged for better or worse. An analysis of various
forms of government searches and seizures can sufficiently distin-
guish the approaches.
1. Illegal Alien Checkpoints. The antidiscrimination model
would not only allow checkpoints for drunk drivers, but would
uphold indiscriminate mass detentions based on any legitimate
408. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
409. See id. at 326.
410. Id. at 332 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
411. Id. at 333 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Both models would likely strike down suspicionless
body-cavity searches of pretrial detainees and home searches of probationers. Cf. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979) (upholding suspicionless body-cavity searches); Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) (upholding searches of probationers’ homes based on
“reasonable grounds”). The antidiscrimination model would strictly scrutinize such searches
because the relevant costs are not diffusely spread throughout the political community but in-
stead are borne by discrete and insular groups. In contrast, the individual rights model would
find these intrusions into the home and body to be unjustified and unconstitutional if not based
on individualized suspicion, consent, or real, direct, and substantial threats to the sovereignty of
others.
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government objective. In particular, the model would validate the
checkpoints for illegal aliens412 that have become commonplace in
states on the U.S.-Mexico border. Like the DUI checkpoints, the
burden of these detentions is shared by all members of the
community, with each passing motorist relinquishing a fraction of his
liberty. If the seizures are truly unreasonable or if the ends are
unjustified, the antidiscrimination model would anticipate redress
through the political process.
But this approach “elevates the adage ‘misery loves company’ to
a novel role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,”413 argues the pro-
ponent of the individual rights’ model. The fact that everyone pays
the cost of checkpoint detentions is beside the point; the real issue is
whether the resulting bodily seizure can be justified by a real, direct,
and substantial threat to the sovereignty of others. Neither drunk
driver nor illegal alien checkpoints demonstrate massive statistical
achievement: both are “successful” in less than 2% of all passing ve-
hicles.414 The difference between the two, however, stems from the
type of danger averted by the detention schemes. As mentioned
above, DUI checkpoints attempt to uncover intoxicated motorists
who pose a mortal threat to others through their incompetent opera-
tion of multi-ton, high-speed machines. In contrast, illegal alien
checkpoints try to prevent the surreptitious and unlawful entry of
foreign citizens—a laudable goal by any standard. But unlike drunk
drivers, illegal aliens do not pose an inherently grave danger to the
personal sovereignty of others. It has been argued that the flow of il-
legal aliens threatens the integrity of American borders and drains
resources from the economy. Even if that is assumed to be true, any
threat is diffuse and financial rather than direct and lethal to other
individuals. Illegal alien checkpoints, therefore, cannot be squared
with the individual rights model of the Fourth Amendment.
412. Cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment permits border patrol officers to search automobiles for illegal aliens without in-
dividualized suspicion).
413. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
414. See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (“Stated as a per-
centage, approximately 1.6 percent of the drivers passing through the checkpoint were arrested
for alcohol impairment . . . . By way of comparison, . . . illegal aliens were found in only 0.12
percent of the vehicles passing through the checkpoint.”).
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2. Student Searches. In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,415 the Supreme
Court upheld the inspection of a high school student’s purse based on
“reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or
the rules of the school.”416 The search for contraband cigarettes in
that case “was based upon an individualized suspicion that [the
student] had violated school rules,” and therefore the Court did “not
consider the circumstances that might justify school authorities in
conducting searches unsupported by individualized suspicion.”417 But
suppose that a school district established a mass-inspection scheme
for nicotine products. School authorities, for example, would pat-
down every student entering the campus in search of cigarettes or
smokeless tobacco. The antidiscrimination model would find no fault
with this search regime. The relevant cost to liberty is borne by all
students, and not just a discrete subgroup. And because the minors
are virtually represented in the political process by their parents,418
the model would defer to the school board’s decision to implement
such a program.
In contrast, the individual rights model would find the mass
searches to be unconstitutional. A frisk of a student’s person clearly
implicates individual sovereignty, invading her right to bodily auton-
omy. But under the facts of this hypothetical, it is unlikely the gov-
ernment could muster a sufficient justification for the mass-search
scheme. Although the potential health effects from tobacco con-
sumption are severe, they do not constitute the type of threat to the
sovereignty of others cognizable under the model. The long-term
danger of tobacco-related disease is very real, but it is neither direct
nor immediate: a particular pack of cigarettes will not be the but-for
cause of lung cancer, for example, and the manifestation of such an
ailment will occur only after years of smoking. More importantly, the
consequences of tobacco consumption are primarily self-regarding
and therefore irrelevant to the individual rights model.
415. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
416. Id. at 342.
417. Id. at 342 n.8.
418. See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, supra note 106, at
1173 (“[R]andom drug-testing of student athletes is exempted from the warrant requirement
not because student athletes exercise significant influence in the political process but because
their parents, who naturally take their children’s interests to heart, do.”)
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3. Thermal-Imager Searches. For a number of years, the
government has utilized “thermal imagers” to search private
residences for illegal drug cultivation.
A thermal imager operates by observing and recording the differen-
tial heat patterns emanating from various objects within its view. . . .
Activities that generate a significant amount of heat . . . produce a
heat “signature” that the imager can detect. . . . [T]his heat signature
[can] indicate the presence of high intensity lights used to grow
marijuana indoors.419
In all reported cases considering this type of search, drug-
enforcement agents focused their attention on the homes of discrete
individuals without having first obtained a search warrant. Nonethe-
less, the federal judiciary has been unable to reach a consensus re-
garding the constitutionality of thermal-imager searches.420
Consider a hypothetical where such searches were authorized by
the relevant legislative body and were conducted on an areawide ba-
sis. For example, assume that law enforcement was empowered to fly
over an entire city block using thermal imagers to detect marijuana
cultivation within that area.421 As long as disgruntled individuals had
an opportunity to be heard by their elected representatives and the
law-enforcement burden was spread across the entire community, the
antidiscrimination model would defer to the political process and up-
hold the mass-search scheme.
The individual rights model, however, would strike down these
searches as violative of the Fourth Amendment. Thermal-imager
scanning of private residences compromises the sovereignty of an in-
dividual’s home. Not only can an imager identify the “use of showers
and bathtubs, ovens, washers and dryers, and any other household
appliance that emits heat,” but it can “determine the origin of two
commingled objects emitting heat in a bedroom at night.”422 And al-
though drug production is not a trivial offense, the government would
not be able to justify such an intrusion under the individual rights
419. United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249, 1251 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
420. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1255 (invalidating search); United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d
1497, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996)
(invalidating search); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding
search); United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 857 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding search); United
States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding search); United States v. Pinson, 24
F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding search).
421. Cf. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1327 (thermal-imager search conducted by a helicopter crew).
422. Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1254-55.
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model. Domestic cultivation of marijuana may be generally deplor-
able and a major source of contraband, but it simply does not present
a real, direct, and substantial threat to the sovereignty of others.
4. Public Housing Sweeps. Beginning in the summer of 1993,
the Chicago Housing Authority instituted a suspicionless search
program for government-subsidized apartment buildings.423 Police
were empowered to conduct “sweeps” of all residential units located
within the buildings on the occurrence of certain preconditions,
including reports of random gunfire.424 The sweeps resulted in
exhaustive searches of closets, drawers, refrigerators, and personal
items in every home.425 But because of “logistical difficulties,”426 the
sweeps normally took place several days after the shootings occurred
and never earlier than forty-eight hours after the incidents.427
Nonetheless, such a search program would be upheld under the
antidiscrimination model of the Fourth Amendment. The sweeps
were expressly endorsed by the political representatives of the af-
fected residents,428 and everyone who lived in the projects was bur-
dened by the searches. Rather than focusing on discrete individuals
or groups, the law-enforcement costs associated with the sweeps were
internalized by the entire community. Although there were undoubt-
edly dissenters among the residents, each individual had an opportu-
nity to air his concerns in the political process. If the sweeps were
truly unreasonable, antidiscrimination model advocates would argue,
the equally affected political majority would rescind the policy.
In contrast, such sweeps are unconstitutional according to the
individual rights model. The searches strike at the very heart of per-
sonal sovereignty—the individual’s home. Although the model does
not measure invalidity in degrees, it is hard to ignore the depth of the
invasion. No area of the resident’s domicile, from bedroom to bath-
room, was free from official scrutiny. The state-sanctioned rummag-
ing through closets, drawers, and cabinets was virtually indistinguish-
able from searches pursuant to the writ of assistance. Mass searches
would nearly always uncover intimate details of a resident’s life
423. See Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 793-94 (N.D. Ill. 1994).




428. See id. at 793 (reporting that eighteen of nineteen local advisory panel presidents sup-
ported searches).
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wholly unrelated to the investigation’s purpose. Nor could the gov-
ernment justify its actions by exigent circumstances. The searches
were largely gratuitous, occurring days after the reported gunplay.
Any criminality had long since subsided and the evidence very likely
taken outside the purview of the sweep.
Building sweeps expose three major flaws in the antidiscrimina-
tion model. As an initial matter, it places an individual’s rights and
sovereignty in the discretion of the political majority. The federal dis-
trict court said as much in striking down the mass search program:
Many tenants within CHA housing, apparently convinced by sad ex-
perience that the larger community will not provide normal law en-
forcement services to them, are prepared to forgo their own consti-
tutional rights. They apparently want this court to suspend their
neighbor’s rights as well.429
A Fourth Amendment grounded in political process theory pro-
vides no floor of rights that is impervious to government interference.
In one sense, the theory converts rights into mere interests—values
which should be considered and weighed but can nonetheless be dis-
regarded should popular will so demand. It is arguable that a “right”
subject to the caprice of a majority is by definition no right at all.430 In
another sense, the theory allows for drifting, disposable rights—a
concept incompatible with free will, moral equality, individual sover-
eignty, and the social compact. There must always be a baseline of
autonomy, an immutable zone of sovereignty which allows free will
to be exercised. If rights are subject to manipulation by majority vote,
there is no barrier to the elimination of the constitutional baseline al-
together. Although this may not come to pass, the potential must be
vigilantly protected against.
The second pitfall of the antidiscrimination model is essentially
an elaboration of the first. The model poses the classic “slippery
slope” dilemma: if we allow building sweeps for reports of gunfire, we
should also allow them for unspecified allegations of domestic vio-
lence or drug trafficking occurring somewhere within an apartment
building. Mass searches for drug sales would justify sweeps for simple
drug use. Building sweeps for the victimless crime of drug use could
429. Id. at 796.
430. Cf. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 151, at xi (“Individual rights
are political trumps held by individuals.”); id. at 269 (“If someone has a right to do something,
then it is wrong for the government to deny it to him even though it would be in the general
interests to do so.”).
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be extended to residential searches for other victimless crimes—
prostitution or gambling, for instance. And maybe a housing author-
ity in Georgia would institute a sweep program for “‘the infamous
crime against nature’”431—consensual sodomy between adults.
“Ridiculous,” some would argue. Such police activities would
not be condoned by even the most reactionary majority. And I would
generally agree. But again the problem with the antidiscrimination
model of the Fourth Amendment is that it would not prevent such in-
trusions if a majority were so inclined. Constitutional rights not only
must stand firm against the political realities of today, but also the
unthinkable contingencies of tomorrow. There is little danger to a
robust public dialogue, for example, if Skokie prevents the Nazis
from marching through town.432 Hate mongers have next to no influ-
ence on the political system and hate speech is largely considered to
be outside the rational boundaries of political debate. Yet the right to
rally under the swastika is constitutionally protected because we be-
lieve that every individual has the right to air his views. More impor-
tantly, there is a real fear of the slippery slope: If hate speech is pro-
hibited, why not offensive speech? Or mildly irritating speech? The
First Amendment refuses to go down that road; neither should the
Fourth Amendment.
The final problem with the antidiscrimination model is a varia-
tion of the first two. The model makes a very appealing argument
that a community subjected to oppressive search tactics will merely
toss the political rascals out. But unfortunately, majorities in times of
perceived public crisis can make very poor decisions and follow the
loudest rather than wisest voice. Claims of necessity are frequently
accepted without deliberation, based on minimal hindsight and non-
existent foresight. The Red Scare, Jim Crow, Japanese internment
camps, and McCarthyism were all accepted by a substantial portion
of the citizenry. “History teaches that grave threats to liberty often
come in times of urgency,” argued Justice Thurgood Marshall, “when
constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.”433 Political
leaders can act out of well-intentioned zeal and a good dose of elec-
431. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *215 (1769)).
432. Cf. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1203 (7th Cir. 1978) (“The asserted falseness of
Nazi dogma, and, indeed, its general repudiation, simply do not justify its suppression.”).
433. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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toral fear,434 giving a majority what it wants while destroying that
which the individual needs. In a very short time, the hydraulic pres-
sures of apparent social imperative can overwhelm the senses of the
political majority and the sensibilities of the government official.435
The antidiscrimination model will sometimes put up a fight, but tyr-
anny is crafty and can allude the model’s strictures. The only protec-
tion against illegitimate pressures is an unwavering constitutional
floor, a zone of individual sovereignty that cannot be invaded on
popular demand.
5. Government Drug Testing. Drug testing has become an
incident of employment throughout America, particularly in
government jobs. Although testing previously had been used in
military and drug-rehabilitation centers, President Reagan’s
executive order in 1986 set the stage for a massive governmental
regime.436 Since that time, federal and state agencies and various
regulated industries have been legally required to test employees.437
Many school districts have enacted programs to test their students.438
A number of reasons are proffered for the testing programs, from
cutting costs and increasing safety to fighting the war on drugs.439
a. The Process. A drug test can be triggered by various events440 or as
part of a random process. The individual is required to give a
specimen, usually urine, under the direct or indirect observation of a
434. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
435. See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting) (discussing the “immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and
distorts the judgment” of economists and statesmen).
436. See Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986).
437. For cases confronting these requirements, see, e.g., National Treasury Employees Un-
ion v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660-63 (1989) (detailing drug testing of federal agents); Loder v.
Glendale, 14 Cal. 4th 846, 853-56 (1997) (detailing drug testing of city employees). See also 41
U.S.C. §§ 701, 702 (1990) (requiring that federal contractors and grant recipients establish a
drug-free workplace, but not requiring drug testing as a condition).
438. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
439. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 128-29.
440. These events might include any of the following: applying for employment; seeking a
promotion or transfer; the occurrence of an accident; being part of a trainee program; returning
to work after time off; or an annual physical exam. See, e.g., Scott S. Cairns & Carolyn V.
Grady, Drug Testing in the Workplace: A Reasoned Approach for Private Employers, 12 GEO.
MASON U. L. REV. 491, 495-99 (1990); Michelle L. O’Brien, Webster v. Motorola: Employees
Reclaiming the Right to Privacy, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 547, 576 n.293 (1996).
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monitor.441 The sample is then subjected to a sensitive though
somewhat inaccurate chemical screening test for the presence of drug
metabolites. Positive samples are often, but not always, validated by
highly accurate confirmatory tests.442 Nonetheless, mistakes are
frequently made in the testing process, resulting in false positives.
The ingestion of certain legal substances can also trigger a positive
test. Inaccuracy, however, usually stems from false negatives due to
the inherent limitations of the testing process443 or chicanery
employed to avoid detection.444 But for the sake of argument, assume
testing errors to be insignificant.
The real problem stems from what drug testing can and cannot
tell you. A positive test indicates the presence of metabolites, the
chemicals that remain in the body after it has processed a substance.
Metabolites can linger in the body for up to a month after an individ-
ual has ingested a given drug.445 The best a test can do, therefore, is
signal drug use at some time in the past. It cannot prove that an indi-
vidual is presently under the influence of an illicit substance.446 And
441. See, e.g., Council on Scientific Affairs, Scientific Issues in Drug Testing, 257 JAMA
3110, 3111 (1987); Lawrence Miike & Maria Hewitt, Accuracy and Reliability of Urine Drug
Tests, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 641, 642 (1988); Stephen Plass, A Comprehensive Assessment of Em-
ployment Drug Testing: Legal Battles over Delicate Interests, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 46
(1990); Mark A. Rothstein, Workplace Drug Testing: A Case Study in the Misapplication of
Technology, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 77-78 (1991); Richard H. Schwartz, Urine Testing in the
Detection for Drugs of Abuse, 148 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2407, 2408 (1988); Phoebe W.
Williams, Governmental Drug Testing: Critique and Analysis of Fourth Amendment Jurispru-
dence, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 27 (1990).
442. See Miike & Hewitt, supra note 441, at 646-47.
443. See id. at 649-51.
444. See Williams, supra note 441, at 27.
445. See, e.g., Edward M. Chen et al., Common Law Privacy: A Limit on an Employer’s
Power to Test for Drugs, 12 GEO. MASON U. L. Rev. 651, 676-77 (1990); Craig M. Cornish &
Donald B. Louria, Employment Drug Testing, Preventative Searches, and the Future of Privacy,
33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 95, 107 (1991); Thomas L. McGovern, Employee Drug Testing Leg-
islation: Redrawing the Battlelines in the War on Drugs, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1453, 1457 (1987);
Craig Zwerling et al., The Efficacy of Preemployment Drug Screening for Marijuana and Co-
caine in Predicting Employment Outcome, 264 JAMA 2639, 2640 (1990).
446. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 652 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Chen, supra note 445, at 673 n.131; Council on Scientific Affairs, Issues in Em-
ployee Drug Testing, 258 JAMA 2089, 2089 (1987); Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note
441, at 3111; James Felman & Christopher J. Patrini, Drug Testing and Public Employment:
Toward a Rational Application of the Fourth Amendment, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253,
266 (1988); Marsha F. Goldsmith, Drug Testing Upheld, Decried, 259 JAMA 2341, 2341 (1988);
Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 124; Task Force on the Drug-Free Workplace, Institute of Bill of
Rights Law, Proposal for a Substance Abuse Testing Act: The Report of the Task Force on the
Drug-Free Workplace, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 42 (1991);
Williams, supra note 441, at 9.
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because of its limitations as a tool of detection, drug testing blurs the
line between employment-related acts and purely personal conduct.
A positive result is just as likely, if not more likely, to detect off-duty
rather than on-duty activity.447 It is, in the words of one federal court,
“a blunt instrument . . . silent as to when or how much of the drug
was taken, the pattern of the employee’s drug use, or whether the
employee was intoxicated when the test was given.”448
The indiscriminate nature of testing would largely be irrelevant
if a strong nexus could be shown between drug use in general and the
particular costs or injuries to be avoided. Unfortunately, such a con-
nection has yet to be made as an empirical matter.449 Nor is such a
proposition self-evident. A positive result will generally indicate a
casual user who presents no threat to safety or performance rather
than a chronic abuser who poses a real danger in certain employment
contexts.450 The justification for drug testing requires an evidentiary
leap of faith: because an individual used drugs in the past, we assume
that drug use will affect his job performance at some time in the fu-
ture.
b. The Precedents. The Supreme Court has taken four swings at the
drug-testing issue, upholding three programs and striking one down.
In each case, it has had no problem finding that government-
447. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d 968, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(noting that “the fact that an employee tests positive does not necessarily indicate on-the-job
impairment, very recent drug use, or habitual drug use”); Beattie v. St. Petersburg Beach, 733
F. Supp. 1455, 1457 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (noting that “urinalysis allows the government to delve
into both job-related and off-duty aspects of an employee’s private life”).
448. National Fed’n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see
also George D. Lundberg, Mandatory Unindicated Urine Drug Screening: Still Chemical
McCarthyism, 256 JAMA 3003, 3004 (1986) (discussing the lack of interpretive information
available from urine drug testing).
449. See Cornish & Lauria, supra note 445, at 108; Jonathan V. Holtzman, Applicant Test-
ing for Drug Use: A Policy and Legal Inquiry, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 47, 90-91 (1991); Ar-
thur J. McBay, Efficient Drug Testing: Addressing the Basic Issues, 11 NOVA L. REV. 647, 647-
48 (1987); John P. Morgan, The “Scientific” Justification for Urine Drug Testing, 36 KAN. L.
REV. 683, 685-88 (1988); Richard Saltus, Workplace Drug Tests Questioned: Report Finds Little
Evidence of Effectiveness of Programs, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1993, at 33; Eric D. Wish,
Preemployment Drug Screening, 264 JAMA 2676, 2676 (1990); Kevin B. Zeese, Drug Testing
Here to Stay?, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 545, 548-49 (1990); Zwerling et al., supra note 445, at
2639.
450. See Chen, supra note 445, at 679 (stating that 90% of all drug users are “casual” or
“occasional” users); Rothstein, supra note 441, at 87-88 (“As many as ninety-eight percent of
all positive workplace tests may arise from casual marijuana use.”).
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mandated testing implicates the Fourth Amendment.451 The
procurement of the sample has been deemed both a search and a
seizure, while the later analysis of the sample constitutes yet another
official search.452 The Court has also agreed that the special needs
doctrine provides the appropriate framework for constitutional
analysis, calling for judicial balancing of the government interest in
drug testing against the individual’s interest in privacy.453
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n,454 the Court up-
held postaccident drug screening for railroad employees.455 In a com-
panion case, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,456 it
validated a drug-testing program for customs employees who were
directly involved in drug interdiction or carried firearms.457 Eight
years after its first foray into the issue, the Court upheld mandatory
451. See Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1300 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 652 (1995); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665
(1989); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-18.
452. See Skinner, at 616-18.
453. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653-54; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66; Skinner, 489 U.S. at
619-20.
454. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
455. The Skinner Court found a special government interest in testing railroad employees
to prevent drug-related accidents and fatalities. See id. at 620-21. It then balanced the individ-
ual’s interest in privacy against the government’s reason for testing. Although the privacy in-
terests were not de minimus, they were substantially reduced by the nonintrusive testing proce-
dure and the highly regulated nature of the industry. See id. at 624-27. In contrast, the
government’s interests were “compelling,” with employees undertaking duties replete with
physical danger to other individuals from even a brief lapse of attention. One faulty step could
precipitate extensive injuries and fatalities without an opportunity for a supervisor to intervene.
And the potential carnage from intoxicated workers was well supported by railroad experience.
See id. at 628-29. The Court found that drug testing served the complementary goals of preven-
tion and deterrence—preventing railway catastrophes by deterring drug use among employees.
456. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
457. The Von Raab Court found a special need in deterring drug users from attaining such
positions, and then went on to balance the interests involved. See id. at 665-66. As in Skinner,
the employee’s privacy interests were diminished by the “operational realities” of customs
service employment and the limited intrusion required by the testing procedure. Id. at 671-73.
In comparison, the government interests in testing employees who carry firearms or are in-
volved in drug interdiction were weighty. Individuals whose primary responsibilities include
ferreting out contraband, argued the Court, constitute “our Nation’s first line of defense” in the
drug war. Id. at 668. Not only are these employees subject to bribery and blackmail by smug-
glers, but drug users are likely to be “unsympathetic to their mission of interdicting narcotics.”
Id. at 669-70. Moreover, those who carry firearms are empowered to use deadly force when
necessary, posing genuine risks of injury to innocent citizens. See id. at 670-71. The Court also
considered the drug testing of customs employees who handled classified materials. It found
the interest in protecting sensitive information to be “compelling,” but remanded that portion
of the case to determine whether the covered employees did in fact handle classified materials.
See id. at 677-78.
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drug testing for student-athletes in Vernonia School District v. Ac-
ton.458 In each of these three cases, the Supreme Court found the gov-
ernment interest to be compelling and the privacy interest of the in-
dividual to be nominal at best. But in its most recent case, Chandler
v. Miller,459 the Court struck down a requirement that candidates for
certain state offices submit to drug testing and receive negative re-
sults.460 This time the individual’s privacy interests outweighed all
claims of official necessity.461
So what type of rubric have these cases created? A “Rohrschach-
like balancing test,” Justice Thurgood Marshall quipped in Skinner.462
Although there is an ostensible logic to the decisions, with mathe-
matical balancing as the medium, the actual weighing process is
largely a mystery. Scholars have excoriated the Court for its unprin-
cipled drug-testing jurisprudence,463 arguing that balancing tests are
inherently manipulable with even proper guidance from a higher
court.464 A legal free-for-all results when the boundaries are only
loosely sketched and the rules are made up on an ad hoc basis. Not
458. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). As an initial matter, the Vernonia Court found that the public
school context universally presents a special need for government that requires a balancing of
the interests. See id. at 652-53. Students within the school environment generally have lesser
expectations of privacy because of their age and their submission to medical examinations and
procedures. See id. at 656-57. Student-athletes have an even lower interest in privacy based on
the communal undress of locker rooms and mandatory preseason physical exams. See id. at 657.
In addition, the testing requirements were deemed relatively noninvasive. See id. at 658-60. The
school’s interests in testing, in contrast, were sufficiently important. Deterring drug use by
schoolchildren was “at least as important” as the government interests in Skinner and Von
Raab. Id. at 651. Student-athletes were particularly susceptible to physical injury on the playing
field due to intoxication. See id. at 662. Athletes known to be drug users would also serve as
poor role models for other athletes or the student population in general. See id. at 663.
459. 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997)
460. See id. at 1298-99.
461. Although the testing procedures in Chandler were relatively noninvasive, the govern-
ment interests were insufficient to justify the search. See id. at 1303. There was no evidence of a
drug-abuse problem by elected officials in Georgia, and the testing procedures themselves were
not well designed to ferret out drug users. Instead, normal law enforcement methods were
deemed more than sufficient to protect the citizenry from drug-addicted politicians. Candidates
for office are under unrelenting public scrutiny and cannot hide such personal flaws. See id. at
1303-04. In the end, the only justification for the drug-testing regime was symbolic—declaring
the moral virtue of government leaders. “The Fourth Amendment,” the Court concluded,
“shields society against that state action.” Id. at 1305.
462. 489 U.S. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
463. For lucid analyses of the Court’s unprincipled drug-testing jurisprudence see LaFave,
supra note 39, at 2556-59; Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 90-123.
464. Cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 958-631 (1987); Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1022, 1022-23 (1978).
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surprisingly, the lower courts have expressed dismay with respect to
their delegated task.465
Without sufficient guidance from the Supreme Court, unstable
and conflicting case law would seem to be the inevitable result. That
prediction has, in fact, become a reality. Lower courts have, for ex-
ample, both upheld and struck down drug-testing programs for the
following individuals:
•     attorneys466
•     automobile drivers467
•     carpenters468
•     clerks469
•     computer specialists470
•     custodians471
•     federal executive branch employees472
•     firefighters473
465. See Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (footnote omitted):
[The Court] made no effort to articulate an analytical rule by which legitimate
drug-testing programs could be distinguished from illegitimate ones. It simply
weighed individual privacy interests against the government’s policy objectives,
enumerating several factors that it deemed relevant in performing this balancing
process. The Court did not, however, indicate whether it deemed the case a close
one, in the sense that minor variations in the facts would have tipped the balance in
the other direction. Nor did it indicate which (if any) of the relevant factors would be
essential to a constitutional testing plan.
Another appellate opinion lamented that the Von Raab “balancing test is inherently, and
doubtless intentionally, imprecise.” Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1187 (D.C. Cir.
1991). “Nonetheless,” the court conceded, “balance we must.” Id. at 1188.
466. See Willner, 928 F.2d at 1185 (upheld); Harmon, 878 F.2d at 484 (struck down).
467. See American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Sanders, 926 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(upheld); Federation of Gov’t Employees v. Sullivan, 787 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1992) (struck
down).
468. See Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 751 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (struck
down); National Fed’n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 742 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990) (upheld).
469. See Romaguera v. Gegenheimer, No. CIV.A 91-4469, 1996 WL 229836, at *1 (E.D. La.
May 3, 1996) (struck down); Cheney, 742 F. Supp. at 1 (upheld).
470. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(struck down); Romaguera, 1996 WL 229836, at *1 (upheld); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Watkins, 722 F. Supp. 766 (D.D.C. 1989) (struck down).
471. See Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1991) (struck
down); Cheney, 742 F. Supp. at 1 (upheld); Middlebrooks v. Wayne County, 521 N.W.2d 774
(Mich. 1994) (upheld).
472. See Stigile v. Clinton, 110 F.3d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upheld); Hartness v. Bush, 919
F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (upheld); Hartness v. Bush, 794 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1992) (struck
down); Connelly v. Newman, 753 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (struck down).
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•     health and safety inspectors474
•     high school students475
•     law enforcement officers476
•     secretaries477
•     soldiers478
•     teachers479
•     truck drivers/commercial vehicle operators480
Even where there is no conflict between the lower court deci-
sions, the specter of whimsy still lingers. Drug testing college ath-
letes,481 meter readers,482 plumbers,483 and postal workers484 is unconsti-
tutional. But testing horse trainers,485 chemists,486 elevator
maintainers,487 and cashiers488 is not.
                                                                                                                                     
473. See Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 1998) (upheld); Beattie v. St.
Petersburg Beach, 733 F. Supp. 1455 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (struck down); Johnson v. City of Plain-
field, 731 F. Supp. 689 (D.N.J. 1990) (struck down).
474. See Yeutter, 918 F.2d at 968 (struck down); Stanziale v. County of Monmouth, 884 F.
Supp. 140 (D.N.J. 1995) (struck down); Plane v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 1070 (W.D. Mich.
1992) (upheld); American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. 1493 (N.D.
Cal. 1991) (struck down).
475. See Willis v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 1998) (struck
down); Todd v. Rush County Schs., 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 1998) (upheld); Brooks v. East
Chambers Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (struck down).
476. See Verri v. Nanna, 972 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (upheld); Pike v. Gallagher, 829
F. Supp. 1254 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (struck down); Johnson, 731 F. Supp. at 689 (struck down).
477. See United Teachers v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 142 F.3d 853 (5th Cir. 1998) (struck
down); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 966
F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1992) (upheld).
478. See United States v. Campbell, 41 M.J. 177 (C.M.A. 1994) (struck down); United
States v. Bickel, 30 M.J. 277 (C.M.A. 1990) (upheld).
479. See Knox County Educ. Ass’n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361 (6th Cir.
1998) (upheld); United Teachers, 142 F.3d at 856-57 (struck down); Georgia Ass’n of Educators
v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (struck down).
480. See Rutherford v. Albuquerque, 77 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 1996) (struck down); Keav-
eney v. Town of Brookline, 937 F. Supp. 975 (D. Mass. 1996) (upheld); Owner-Operator Indep.
Drivers Ass’n v. Pena, 862 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C. 1993) (upheld).
481. See University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993).
482. See O’Keefe v. Passaic Valley Water Comm’n, 602 A.2d 760 (N.J. Super. 1992).
483. See Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 751 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
484. See American Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 725 F. Supp. 87 (D. Mass. 1989).
485. See Phelps v. State Racing Comm’n, 611 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 1992).
486. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Hallet, 776 F. Supp. 680 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
487. See Burka, 751 F. Supp. at 443.
488. See Brunson v. Commonwealth, 570 A.2d 1096 (Pa. Commw. 1990).
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Trying to find the underlying principle of current drug-testing ju-
risprudence is a herculean task. And assuming some type of statistical
analysis could discern a common thread running through the cases, its
usefulness as a legal principle would be highly dubious. If the judici-
ary is serious about the issue of drug testing, the Fourth Amendment
demands a clear, simple substitute for the current doctrine.
c. The Fourth Amendment Models. The antidiscrimination model
would uphold virtually all drug-testing regimes. Again, the defining
issue is whether the relevant community can be seen as internalizing
the costs of a given program or whether a discrete and insular minor-
ity is forced to bear the entire burden. In both Skinner and Von Raab,
the groups affected—railway and customs employees—cannot be
categorized as politically impotent. Rather, these groups are repre-
sented by potent lobbies and powerful unions. If drug testing were to
be viewed as particularly offensive to the employees, they retain the
ultimate trump card: the power to strike. Moreover, the public at
large can be seen as internalizing the costs as a matter of economic
supply and demand. Employees will demand higher wages or other
benefits as compensation for relinquishing a portion of their individ-
ual liberty. This added expense will then be passed on to the general
population in the form of higher taxes.
The drug-testing policy in Chandler is susceptible to similar
analysis under the antidiscrimination model. Candidates for public
office are a politically powerful lot almost by definition. They are
generally backed by one of the two dominant institutions of govern-
ment: the Republican and Democratic parties. Individually, candi-
dates are almost invariably influential, wealthy, and members of the
racial majority. And the public must internalize the costs of a drug-
screening regime, with some otherwise superior candidates being
driven from the market and others demanding more perks or higher
salaries for their forfeiture of bodily integrity. In the end, it will be
the general citizenry that will bear these burdens in the form of less-
talented representation or higher taxes.
The testing program in Vernonia may provide the best example
of the political process theory at work. The entire school community
felt the burden of the testing program, since any student who wanted
to play sports had to submit to drug testing. It is hard to conceive of
student-athletes as a discrete minority—their membership generally
transcends the boundaries of race, color, creed, or gender. It is even
harder to view them as insular. Athletes tend to wield the greatest
LUNA TO PRINTER.DOC 04/29/99 4:49 PM
1999] SOVEREIGNTY AND SUSPICION 879
power on a school campus and are virtually represented by the single
most influential group in a given school district. Although they them-
selves may not “exercise significant influence in the political process .
. . their parents, who naturally take their children’s interests to heart,
do.”489
The individual rights model of the Fourth Amendment would
not be so deferential. Drug testing directly implicates an individual’s
sovereignty over his own body; the required disrobing and official ob-
servation are intrusions of the first order. Urination is banned in
public, avoided in conversation, and carried out in areas constructed
with personal solitude in mind.490 A violation of this zone of sover-
eignty is, at a minimum, “‘extremely distressing’”491 and “offensive to
personal dignity.”492 Even more disturbing is the compulsory nature
of such testing procedures, commandeering all autonomy over one’s
bodily functions. “Neither the law of the land nor the law of nature,”
argued Justice Brennan, “supports the notion that petty government
officials can require people to excrete on command.”493 The seizure of
bodily fluids and the subsequent chemical search for evidence of
wrongdoing compounds the intrusion on individual sovereignty. It is,
in fact, government surveillance of the inside of one’s body. Testing is
also an indirect intrusion into the sovereignty of the home. It is often
admitted that the goal of drug screening is to uncover off-duty con-
duct,494 disclosing activities which almost invariably occur in a resi-
dence. As such, the tests provide government with a “periscope” into
an individual’s home.495
489. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Orgs. in Support of Petitioner, City
of Chicago v. Jesus Morales (No. 97-1121) (cert. granted Apr. 20, 1998), available in 1998 WL
328366, at *9 (U.S. June 19, 1998) (emphasis added); see also Kahan & Meares, The Coming
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, supra note 106, at 1173.
490. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 645-46 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[u]rination is among the most private of activities”).
491. Id. at 646 (quoting Fried, supra note 203, at 489 (discussing the detrimental effect of
violating the cultural privacy surrounding excretory functions)).
492. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the effect of monitoring the collection of mandatory urine samples).
493. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 560 (1985) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
494. See Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, Nos. C85-3356, C86-4373, 1992 WL 59128, at *2
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 1992) (noting in the record the alleged statement of a superior officer re-
garding surprise mandatory drug testing of police cadets: “‘We want to see what you have been
doing this weekend.’”).
495. Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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But the model would not call for the invalidation of every
screening program. Drug tests based on an individualized suspicion
of on-duty intoxication fall within an exception to the model’s stric-
tures. Likewise, individuals who voluntarily consent to be tested
waive any constitutional protection. The interesting issue is when the
government may test without suspicion or consent. In such circum-
stances, the government may only invade an individual’s bodily sov-
ereignty when there exists a real, direct, and substantial threat to the
sovereign zones of other citizens. In other words, Mill’s “harm prin-
ciple” must be implicated.
The inherent limitations of drug testing must also be factored in,
requiring a particularly compelling physical danger to other individu-
als. As mentioned previously, a positive result only establishes drug
use at some time in the past. It cannot indicate when the substance
was ingested, how much was taken, the pattern of drug use, nor
whether the individual became intoxicated while on- or off-duty. Any
connection between a positive test and potential harm requires what
I have termed an evidentiary leap of faith—someone who has used
drugs in the past will become inebriated on the job at some time in
the future. The assumption itself is not a very strong one and needs to
be rephrased as an issue of danger and probabilities: the potential
harm is so great that we cannot take even a minute chance that an in-
dividual will be intoxicated. The Court itself has referred to this lim-
iting principle, discussing people who “discharge duties fraught with
such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of atten-
tion can have disastrous consequences . . . [and who] can cause great
human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable.”496 In-
dividual jurists497 and scholars498 have also argued that an evidentiary
leap of faith can be justified when the potential danger is so grave
that no risk is tolerable.
496. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989).
497. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting):
If we assume . . . that a child is kidnaped [sic] and the officers throw a roadblock
about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it would be a drastic and un-
discriminating use of the search. The officers might be unable to show probable
cause for searching any particular car. However, I should candidly strive hard to sus-
tain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be reasonable
to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened life
and detect a vicious crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and
universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger.
498. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 10.3(e), at 488-505; Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 156.
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The railroad employees in Skinner and the customs agents who
actually carried firearms in Von Raab present the type of threat that
would allow suspicionless drug testing under the individual rights
model. The potential danger from a slight mistake in judgment is not
only life threatening but empirically demonstrable. It is self-evident
that an error by a train conductor could lead to the death of everyone
on board; likewise, a law enforcement agent who unholsters his
weapon can kill an innocent person in the blink of an eye. There sim-
ply is no opportunity for review by superiors, and such scenarios have
in fact produced terrible tragedies. Between 1975 and 1983, drugs or
alcohol were involved in forty-five train accidents resulting in thirty-
four fatalities, sixty-six injuries, and over $28 million in damage.499 In
January of 1987, sixteen people were killed in a train collision in
which drugs were believed to be a contributing factor.500 And the rec-
ord is replete with law enforcement officers accidentally killing inno-
cent bystanders or harmless suspects.501 The grave danger to the per-
sonal sovereignty of these third parties—whether it be train
passengers or people caught in the crossfire—justifies the intrusion
into the bodily sovereignty of the individual tested.
In contrast, the other drug-testing programs considered by the
Court lack the requisite nexus to tragic or disastrous consequences.
The customs agents considered in Von Raab—who were involved in
drug interdiction but did not carry firearms—posed no grave danger
to the individual sovereignty of other individuals.502 Not only were the
harms advanced by the government (e.g., bribery and blackmail) un-
related to any lethal repercussions, the government was unable to re-
cite “even a single instance in which any of the speculated horribles
actually occurred.”503
Likewise, Vernonia presented no possibility of tragic physical
danger to other individuals. The evidence in that case could only
demonstrate some drug use at the schools, a decrease in student dis-
cipline, and one coach’s belief that an athlete had suffered injury be-
cause of his drug use.504 The single alleged incident of physical harm
499. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 608.
500. See Conrail Crew Allegedly Used Drugs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1987, at 24.
501. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
502. This analysis would also apply to customs employees who handled classified materials.
See supra note 457.
503. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
504. See Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 23 F.3d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated and re-
manded, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
Luna to Printer.doc                   04/29/99 4:49 PM
882 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [48:787
was not only relatively minor, but self-inflicted and therefore imma-
terial under the individual rights model. No connection in fact or
logic could be demonstrated between the drug-testing program and a
real, direct, and substantial threat to the sovereignty of others.505
Finally, the screening program in Chandler could only be justi-
fied by its symbolic value.506 Candidates for public office do not en-
gage in high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks that place individuals in
physical danger.507 Even if a threat of harm were to be assumed, poli-
ticians are under constant public scrutiny, presenting ample opportu-
nities to uncover drug abuse.508 And as a matter of historical fact, the
record failed to reveal any drug use among elected officials. The
testing program did not address a potential danger to the physical
sovereignty of other citizens and therefore could not be sustained.
d. The Limits of the Antidiscrimination Model. The individual rights
model of the Fourth Amendment would preclude suspicionless drug
testing in all but the most compelling circumstances. Unless the
government can demonstrate a real, direct, and substantial threat of
physical harm to other individuals, drug screening is an impermissible
violation of bodily sovereignty. In contrast, the antidiscrimination
model requires only that the relevant community internalize the costs
of a drug-testing policy. The needs of the lone citizen, as well as the
effects on his dignity and bodily integrity, are irrelevant. If a political
majority wishes to live in a police state of omnipresent chemical
surveillance, the individual must submit. As noted previously, the
antidiscrimination model provides no constitutional floor
undergirding the impulses of a political majority.
This dilemma leads directly into a slippery slope, and with re-
spect to drug testing the slide has in fact begun. Vernonia was first ex-
tended from student-athletes to all students involved in extracur-
ricular activities, including those in the school band and the chess
505. Moreover, students are under constant supervision, providing ample opportunity to
identify those under the influence of intoxicants. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 678-79 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). As noted by Justice O’Connor, “the far more
reasonable choice would have been to focus on the class of students found to have violated
published school rules against severe disruption in class and around campus.” Id. at 685.
506. See Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997).
507. See id.
508. See id. at 1304.
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club.509 Then drug testing was expanded to all students who drive cars
to and from school. A few school districts adopted screening pro-
grams for all students in a particular grade.510 Now gubernatorial can-
didates in California and Georgia want to enact drug-testing regimes
for all public school students.511 Skinner and Von Raab have been ex-
tended in a similar fashion in the state employment context. San Di-
ego County, for example, now drug tests all applicants for govern-
ment jobs, regardless of the position sought.512 Secretaries and police
officers alike are subject to the screening process; no connection is
required between the job and any of the government interests as-
serted in Supreme Court precedents. Other counties and states look
to follow San Diego’s lead.513
Although the Court has cautioned that its drug-testing cases
have not opened “broad vistas for suspicionless searches,”514 the po-
litical branches of government have acted otherwise. Drug screening
has either been proposed or adopted for driver’s license applicants,515
college students at state-supported universities,516 participants in job-
training programs,517 and welfare recipients.518 The only limit on po-
509. See Todd v. Rush County Schs., 139 F.3d 571, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1998) (Ripple, J., dis-
senting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
510. See, e.g., Around Texas and Southwest: District Weighs Mandatory Drug Tests,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 8, 1998, at 24A (reporting on the proposal of a school district in
Hot Springs, Arkansas, to implement both mandatory and random drug tests of students).
511. See Robert B. Gunnison, Davis Has Auditioned 23 Years for Governorship, SAN FRAN.
CHRON., May 26, 1998, at A1 (reporting that the lieutenant governor (now governor) of Cali-
fornia “want[ed] random drug testing of public school students”); Charles Walston & Kathey
Pruitt, Campaign Notebook: Drug Tests Urged in State Schools, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 1,
1998, at B8 (reporting on a gubernatorial candidate’s proposal for “random drug testing of stu-
dents at schools throughout Georgia”).
512. See Board Directed Expansion of Pre-Employment Medical and Drug Testing, Minute
Order No. 26, County of San Diego Board of Supervisors (Aug. 5, 1997) (on file with author).
513. See, e.g., News from Every State, USA TODAY, Mar. 30, 1998, at 13A (reporting
Michigan’s drug-testing proposal).
514. Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1304 (1997).
515. See Larry Lipman, Tobacco Bill Reignited: Senate Republicans Attach Anti-Drug
Amendment, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 10, 1998, at A1 (discussing proposed amendment to
comprehensive tobacco bill to “provide $10 million a year in grants to states that institute vol-
untary drug testing for teen drivers’ license applicants”); Paul Magnusson, Analysis & Com-
mentary: The Ten Worst Ideas of the Campaign, BUS. WEEK, Nov. 11, 1996, at 39 (critiquing
President Clinton’s proposal to “deny drivers’ licenses to teenagers who fail a urine drug test”).
516. See Clamping Down on Campus Drug Use, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 15, 1991,
at 12 (discussing Virginia Governor L. Douglas Wilder’s proposal of mandatory drug testing for
students at state-supported colleges and universities).
517. See Job-Training Bill Conferees Should Accept Senate Reforms, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
May 13, 1998, at 8A (criticizing a proposed amendment to a job-training reform bill that would
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tential subjects of drug testing is legislative imagination, with each
new testing scheme providing a bootstrap for the next.519 Yet the
greatest danger may not lie in drug testing itself, but the path it paves
for a more powerful surveillance tool—genetic testing.520 Society has
already witnessed the use of genetic analysis in the courtroom; its po-
tential as an instrument of law enforcement is simply awesome. Offi-
cials in a German hamlet, for instance, recently summoned all 18,000
young men in the region to give genetic samples for use in a murder
investigation.521 A similar police technique had been used in England
in 1987.522 And the FBI has recently established a national DNA da-
tabase for investigative purposes.523 The potential for abuse as a
eugenic weapon has not gone unnoticed.524
                                                                                                                                     
“requir[e] states to conduct random drug testing of all participants” in the program as a condi-
tion of receiving grant money).
518. See Karen Brandon, Counties Test Out Welfare Reforms: Many Ways Explored to
Move Recipients Off of Rolls, Into Jobs, CHI. TRIB., May 4, 1998, at 1 (discussing, inter alia, a
proposal to institute “mandatory drug tests for welfare recipients”); Gary Heinlein, Welfare
Reform Splits the Senate, DET. NEWS, Mar. 30, 1998, at D1 (discussing the partisan debate over
a proposal to require drug tests for welfare recipients); Legislature ’98: Winners and Losers, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, May 3, 1998, at 5B (listing as a bill that passed the state legislature an act
to test welfare-to-work applicants in North Florida and the Panhandle).
519. See Richard C. Reuben, Privacy: The Issue of the ‘90’s, 10 CAL. LAW. 39, 40 (1990)
(quoting Professor Yale Kamisar who opined, “I can see everyone having to take drug tests”).
520. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Med. Ass’n, Use of Genetic
Testing by Employers, 266 JAMA 1827, 1827 (1991) (discussing the potential for employer
abuse of the genetic information gathered through the federal “human genome project”).
521. See Lori Montgomery, 18,000 Men Called for DNA Test: Massive Screening Follows
Slaying in German Hamlet, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 21, 1998, at A20.
522. See id.
523. See Nicholas Wade, F.B.I. Set to Open its DNA Database for Fighting Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1998, at A1.
524. “‘The DNA database started with pariahs—the sex offenders—but has already been
enlarged to include other felons and will probably be extended to include everyone, giving
elites the power to control “unruly” citizens.’” Id. (quoting Professor Phillip Bereano). Al-
though most states currently limit the use of DNA databases to law enforcement purposes,
“Alabama authorizes the use of its samples for ‘educational research or medical research or
development,’ an apparent invitation to genetic inquiry.” Id. Benjamin Keehn, a Boston public
defender who represents several defendants challenging the DNA sampling, fears the potential
use of the databanks:
It’s a very dangerous slippery slope. . . . Why not round up poor people? . . . Poor
people are more likely to commit a crime, so shouldn’t we have their DNA on file?
Of course, there are benefits every time you get a cold hit. There are going to be
dramatic success stories. But where does it stop? Why not take DNA samples at
birth?
Carey Goldberg, DNA Databanks Giving Police Powerful Weapon, and Critics, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 1998, at A1 (quoting Benjamin Keehn).
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To some, these events signal the coming of a “brave new
world.”525 But others view such fears as alarmist and gross overreac-
tions. Americans cherish their privacy and freedom, skeptics argue,
and the political majority can be trusted to protect these values. Un-
fortunately, majoritarian vigilance for the sovereign individual is not
guaranteed. When the public is faced with grave social threats, en-
lightened discussion is often impossible. Majorities can lose their sen-
sibilities in the heat of the moment, demanding solutions without
considering the costs. A political process theory which assumes ra-
tional debate and decisionmaking ignores the fact that rationality can
break down in the face of perceived public crises.
It has been said that truth is the first casualty of war. America’s
war on drugs has proven that the second casualty is logic. Billions of
dollars are spent each year on drug interdiction and law enforcement,
yet such efforts have done little to suppress narcotics trafficking. Nor
will they, some have argued.526 As long as there is a demand for drugs,
Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” will provide the supply. And as long
as government’s goal is the total elimination of drug use, failure is
predestined. America’s experience with Prohibition more than sup-
ports this conclusion.
Unfortunately, anything short of all-out war is deemed “morally
scandalous.”527 National and local leaders brand casual drug users
525. Phil Bereano & Richard Sclove, Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Genetic Testing,
WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1998, at C5 (arguing that “a technology with the potential to improve
and prolong lives could be used to create a nightmarish brave new world”); see also Cornish &
Lauria, supra note 445, at 120-21 (arguing that with “the increased use of predictive judgments .
. . individuals who grow up with certain genetic, biochemical, or behavioral profiles may find it
difficult to overcome the odds of these predictive judgments”).
526. See Luna, supra note 289, at 518-23 (arguing that the war on drugs will continue to fail
as long as the program focuses on limiting supply rather than demand); Steven B. Duke & Al-
bert C. Gross, Preface to AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE
AGAINST DRUGS, at xv-xix (1993) (arguing that the federal government has spent over $12 bil-
lion annually in the war on drugs and yet the number of cocaine addicts almost doubled be-
tween 1985 and 1993); SZASZ, supra note 289, at xiii-xvii (arguing that the desire for drugs has
been present since colonial times and that “nearly everything the American government,
American law, American medicine, the American media, and the majority of the American
people now think and do about drugs is a colossal and costly mistake, injurious to innocent
Americans and foreigners, and self-destructive to the nation itself”).
527. Donald Baer, A Judge Who Took the Stand, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 9, 1990,
at 26 (quoting former “drug czar” William Bennett).
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“accomplice[s] to murder”528 who should be “taken out and shot.”529
Law enforcement uses every tactic approved by the Court, from sift-
ing through people’s garbage and trespassing on private property to
aerial surveillance of homes.530 Paramilitary gadgets like the parabolic
microphone and thermal imager penetrate walls to gather evidence of
drugs. And thousands of individuals enter the prison system each
year pursuant to steadily increasing penalties for drug crimes. All this
is accepted by the public not because it is inherently rational, but be-
cause such policies are viewed as necessary to win the war on drugs.
According to one public opinion poll, “62 percent of those ques-
tioned said they would be willing to give up ‘a few of the freedoms we
have in this country’ to significantly reduce illegal drug use.”531 Little
if any justification is required; increased punishment and law en-
forcement is taken as an unmitigated good. Drug testing is but a
natural outgrowth of this phenomenon, subject to the same hydraulic
pressures. Expansion of screening programs is considered by many to
be per se legitimate as a means of fighting the drug war, and as such,
no justification is necessary for new drug-testing programs.
The antidiscrimination model of the Fourth Amendment does
not stand in the way of an irrational but cost-internalizing commu-
nity. If a majority wants to subject the entire population to random
drug tests, political process theory does not object. And although the
antidiscrimination model provides an ostensible limitation on abusive
programs, it is unlikely to detect veiled misdeeds once drug testing is
fully ensconced. Blood and urine samples can reveal highly personal
information unrelated to drug use, including epilepsy, diabetes, high
blood pressure, clinical depression, schizophrenia, sexual disease, and
pregnancy.532 A number of cases have uncovered employers secretly
analyzing their worker’s bodily fluids to attain such information.533
528. Stephen Chapman, Nancy Reagan and the Real Villains in the Drug War, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 6, 1988, at 3 (quoting former First Lady Nancy Reagan).
529. Joseph D. McNamara, The War on Drugs Is Lost, NAT’L REV., Feb. 12, 1996, at 34, 43
(citing comment of former Los Angeles police chief Daryl Gates in testimony before United
States Senate).
530. See supra notes 20-26 & 419-23 and accompanying text.
531. Richard Morin, Many in Poll Say Bush Plan Is Not Stringent Enough; Mandatory Drug
Tests, Searches Backed, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1989, at A1.
532. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 647 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1236 (Cal. 1997) (Mosk, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
533. See, e.g., Bereano & Sclove, supra note 525, at C5 (discussing instances where people
lost jobs as a result of secret genetic testing).
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Drug-testing programs may have also been used to discriminate on
the basis of race534 and status,535 and as a means of political retalia-
tion.536
Finally, drug testing pursuant to the antidiscrimination model
may in fact defeat the very purpose of the model itself. The primary
characteristic of official power in contemporary society is its ten-
dency to shape individuals into archetypes of normality.537 That, in
fact, is the precise purpose of criminal punishment—singling out so-
cial outliers for sanction or disability, and thereby creating a caste
backed by official force. Although the antidiscrimination model has
the ostensible goal of spreading costs throughout a community, its
bottom line is greater police power to marginalize certain elements
within that community. The ultimate question, however, is whether
the resulting caste can be normatively justified. Racial minorities will
be deemed discrete and insular under the antidiscrimination model
and therefore worthy of protection. Yet murderers and rapists will
not—and that seems palatable on some normative basis.
But what about inner-city drug users facing the nation’s insatia-
ble desire for drug testing? Drug screening is designed to weed out a
particular group of individuals—those who use drugs. Its avowed goal
534. See Employees of Boeing Claim Discrimination in Lawsuit in Seattle, WALL ST. J., Mar.
18, 1998, at B5 (alleging discriminatory remarks such as “blacks can’t pass a drug test”); Albert
R. Karr, Black Workers Sue Amtrak, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1998, at A1 (discussing suit charging
that “some managers help white workers avoid drug testing”); Metro Digest, DENVER POST,
Mar. 10, 1998, at B2 (discussing lawsuit against the Hertz Corporation for racial discrimination
in the frequency of drug testing); Racial Factor Seen in Tests White House Did for Drugs, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1998, at A14 (“Two black members of the Clinton cabinet said they had to sub-
mit urine samples, apparently for drug tests, before obtaining their jobs, while two white Cabi-
net officials said they did not . . . .”); Hollis R. Towns, Caddies Charge East Lake Club with
Bias, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 1, 1998, at B3 (claiming that black caddies were subjected to
drug tests while white caddies were not); see also Wormley v. Arkla, 871 F. Supp. 1079, 1084-85
(E.D. Ark. 1994) (denying summary judgment for defendant on Title VII claim that drug test-
ing was used as a tool of racial discrimination).
535. See Margaret Gillerman, Berkeley’s Acting Police Chief, Who Failed 2 Drug Tests,
Wins Back Job, ST. LOUIS POST-DISP., Apr. 21, 1998, at B3 (detailing retention of police chief
despite failing drug tests).
536. See John Nolan, Drug-Test Order Riles Councilman, CLEVELAND PLAIN-DEALER,
Mar. 22, 1998, at 5B (arguing that the mayor proposed drug tests because a councilman advo-
cated legalizing marijuana for medicinal purposes); Saturday File Odds and Ends: More Ste-
vens vs. Brown, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 6, 1998, at 1 (arguing that politicians are calling on
opponents to submit to drug testing as a political maneuver).
537. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 199 (1975) (claiming that the prin-
ciples of discipline center around the “constant division between the normal and the abnormal,
to which every individual is subjected,” and the “existence of a whole set of techniques and in-
stitutions for measuring, supervising and correcting the abnormal”).
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is to lower costs, increase productivity, and reduce accidents. But as
noted previously, the evidence cannot support these claims. The
original goal of government drug testing, however, does not require
empirical support. By implementing job-screening programs, drug
users are segregated from other members of society.538 They were ini-
tially relegated to a secondary employment market,539 but even those
opportunities are now being foreclosed by the logarithmic expansion
of testing regimes. In the end, drug users may be prevented from at-
taining gainful employment, denied medical and welfare benefits, and
shut out of job-training programs.540 They become the discrete and in-
sular minority that the antidiscrimination model was intended to pro-
tect. But they are only a secondary caste, beyond the purview of po-
litical process theory.
CONCLUSION
This Article has developed two models of the Fourth Amend-
ment from comprehensive theories of the Constitution. The antidis-
crimination model stems from a political process theory of the Con-
stitution. It suggests that the Fourth Amendment is driven by
procedural concerns relating to political representation rather than
by substantive individual rights. As long as the costs of a policy are
diffusely spread throughout a community, majoritiarian decisions
should be deferred to despite the effects on individual citizens. In
contrast, the individual rights model derives from a sovereignty the-
ory of the Constitution, which argues that the Fourth Amendment is
a personal liberty secured to each citizen rather than to collective
groups. Individuals wield ultimate authority in their zones of sover-
538. See Felman & Petrini, supra note 446, at 279 n.168 (arguing that workplace drug test-
ing is at least partially motivated by the desire to police drug use and to eliminate drug users
from the workplace).
539. See, e.g., Cornish & Lauria, supra note 445, at 122 (arguing that “the stigma attached
to a drug-related firing may make it very difficult to find future employment . . . [because] sec-
ond employers may not want to take a chance with the applicant”); Holtzman, supra note 449,
at 82-84 (arguing that, especially in some fields, addicts are unable to find employment in major
sectors of the economy due to drug-screening requirements and may only find jobs in lesser
areas).
540. See F. Allan Hanson, Some Social Implications of Drug Testing, 36 U. KAN. L. REV.
899, 903-04 (1988) (arguing that drug addicts are slowly being eliminated from the workforce
and predicting that as drug addicts become a larger percentage of the unemployed, welfare and
medical benefits will be lessened or eliminated as well); Holtzman, supra note 449, at 82-84
(arguing that addicts “who are handicapped by their youth, old age, educational level, minority
status, or who have skills that are specific to certain industries, may not be able to find other
jobs easily, if at all”); supra text accompanying notes 514-19.
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eignty, subject to government interference in only the most compel-
ling circumstances. This model, therefore, provides a constitutional
baseline of rights that cannot be manipulated or wholly erased by po-
litical majorities.
Eventually the Court will have to address the plight of the
Fourth Amendment directly—not with minor adjustments, but with
wholesale change. And when that time comes, great care must be
taken to ensure that the solution is not in fact much worse than the
problem. I fear that the antidiscrimination model presents precisely
this danger. It undoubtedly works quite well during peaceful times of
thoughtful debate and deliberation. But when perceived exigencies
heighten popular anxiety, political majorities often abandon logic in
favor of emotion. The antidiscrimination model not only defers to ir-
rational decisionmaking but provides a theoretical justification for
oppressive police tactics. In such times, the Fourth Amendment can-
not stand idle as the hysterical mob threatens the lone citizen. It must
protect personal sovereignty not only for the welfare of the individual
but for the good of all society.
